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Abstract
Essay 1: Corporate Governance and Firm Value
This study re-examines how ownership structure and conflicts of interest among 
shareholders affected corporate valuation under a poor system of corporate 
governance that offered poor legal shareholder protection prior to the East Asian 
Economic Crisis. The data is from 1,892 publicly traded firms in the Korean 
economy, during 1988-1997. Ownership structure is included for unlisted firms in 
terms of pyramid and cross-holding structures. Higher valuations are not found when 
the largest shareholder owned more cash flow rights. However, the divergence 
between cash flow rights and the control rights of ultimate shareholders in pyramid 
ownership and cross-holding ownership structures is associated with a negative 
entrenchment effect. The conflicts inherent to this ownership structure that 
expropriates the minority shareholder and agency cost increased approaching the East 
Asian crisis year.
Essay 2: Ownership Structure, Investment and Firm Valuation in Korean Companies 
There has been a robust debate surrounding the causes of the East Asian Economic 
Crisis of 1997 and this study develops and builds upon these results. This chapter 
examines how ownership structures with conflicts of interest among shareholders and 
under a system of weak corporate governance affects investment, in terms of both 
capital and research and development (R&D). The sample is from 1,892 publicly 
trading firms in the Korean Stock Exchange, during the period 1988-1997.
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I find that divergence between control rights and cash flow rights is associated with 
over-investment in capital expenditure. These rights affect innovation in R&D, 
though the effect on capital expenditure and R&D spending are in opposite directions 
within Korean firms, prior to the East Asian Economic Crisis. These results imply 
that the ownership structure in the context of a poor governance system encourages 
‘empire-building’ and the neglect of investment in firm innovation. Furthermore, I 
find that debt financing is more important than cash flow-investment sensitivity. This 
affected investment in both affiliated firms and independent firms in the process of 
financial liberalisation and deregulation during the 10 years prior to the East Asian 
Economic Crisis.
Essay 3: Ownership Structure, Diversification and Firm Value in Korean Companies 
This study analyses the diversification effect of ownership structure and compares the 
effect of diversification on the performance of Korean affiliated firms (top 30 
Chaebol) with its effect on independent firms in 10 years of panel data (1988-1997). 
The divergence between the cash flow rights and the control rights of ultimate 
shareholders affects firm diversification. Group affiliated firms have stronger a 
agency cost problem than creating internal capital market during the 10 years sample 
period but diversification for independent firms create the advantage for internal 
capital market in less developed capital markets. Additionally, I find the divergence 
between control rights and cash flow affects the diversification, diversification affects 
corporate value, but firm value does not affect the ownership structure in a 2SLS test.
2
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Chapter 1: Corporate Governance and Firm Value
1. Introduction
The focus of this study is the effect of ownership structure on firm valuation when 
there are agency problems arising from poor corporate governance. I develop and 
extend the research of recent major articles (Claessens et al 2002, Mitton 2002, 
Lemmon and Lins 2003) that analyse corporate ownership structures in East Asian 
countries, and focus on the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
valuation in Korea during its economic development from 1988 to 1997 inclusive.
Corporate governance systems have received an increasing amount of attention from 
academics, government, the popular press and businesses. Much of this attention has 
focused on differences between the U.S. and U.K. system, and Germany and Japan 
among the developed countries before the East Asian Economic Crisis of 1997. The 
corporate governance system found in both the U.K. and the U.S. is generally 
characterised as a market-based system. These capital markets are liquid and 
company ownership is relatively well spread. Managers are supposedly monitored by 
an external market for corporate control and by boards of directors, of which the 
majority of members are independent of the company. The German and Japanese 
governance systems, in contrast, are characterised as bank-based systems: firms have 
concentrated ownership with relatively illiquid capital markets. Managers in these 
countries are monitored by a combination of banks, large shareholders and other 
inter-corporate relationships that are maintained over long periods. An external 
market for corporate control is small, if not altogether absent (Kaplan 1995).
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During the East Asian Economic Crisis period studies (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, La 
Porta et al 1998) began to analyse corporate governance structures around the world. 
They found that in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few 
of the shares of firms were widely held; a conclusion which was in stark contrast to 
Berle and Means’ (1932) conception of ownership in the modem corporation. Such 
firms are typically controlled by certain families or the state and equity control by 
financial institutions or other widely held corporations is less common (La Porta et al 
1999, Claessens, Djankov and Lang 2000, Denis and McConnell 2003). Faccio and 
Lang (2002) analyse the ultimate ownership and control of firms in 13 western 
European countries, distinguishing those that are widely held (36.93%) or family- 
controlled (44.29%). Widely held firms are more common in the U.K. and Ireland, 
whereas family-controlled firms are more common in continental Europe. Gadhoum 
et al (2005) further strengthen the point by tracing the controlling shareholders of all 
U.S.-listed corporations. Their argument illustrates that ‘at the 10% control threshold, 
59.74% have controlling shareholders; 24.57% are controlled and managed by a 
family (the same percentage as in Asia), 16.33% are controlled by a widely-held 
financial institutions (close to the percentage in Europe and Asia), and 13.55% are 
controlled through family trusts. In the top 30, top 250, top 500 and in every quintile 
range, the US has more corporations controlled by families than by financial 
institutions’.1
It should be noted that corporate governance mechanisms consist of economic and 
legal institutions that can be altered through the political process. In particular, the
1 Gadhoum et al (2005: 340)
11
issue of minority shareholder protection is relevant (Burkart and Panunzi 2006, 
Claessens and Fan 2003, Doidge et al 2004). Burkart etal (2006:2170) insist that ‘in 
the regimes with the strongest legal protection of minority shareholders, the optimal 
solution for the founder is to hire the best professional manager and sell off the entire 
firm in the stock market—unless his amenity potential of keeping control in the 
family is huge. This gives rise to the Anglo-Saxon model, in which the law is the 
principal constraint on managerial discretion and the agency conflict is between the 
manager and small minority shareholders. With intermediate protection of minority 
shareholders, the founder still hires a professional manager, but the law is not strong 
enough to control managerial discretion, and the founder or his children must stay on 
as large shareholders to monitor the manager’.
The question that transpires from the current literature is not one of agency conflicts 
between managers and controlling owners, but rather between the controlling and 
minority shareholders. Who prevents controlling families from expropriating 
minority shareholders, especially in countries where minority shareholders have 
weak legal protections and family control is even more common? Thus, specific 
questions that can arise are:
1. Who monitors the families?
2. What role is played by the market in countries with concentrated family 
ownership?
Several studies establish a link between corporate governance systems and firm 
valuation in contexts with poor corporate governance. In East Asian emerging market
12
countries, a substantial number of firms are owned and managed by controlling 
families. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) investigated the separation of 
ownership and control in publicly traded firms in nine East Asian countries and found 
that voting rights frequently exceed cash flow rights via pyramid structures and 
cross-holding. Claessens et al (2002) also found that firm value increases with the 
cash flow ownership of the largest shareholder, but falls when the control rights of 
the largest shareholder exceed his or her cash flow ownership. Johnson, Boone, 
Breach and Friedman (2000) found that the effectiveness of protection for minority 
shareholders in 25 emerging markets explains more of the variation in exchange rate 
and stock market performance during the East Asian Economic Crisis. Using a 
sample from five East Asian countries, Mitton (2002) also shows that better stock 
price performance is associated with firms that have lower inside ownership. 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) studied firms in eight East Asian countries during the 
region’s financial crisis and found that the crisis period stock returns of firms in 
which managers had high levels of control rights but had separated their control and 
cash flow ownership were 10-20 percentage points lower than those of other firms. 
This empirical evidence demonstrates that there is a significant relationship between 
controlling family ownership and firm valuation.
However, these existing studies (Claessens et al 2002, Mitton 2002, Lemmon and 
Lins 2003) contain limited information vis-a-vis pyramid structures and cross­
holdings among firrqs, because their data cover only listed firms in the sample of East 
Asian countries.2 Therefore, estimated data of only listed firms may create a bias in 
terms of ownership structures and firm valuation. Unlisted firms could have direct
2 For example, the three biggest business groups in Korea—Hyundai, Samsung, and LG (Lucky 
Goldstar)— had 46,55, and 48 affiliated firms at the end of 1996, respectively. O f those, only 16,14, 
and 11 were publicly listed, respectively.
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and indirect ownership links with listed firms, resulting in a possible underreporting 
of their measures for ultimate control and ownership, since they assume that someone 
other than a related shareholder controls the unlisted firms.3
i
Some studies analyse the relationship between controlling shareholder ownership and 
firm performance in Korea. Joh (2003), using 5,829 Korean firms during 1993-1997, 
found that the firms with a high disparity between controlling shareholder’s control 
rights and cash flow rights show weak profitability (i.e. operating profit of account), 
and such negative effects of control-ownership disparity were stronger in publicly 
traded firms than in privately held ones. Baek, Kang and Park (2004) analyse Korean 
firm performance during the 1997 financial crisis. They found that chaebol firms 
(Top 30 family group firms) with concentrated ownership, where controlling family 
shareholders’ voting rights exceeded cash flow rights, also had lower returns. Chang
(2001) analysed a sample of chaebol group affiliated Korean public firms for the
<
period 1986-1996 and, shows that performance determines ownership structure, but 
not vice versa. He provides evidence that controlling shareholders use insider 
information to increase their number of shares in more profitable firms and transfer 
profits to other affiliates through related party transactions with affiliated companies.
In contrast, Khanna and Palepu (2000) and Khanna and Rivkin (2001) both found 
that, on average, firms belonging to a pyramid group in developing countries 
outperform independent firms. Friedman et al (2003) present evidence consistent 
with transfers of wealth from controlling shareholders, benefiting public shareholders
3 For example, Samsung Corporation, part of the Samsung Group, is partially owned by Samsung Life 
Insurance, which is not listed. However, Samsung Life Insurance is controlled by the same family who 
have a large direct stake ip Samsung Corporation which increases the family’s overall control stake in 
Samsung Corporation. Similarly, control for Samsung Electromagnetic is underestimated because it is 
also partly owned by Samsung Life Insurance (as well as other Samsung corporations).
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in pyramid firms. They describe both public shareholders during the East Asian 
Economic Crisis of the 1990s and econometric results consistent with this occurring 
on an economically important scale. The results pose the question of why the 
empirical results of the relationship between ownership structure and firm value are 
different under a poor governance system. Do the advantages of business groups 
disappear as the economy develops further and the divergence of cash flow rights and 
control rights affect firm value in economic development (Claessens et al 2002)?
In this study, I test various views of the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm value before the crisis, with a focus on Korean companies. Focusing on a single 
nation in this way allows the examination of corporate governance measures at a 
level of detail that would be difficult to aggregate across countries. This study makes 
two main contributions to research on corporate governance and firm value in the 
Korean economy. First, it compares ownership structures, including unlisted Korean 
firms, to estimate divergence between cash flow rights and control rights in pyramid 
and cross-holding ownership; in this way it develops the results of other papers (e.g. 
La Porta et al 1999, Claessens et al 2002, Mitton 2002, Lemmon and Lins 2003). 
Second, it extends the empirical analysis of how ownership structure affects firm 
valuation and the agency problem of minority shareholder expropriation during the 
economic development (1988-1997) of Korea. This study approaches these questions 
by investigating the dynamics of the corporate governance system in Korea.
I argue that the relation of ownership structure and corporate value is non-linear in an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) test, but the divergence between cash flow rights and 
the control rights of ultimate shareholders through a pyramid ownership structure or a
cross-holding ownership structure is associated with firm value in a linear fashion. 
The difference in agency cost means that the greater the proportion of the shares 
owned with cash flow rights of those who ultimately own the corporation, the smaller 
the value of the firm. This relation holds after controlling for other well-known 
determinants such as capital expenditure, research and development (R&D), 
advertising, leverage, firm size. In this study, I test several views and hypotheses of 
the relationship between ownership structure and firm value before the Asian Crisis, 
focusing on Korean companies. Restricting to one nation allows the examination of 
corporate governance measures at a detailed level that would be difficult to aggregate 
across countries.
The balance of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2 ,1 discuss the role of 
corporate governance and firm valuation with explanatory hypotheses. In Section 3 ,1 
explain corporate governance in Korea. In Section 4, I describe the data and 
measurement methods for empirical testing, and in Section 5, I investigate the 
ownership structure and control of firms in Korea. Also, I examine the ownership 
structure and firm valuation, comparing affiliated firms (Chaebol) and independent 
firms. I offer concluding remarks in Section 6.
16
2. Theoretical background in corporate governance and firm value
2.1 Introduction
This study attempts to define the effects of the corporate ownership structure or 
governance system on firm value. Certain theories have been selected for use in this 
study focusing on Korean firms where the governance systems are different from the 
ownership structure of the U.S or the U.K. firms. First, I analyse the forms of the 
corporate ownership structure and the corporate governance systems of Korea prior 
to receiving financial assistance from the IMF in 1998. Particularly, I divide the 
corporations into large conglomerates (Chaebol)4 and the independent corporations 
by the corporate structures, and attempt to investigate their corporate ownership 
structure and firm value issues centring on the agency issue such as pyramidal 
structure and cross-holding type structure. In this context, I will exam the theoretical 
relationship in ownership structure and firm valuation.
2.2. Understanding of corporate ownership structure theory
2.2.1 Principles of corporate development
Chandler (1980) terms capitalism up to the pre-industrial Revolution stage ‘family
capitalism’, capitalism in the initial stage of the Industrial Revolution ‘financial
capitalism’, and capitalism within professional managers’ corporation ‘managerial
capitalism.’ Before the Industrial Revolution corporations had been operated, on the
4 The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) defines a business group as ‘a group of companies, more 
than 30% of whose shares are owned by the group’s controlling shareholder and its affiliated 
companies’. Each year, the KFTC ranks business groups in terms their total assets and identifies the 30 
largest business groups (hereafter called the ‘Top 30’).
More detail in section 3.1.3.
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whole, as small scale and rather as simple businesses. Corporate management 
decisions were taken exclusively by the corporate owners, or by their family 
members. The major source of financing of these corporations was limited to the 
internal financing through cumulative retained earnings produced from the business 
operation, and corporate ownership was concentrated more or less on an individual or 
family members. The expansion of the market size after the Industrial Revolution 
demanded continuous expansion of the corporate size, which consequently required 
an enormous amount of operating capital that could not be financed solely through 
the retained earnings. The corporations eventually had to turn to external financing 
and the rapid growth of the demand for such corporate funds resulted in the 
drastically expanded roles of banks and other financial institutions.
With the increasing dependence on financial institutions for funds, participation by 
the financial institutions in corporate management decisions making process started 
to become a routine. As a result, the corporate management styles have evolved from 
family-oriented management to including the financial institutions’ participation in 
the management. With the limits of the external financing through financial 
institutions in sight, direct financing through equity emerged. The direct financing 
through unspecified individuals led to a reduction of the equity of the corporate 
owners and also reduced the influence of the owners in management. The complexity 
of the corporate management brought about by this financing method and technical 
innovation has given birth to the management profession and the separation of 
ownership and management. Such wide diversification of the equity shares has made 
it necessary to redefine the corporate ownership, and “possession of wealth without
18
governance” and “control of wealth without possession” have emerged as the 
theoretical conclusion of the development of joint stock companies.
2.2.2 Theory of ownership structure based on theory of agency
In the conventional theory of the corporate ownership structure evolving around the 
inside shareholders, maximizing dividends to stockholders was assumed as a major 
management goal. Such an assumption, however, is erroneous given there exist 
numerous interest groups in corporations: in addition to shareholders and managers 
these include outside shareholders, creditors, employees, material suppliers and the 
government. Each group competes against one another in an asymmetrical 
information system and this result in an oft-ignored conflict of interest. In particular, 
with public offering of shares expanding and the increasing demand for professional 
managers resulting in separation of ownership and management, the relationship 
between shareholders and managers has come to be recognised as an agency contract 
in current corporate ownership and governance system theory. The methodology of 
establishing the corporate ownership structure to minimize the agency cost being 
incurred from such agency contracts has received given much attention.
Jensen & Meckling (1976) and Fama (1980) analysed corporations as organizations 
bound by contract between principals and agents and maintained if the ratio of the 
outside shareholder is high or the ratio of external borrowing increases, the following 
agency costs will incur. First, if their ratio of shareholding for majority stockholders 
is reduced due to offering stocks to the public, they will incur more expenses to be 
shared with the outside shareholders, and will therefore strive to maximize their
19
efficiency through increasing payments of non-salary expenses. These include, but
■ i
are not limited to, corporate entertainment costs, office supplies expenses and 
facilities exclusive for managerial use. In addition, the major inside shareholders tend 
to pursue their benefits through self-dealing and the agency cost of equity, causing 
the agency cost to be incurred from the high ratio of raising their external equity 
capital. Second, the shareholders of the joint stock company shall be limitedly liable 
to the debts to the extent of their respective equity participation, as they prefer high- 
return-high-risk investment when the debt ratio is high. Consequently they tend to 
transfer the risk of investment failure to the creditors. Hence, the expenses to be 
incurred by corporate management in the event that the capital ratio is lowered (by 
increasing external borrowing) are termed the agency cost of debts.
Third, the professional managers without their own equity need to be careful of 
initiating new investments, such as Research and Development (R&D) and this will 
tend to result in under-investment. Furthermore, since their remunerations are 
determined on the basis of performances attained during their tenure, there is a 
tendency to focus on short-term performance and neglect long-term investment. The 
managerial human capital is worthwhile only while the manager maintains his 
managerial position and this human capital is often firm specific and cannot be easily 
transferred to another job. Managers tend to avert high-risk investment to secure their 
positions and, at the same time, tend to expand diversified investments in non-related 
fields. In other words, they would not divert the free cash flow generated from the 
line of business to be liquidated into new investment but would rather increase their 
internal reserve or use the cash to acquire other corporations. Even in the case of
20
professional managers, effort aversion, short-termism and risk aversion are 
commonplace.
This theory recognizes corporations not as decision-making entities but as aggregates 
of interest persons. Corporations enter into contracts with interest persons directly or 
indirectly and try to sustain efficient relationships. However, the principals and 
agents are disposed to maximize their own benefits and therefore agency costs are 
incurred. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain the corporate ownership structure by 
examining the possible conflict of interest between inside shareholders and outside 
shareholders and the resulting agency cost. They argue that since the managers with 
relatively low portion of equity have to make the decisions aiming to maximize their 
corporate value, agency problem is bound to occur. They also asserted that as a 
result, optimum ownership structure of the borrowed external capital (stocks and 
debts) was formed where the marginal benefits from use of external borrowing and 
the marginal agency cost coincide. They also explain that with the managers’ equity 
portion increasing and the closed type ownership structure resulted, frequencies of 
the managers’ conflict of interest with shareholders decrease and as the result, the 
corporate value increases. On the other hand, Fama and Jensen (1983) maintain their 
positions with respect to all forms of general corporate ownership structures 
including closed type structure as follows. They classify the managerial decision 
making phases into development, approval, execution and monitoring, and defined 
development, with execution phases as decision management, and approval and 
monitoring phases as decision control. They also opined that it would be difficult to 
separate ownership in management and control functions if it was difficult to separate 
decision management and decision control in the corporate decision making systems.
21
If the effective system to control the working level managers is not well organized, 
the agency problem will likely be neglected, and the only solution to this problem 
will be the managers owning the corporation. In conclusion, if the corporate equity 
ownership structure is to be established as a diversified open type ownership 
structure, the decision management and decision control should be separate, and then, 
it can be noted that the corporate decision making structure affects the ownership 
structure. Therefore, they maintain that the corporate ownership structure is 
determined in favour of minimizing the agency cost and this can be achieved by the 
managing of decision making, and integrating and separating of decision control.
Demsetz (1983) maintains that even in consideration of agency cost, theory of 
ownership decision does not deviate from the frame of Classical Economics, which 
recognizes corporations as the subject of decision making and assumes profit 
maximization as the criteria for decision makings. In discussing determination of 
ownership structures, he confined the agency cost to monitoring expenses involved in 
controlling managerial unfaithful acts. He maintained that such agency cost could not 
be understood separately from production related costs. He argues that the cost 
involved in monitoring managers should be understood as part of the total costs 
including production costs. Accordingly, he maintained that the optimum capital 
structure should be determined at the level the total production costs including 
agency cost would be at the minimum.
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2.2.3 Expropriation of minority shareholder in ownership structure
A study was conducted by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998) (hereafter 
referred to as LLS) into the effect the legal and institutional developments of a nation 
has on corporate ownership structures. In examining the 20 largest corporations in the 
27 most affluent countries, they discovered that the corporations with diversified 
ownerships were most commonplace in countries with well-organized legal systems 
for protection of minority shareholders. Conversely, countries with poorly organized 
legal systems for protection of minority shareholders tend to be dominated by 
corporations that are either family-controlled or state-controlled. In such countries, 
the controlling shareholders were tending to control the corporations through the 
pyramidal structure as well as participating in management well in excess of the cash 
flow rights.
The LLS study’s findings can be summarised as follows. In countries where legal 
protection is ample for the minority shareholders, they are aware of the legal 
protection from expropriation by controlling shareholders and are willing to purchase 
stocks even at high prices. When this point is reached the controlling shareholders 
will attempt to raise funds through equity, which will result in the reduction in their 
own equity. If legal protection for the shareholders is well organized, even the 
controlling shareholders would be aware that in the event of losing their control 
rights, there would be no expropriation and thus would be willing to have their equity 
reduced. This eventually results in diversified ownership within the corporations. 
LLS point out that the controlling shareholders expropriate the minority shareholders 
to excel the cash flow right. In order to remove any conflicts of interest between the 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, it would be very effective to
improving the legal and institutional environments and building an apparatus against 
expropriation of the minority shareholders.
Quoting the methodology of LLS, Clasessens, Djankov and Lang (1998) studied the 
corporate ownership structures of 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries 
such as Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, 
Korea and Hong Kong. Their study shows more than half of the corporations in East 
Asian countries are controlled by single major shareholders. It also reveals that the 
smaller in size and the older in history the corporations are, the more they tend to be 
family-controlled. On the other hand, it also shows that the form of corporate 
ownership by controlling shareholders varies with countries, but generally the more 
developed in economic and institutional terms the countries are, the more diversified 
the corporate ownerships are. The controlling shareholders in the majority of 
countries strengthen their control rights through the pyramid structures and stocks 
with differentiated voting rights. This gives them more voting rights than the cash 
flow rights, and, furthermore, with the family members of the controlling 
shareholders participating in management, ownership and management are almost 
adjoining. Clasessens, Djankov and Lang(2000) state that wealth is concentrated in a 
few families in most of the Asian countries and there tends to be close relationships 
between governments and corporations and this can lead to interference in legal and 
institutional developments.
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2.3 Ownership structure and Firm value
2.3.1 Influence of corporate ownership structure on corporate value
1) Convergence o f interest hypothesis (interest alignment hypothesis).5 
Convergence of interest hypothesis is based on the classical agency theory by Berle- 
Means (1932) or Jensen-Meckling (1976). It maintains that with the increasing 
managerial equity ownership ratio, the conflict between the managers and the outside 
shareholders decreases and their mutual interest converges. This represents an 
affirmative relationship where increasing managerial equity, the firm valuation will 
increase due to the decrease in agency cost. According to the hypothesis, therefore, 
the fittest for increasing the interest of the shareholders will secure control right 
through the competition for corporate management right in market for corporate 
control or takeover market, which will help the limited human resources utilized 
under corporate organizations.
2) Managerial entrenchment hypothesis6
Managerial entrenchment hypothesis is the counter-argument to the convergence of 
interest hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, with increasing managerial equity 
ownership, the managers tend to act in the interest of their private benefits rather than 
for maximization of the firm valuation and accordingly the firm valuation will 
decline. The convergence of interest hypothesis states that since outside control 
system functions well through the market for corporate control, the managers could
5 Berle-Means (1932),Jensen-Meckiling (1976), Jensen and Ruback (1983), Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), Holdemess and Sheehan (1988), Ang,Cole, and Lins (2002), Anderson and Reeb 
(2002,2003), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), Belen Villaonga and Raphael Amit (2006).
6 Monsen,Chiu and Cooley (1968), Radice (1971), Bothwell (1980), DeAngelo and Rice 
(1983),Demsetz (1983) and Fama-Jensen (1983).
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not deviate from the interest of shareholders. However, the managerial entrenchment 
hypothesis broadly recognizes the possibility that the managers can violate the 
shareholders’ interest such as perquisites consumption. Increased equity ownership of 
the managers further firmly guarantees the position of the managers and the 
managers pursue their interest even at the sacrifice of the shareholders. Therefore 
there may be a negative correlation between managerial equity ownership and the 
firm valuation. Jensen-Meckling (1976) maintained that with managerial equity 
ownership increasing, there is decreasing likelihood of deviation from the goal of 
maximization of the firm valuation and the cost resulting from the deviation will 
decrease. With their equity ratio increasing, the portion of the deviation cost the 
managers will bear will increase and the likelihood of wasting the corporate wealth 
will decrease. In contrast, Demsetz (1983) and Fama-Jensen (1983) pointed out the 
offsetting costs significant to managerial equity ownership. When the functions of the 
managerial equity ownership ratio is low, the market discipline, managerial labour 
market, product market, and market for corporate control mitigate the opportunistic 
behaviour of the managers and will force the managers to pursue maximization of the 
firm valuation. However, the managers with substantial equity ownership will carry 
enough voting power or influence to protect their own interest, and consequently they 
may pursue the goals against maximization of the firm valuation.
3) Eclectic Hypothesis7
The convergence of interest hypothesis and management entrenchment hypothesis 
has hitherto been considered with regard to the relationship between corporate
7 Morck-Shleifer-Vishny (1988), Stulz (1988), Wruck (1989), and McConnell-Servaes (1990,
1995).
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governance and the value of the corporation. Although a theoretical analysis of this 
relationship is important, an empirical verification has greater significance. Varying 
results can be reached depending on the corporate system and capital markets of each 
country, depending particularly on how effectively the corporate governance market 
functions. In particular, in the empirical study of the relationship between the 
ownership and the value of a firm, both positive (+) and negative (-) correlations are 
seen in the differing equity sections. The results depends on which of the two 
tendencies of managers is greater, either the tendency to use business resources for 
their own interests, or the tendency to make the interests of the managers consistent 
with those of outside shareholders. Therefore the results support both the interests 
consistency hypothesis and manager entrenchment hypothesis.
Empirical studies that support the eclectic hypothesis are those conducted by Morck- 
Shleifer-Vishny (1988) and McConnell-Servaes (1990,1995). They demonstrated 
how the variable that represents the value of the firm (Tobin Q) changes in 
accordance with the varying types of corporate governance. Morck-Sheliefer and 
Vishny (1988) examined 371 US public companies listed in Fortune 500 in which the 
board has more than 0.2% of the shares through piecewise linear regression. The 
selection of 5% and 25% as the structural classification shares has no theoretical 
justification. 5% was used by Herman (1981) as the standard in the mandatory 
disclosure of ownership, while 25% was used when Weston (1979) presented the 20- 
30% as the threshold where predatory acquisitions would be difficult. In the 0~5% 
range, the circumstances of the managers to maximize their self-interests have not 
been formed, and thus the value of the firm (Tobin’s Q) and shares have a positive 
correlation. In the 5~25% range, as the shares increase and in turn the rights of the
manager strengthen, the likelihood of the manager to act for one’s self-interest 
increases, resulting in the decline in firm’s value (Tobin’s Q). Finally, in the 25% or 
more range, as the managers’ shares increase, one can see that the interests of the 
managers and the shareholders become the same. In addition, it is often held that if 
the founder’s participation in the board of directors has a long history, then the value 
of the firm may decline. On contrary, if the founder takes part in a firm that is 
relatively young, then the value of the firm was shown to increase.
McConnell and Servases (1990) studied companies listed in the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and AMX (American Stock Exchange). In 1976 and 1986,1173 
and 1093 companies respectively were sampled for this purpose. For the value of the 
firm, Tobin’s Q was used, which was calculated with the 1987 Compustat tape, while 
the information on equity was compiled from Value Line Investment Survey. The 
ownership structure was classified as insider ownership, the outside blockholders and 
the institutional investors to study the hypothesis that Tobin’s Q (representing the 
value of the company) had a curvilinear relation with the equity of the insider 
ownership and a positive correlation with the outside blockholders. Also, the 
institutional investors were to follow Pound’s (1988) hypothesis. The other 
explanatory variables were the same as those used by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988). The result^ of the curvilinear regression analysis showed that as the 
percentage of insider ownership increased, the value of the company increased in 
both 1976 and 1986. However, the relationship had a curvilinear shape and thus the 
value of the firm reached the ceiling before the equity of internal ownership reached 
50%. The maximum value was reached when the equity of insider ownership reached 
49.9% in 1976 and 37.6 % in 1986. This outcome was the same as that of Stulz
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(1988). When the variables of the institutional investor and the outside blockholder 
were included, the value of the company increased even more in accordance with the 
increase in equity of internal ownership. The results of the piecewise regression 
analysis showed that the relationship between the insider ownership and the value of 
the company was a positive correlation ranging from 5% to 25%. However, it could 
not encounter the structural transition point as found in the research of Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988). Furthermore, the value of the firm was shown to have a 
positive correlation with the institutional investors and, in turn, supported the 
effective monitoring hypothesis of Pound (1988). However, the correlation between 
the value of the company and the outside blockholders was not statistically 
significant. i
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) studied the mutual dependency among the monitoring 
structures to minimize the proxy costs through a sample of 383 US companies, as 
well as the relationship between the monitoring structures and business profitability. 
For the monitoring structures, seven factors are taken into consideration: equity of 
inside managers; equity of institutional investors; equity of outside blockholders and 
participation of external board members; loan policy; use of external market in 
selecting managers; and the use of corporate governance market. For internal 
decision making, the following factors were taken into account: inside management 
equity; employment of external board members; use of manager market; and the loan 
policy. For the external decision making such factors as equity of institutional 
investors, equity of outside blockholders and use of the corporate governance market 
were employed. In order to study the relationship among the monitoring structures, 
the 2SLS regression analysis was used. In the case where activities of the corporate
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Igovernance market are active, there is relevance between the outside blockholders 
and equity of the institutional investors. This presents the complementary nature 
between outside equity and the corporate governance markets. Among various 
monitoring structures, if participation of the external board members and equity of 
the inside managers increases, then the pressure for pursuing loans increases, 
resulting in the reinforcement of internal monitoring through the internal managers or 
the external board members. In this case, this study mentioned that monitoring by the 
lender would be most effective. It was also discovered as a result of this study that 
the equity of inside managers, participation of external board members, loan policy 
and the activities of the corporate governance market affect the value of the 
company.
2.3.2 Influence of corporate ownership structure on corporate value under a 
poor governance. (Expropriation Hypotheses)8
Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang (2002) studied how the concentration of cash flow 
rights and control rights affects the value of the company. In this study, the ultimate 
owner is controlling stockholders that own more than 5% of the control rights, and 
the companies are divided into five types: family, state, widely-held financial 
institutions and widely-held corporations in nine East Asian countries (Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand, Philippines, Korea and Hong Kong) 
before the East Asian crisis in 1997. According to the results, as the controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights increase, the value of the company increases; and as 
controlling shareholders’ control rights increase, the value of the company decreases.
I
Furthermore, the ratio of cash flow rights and control rights, representing the
8 Classens, Djangkov and Lang (2002), Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000), Mitton 
(2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), Joh (2003)
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difference between cash flow rights through a use of the graded voting rights stocks, 
the stock pyramids and cross-ownership of stocks and control rights, had a positive 
correlation with the value of the company. In short, the value of the company 
increased as the difference between the cash flow rights and control rights owned by 
the controlling shareholders declined. It also showed that the difference between the 
relatively higher control rights lowers the value of the company. This supports the 
hypothesis that when cash flow rights owned by the controlling shareholders are 
small and the difference between cash flow rights and control rights are great, then 
the controlling shareholders exploit the minority shareholders to pursue their self- 
interests.
According to the relationship between ownership Structure and the value of the firm 
as discussed in Claessens et al (2002) and Section 2.2.3, the incentive for the 
controlling shareholder to exploit the minority shareholders for their self-interests 
depends on how much cash flow rights they own. When the cash flow rights of the 
controlling shareholder are low, the incentives and proxy costs increase due to the 
conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
Therefore, the lower the cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder, the lower the 
value of the firm. In contrast, Shleifer and Vishny (1997:754) note that
‘Large shareholders thus address the agency problem in that they have both a general 
interest in profit maximization, and enough control over the assets of the firm to have 
their interest respected. La Porta et al, (1999) and Stijin Claessens et al, (2002) 
describe the positive effect related to the share of cash flow rights held by large
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shareholders and argue that the negative entrenchment effect relates to the share of 
control rights held by large shareholders.’
Therefore, the degree of this incentive may change according to the level of 
ownership. In order,to examine this relationship, the following hypothesis has been 
set up:
Hypothesis 1: As the cash flow  rights o f a controlling shareholder increase, the value 
o f the firm  increases. Conversely, as the control rights o f a controlling shareholder 
increase, the value o f the firm decreases.
If a controlling shareholder uses a pyramid ownership structure or cross-ownership 
structure to reinforce their control rights and thus indirectly control the firm, then a 
difference arises between cash flow rights and control rights of the controlling 
shareholder.9 The controlling shareholder tends to own a higher portion of control 
rights than cash flow rights, and as the difference between these two rights becomes 
larger, the incentive for the controlling shareholder to exercise their control rights to 
attain private interests becomes even greater. Claessens et al (2002: 2743) state 
‘Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) show that separating 
ownership and control can lower shareholders value and may not be socially 
optimal.’ Shleifer and Vishny (1997:759) argue that ‘ as ownership gets beyond a 
certain point, large owners gain nearly full generate private benefits of control that 
are not shared by minority shareholders.’ Bebchuk et al (2000) indicate that 
separating control rights from cash flow rights can create agency costs an order of
9 La Porta et al (1999) and Claessens et al (2002)
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magnitude larger than costs associated with a controlling shareholder who also has a 
majority of the cash flow rights in his or her corporation. Therefore, as this difference 
becomes greater, the value of the firm declines; while as this difference becomes 
smaller, the value of the firm increases. In order to corroborate this phenomenon, 
Hypothesis 2 has been set up:
Hypothesis 2: As the difference between the cash flow  rights and control rights 
becomes greater, the value o f the firm declines.
3. Corporate governance in Korea
3.1 Economic performance and corporate governance.
3.1.1 Korean economic development
The Korean economy has developed significantly since 1962 with the 
implementation of the government’s Economic Development Plan (Park J.H. Model 
1995, Economist). Many of the current dominant Korean companies emerged after 
the Second World War and were assisted by the reverted enterprises that the Japanese 
had left and assistance from the USA. Disposal of these resources were preferentially 
carried out by a small number of privileged people and these companies were able to 
build up a great wealth. Such parties eventually managed to establish a systematic 
link with the government institutional framework. Korean companies have grown 
significantly with a continued adhesion to the government. During the first five years 
of the Economic Development Plan, raising funds was difficult and government
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control of foreign capital meant these were only available for a privileged few. 
Certain firms would therefore get subsidised access to resources conditional on 
sustained contribution to national wealth. During this period most firms’ external 
finance was in the form of debt or bank purchased equity; however in a twist from a 
conventional bank based system, the government had a controlling stake on most 
major national banks.
The key objectives of Korea’s successive five-year plans have changed over time 
with the changing economic climate. Such changes may be examined in relation to 
the major government economic functions:10
• Creating the economic and legal framework (the constitution, economic law, 
etc.). The constitution of Korea has been almost totally revised nine times 
since liberation in 1945.
• Promoting growth.
• Ensuring stability.
• Promoting efficiency including industrial policy, trade policy, agricultural
policy, and social infrastructure policy.
• Promoting equity (personal, regional, and industrial).
Appealing to the government to be chosen as a target of promotion became one of the 
foremost management strategies. It became essential for the development of an 
enterprise to participate aggressively with the government policy. The objective of
10 According to Samuelson and Nordhaus (1992: 301-1), the government’s proper economic 
functions are creating an appropriate economic or legal framework, ensuring stability, and 
promoting efficiency, equity and growth.
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the economic plans was to overcome domestic resource deficiency through export 
promotion, thereby achieving growth and increased employment. By controlling the 
ownership of banks and financial institutions, the government was able to carry out 
its policies and selected firms grew. In this process an implicit contractual 
arrangement was established and a system of firm monitoring by the government was 
sustained. At the heart of this corporate governance lay the public control of financial 
institutions and the protection of domestic markets from competition from foreign 
goods. Under such a system the Korean economy structured its development to pass 
from agricultural products to light industries (particularly flour, sugar, fibre and 
textile) to heavy industries, then to automobile and finally arriving at the prevailing 
dominance of high technology industries.
3.1.2 Chaebol and agency problems
Corporate governance mechanisms are often divided between bank-based and 
market-based. Bank-based mechanism refer to the use of debt as the major source of 
external finance and is a form most often associated with the German and Japanese 
economic systems. Market-based mechanism, on the other hand, tends to rely on 
external equity finance and is associated with U.K. and U.S. economic systems. 
Granted a significant amount of equity finance can also be found in bank-based 
system, but the market based mechanism tends to show a much larger share of equity 
ownership. A common feature of both is leaving the real control of capital to the firm 
management but differences lie in the method of regulating managerial power and the 
names refer to the main parties that monitor this possible abuse. This then has the 
result of creating different incentive structures for managers, which impacts on the
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overall behaviour of firms. It has often been argued that close financial ties in the 
German and Japanese systems ‘reduce agency costs and allow investors to monitor 
managers more effectively than in the U.S.’(Aoki et al 1990, 1991, Lipton and 
Rosenblum 1991, Porter 1991, Prowse 1991). The cost of changing management 
when it performs poorly is therefore lower, because banks and large shareholders 
have more power. This can therefore inhibit costly hostile takeovers and proxy fights.
Korean chaebols are often compared to Japanese keiretsus'u as firms belonging to 
both maintain substantial business ties with other firms in the group and there is a 
considerably interlocking equity ownership. Nevertheless, several characteristics 
distinguish an archetypal Korean chaebol. First, unlike keiretsus, which tend to be 
controlled by a professional corporate management, chaebols are controlled by 
individual shareholders or their families. Second, keiretsus, but not chaebols, are 
concentrated on one large commercial bank that then plays a leading role in the 
financial activities of the group Finally, chaebols maintain a central staff within the 
group. These play the role of a holding company, exercising substantial control over 
all group firms.
Member firms within the Top 30 Chaebols are interconnected through an extensive 
network of reciprocal shareholding agreements. Korean banks are expected to play an 
active monitoring role in a firm’s investment decisions as they are allowed to own up 
to 10% of the equity of firms. In fact, Korean banks provide many firms with
11 For a discussion o f the Japanese governance mechanism, see Aoki (1990), Sheard (1989), Prowse 
(1990), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Kaplan (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995).
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substantial equity and debt financing:12 For example in 1997 the equity ownership 
held by Korean banks accounted for 9.42 % of the shares listed on the KSE. 
Furthermore, the Korean government has often utilised their control of banks to 
exercise control over many firms. This suggests that Korean banks hold a significant 
potential for performing the role of an active investor but have traditionally not 
exercised a role as monitors. First, Korean banks have traditionally held shares 
primarily to allocate their portfolio assets rather than for the exercise of voting rights. 
Second, concentrated equity ownership by chaebol owners, combined with cross­
shareholding practices within chaebol firms, effectively prevents banks from playing 
the monitoring role of a large shareholder. Finally, most bank loans are guaranteed by 
cross-debt guarantees among chaebol member firms. This suggests that banks have 
little incentive or room to undertake the role of an active monitor (Kang 1998).
There is a tendency for the controlling shareholder to ‘tunnel’ profits across firms, 
transferring them from where that shareholder has low cash flow rights to firms 
where he or she has high cash flow rights.13 This can usually be accomplished 
through of the use of pyramid ownership structures and cross-holdings among firms 
that belong to a business group allows controlling shareholders to exercise full 
control over a firm despite holding a relatively small portion of its cash flow rights.14 
The disparity between ownership and control raises questions regarding the degree to 
which the controlling shareholders of a business group can siphon resources from 
firms to increase their own private wealth. (Johnson et al 2000, Bertrand, Mehta and
12 Under Article 200 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1962, which was in effect until March 1997, 
investors were not allowed to acquire more than 10% of the equity of other firms without the 
permission of the Korean Securities and Exchange Commission.
Bebchuck et al (2000), Wolfenzon (1999) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2000) provide theoretical 
models of various forms of tunnelling.
14 Greater detail is offered in Section 3.2.
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Mullainathan 2002). In the context of Korea, Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) found that 
while minority shareholders of a firm within a Korean business group that makes an 
acquisition will ultimately lose, the controlling shareholders benefit as a result of the 
acquisition loss because it enhances the value of other firms in the group. Bae, Kang 
and Lee (2006) examine the pricing and valuation effect of equity-linked private 
securities offerings by Korean firms from 1989 to 2000 and report that chaebol 
issuers involved in intragroup deals set the offering prices in order to benefit their 
controlling shareholders. They also found that chaebol issuers (member acquirers) 
realised an 8.8% (5.8%) higher (lower) announcement return than other types of 
issuers (acquirers) if they sell private securities at a premium to other member firms 
and if the controlling shareholders receive positive net gains from equity ownership 
in issuers and acquirers. It is a result of this form of trading that owners of business 
groups are often accused of expropriating minority shareholders, by tunnelling 
resources from firms where they have low cash flow rights to firms where they have 
high cash flow rights. This is especially prevalent where regulations that would 
otherwise protect minority shareholders are poor.
3.2. Characteristics of the corporate ownership in Korea
Who owns the companies in Korea? The existing literature suggests that corporate 
governance in Korea is similar to that of Japan (La Porta et al 1999, Berglof & 
Perotti 1994). However the evidence is not conclusive and La Porta, Lopez de Silanes 
& Shleifer (1999) admits that on the issue of ownership, ‘for Korea, different sources 
offer conflicting information on corporate ownership structures of chaebols'
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3.2.1 The measurement of the ownership Structure
1) Classification according to ultimate owner
This study employs the methodology of La Porta, Lopez de Silanes & Shleifer (1999) 
(‘LLS’) and Claessens et al (1998) and examines all ultimate owners with more than 
10% of voting rights to study the control patterns of the companies. In examining the 
corporate governance, the controlling shareholder and family are regarded as one 
unit. If the shareholders of the sample company are that of a corporation, financial 
institution or non-profit company, the shareholders were then examined to see 
whether ultimate owners that controlled the companies existed.
First, at the control levels of 10%, 20%, 30% and 40%, companies were classified as 
companies with diversified ownership and companies with ultimate owners. The 
ultimate owners are divided into the following five types.
1) Family;
2) Government;
3) Financial institutions with diversified ownership;
4) Corporations with diversified ownership;
5) Others.
This study of expropriation relies on cash-flow rights opposed to control rights. 
Suppose, for example, that a family owns 11% of stock of publicly-traded Firm A, 
which in turn has 21% of the stock of Firm B. It would be logical to say that family 
controls 11% of Firm A as it is the weakest link in the chain of voting rights. In 
contrast, here it would be said that the family owns about 2% of the cash flow rights 
of Firm B, the product of the two ownership stakes along the chain (Claessens et al
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1998). To make the distinction between cash flow and control rights, pyramiding 
structures are here documented for each firm with cross-holdings among firms and 
deviations from one-share-one-vote rules. To better understand the variety of 
ownership structures that determine the ultimate control of companies, the following 
example is provided.
According to the LLS methodology, (a) of Figure 1 shows that ultimate owners 
(control) exist in the levels of 10% and 20% of company A. However in the 30% and 
40% levels, firm B only has 27% of the control rights of firm A. Therefore, the 
ownership of the company is diversified, (b) of Figure 1 shows that the controlling 
shareholder (control) controls firm B at the 20% level, which goes to show that the 
controlling shareholder is controlling firm A through firm B. However, in the 30% 
level, firm A is classified as a diversified ownership company.
<Figure 1> Control rights ownership in level of ultimate owner
15% 7%
25%
Firm B
Control
Control
Firm
27%
43% J L
Firm B
control
Firm A
( a )  ( b )
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2) Control rights and cash flow rights
(1) Direct control
Direct control is defined as the controlling shareholder directly owning his or her 
equity. In this case, control rights are synonymous with cash flow rights. From (b) in 
Figure 2, the 15% of the stock of the controlling shareholder is an example of direct 
control.
(2) Indirect control
Indirect control occurs when the controlling shareholder uses an intermediate 
company or a non-profit corporation. There are three types of indirect control: i) 
stock pyramid, ii) cross-ownership, and iii) equity ownership through non-profit 
corporations.
i) Indirect control through stock pyramids
Stock pyramids are used when the controlling shareholder exercises his or her control 
rights through one or more corporations. When a corporation is controlled through 
these pyramid structures, a difference between control rights and cash flow rights 
arise. Although controlling shareholders may control a corporation through an 
intermediary company, it is considered to be direct control when the controlling 
shareholder controls 100% of the stock of the intermediary company. Figure 2 
illustrates the different types of indirect control through such pyramids.
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<Figure 2> Pyramids ownership
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(a) Figure 2 shows a controlling shareholder (control) has a 43% directly of company 
A and company B control own a 27% stocks of the company A as the intermediary 
company. I can say that in this case the controlling shareholder (control) has 27% of 
the control rights and 11.61% (=0.27*0.43) of the cash flow rights for company A.
(b) in Figure 2 demonstrates that the controlling shareholder has 100% control of 
company B’s shares and therefore cannot be called a pyramid. In this case, the 
control rights and cash flow rights are both 27%. Because controlling shareholder 
have has 27% of cash flow right (0.27*1).
(c) Figure 2 shows a combination of direct control and indirect control through a 
pyramid by a controlling shareholder (control). In calculating the control rights 
connected to a pyramid, we consider the smallest control rights to be controlled by 
the controlling shareholder. Therefore, I assume that 40% of the control rights of 
company A is held by the controlling shareholder (15% direct control, 25% indirect 
control). 23.75% (=0.15+0.25*0.35) can be said to be the control of cash flow rights. 
The above method tends to underestimate the control rights of the controlling
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shareholder compared to the method of calculation that assumes voting rights of 
company B is completely held by the controlling shareholders.15
<Figure 3> Cross- holding ownership
13%
16%27%
18%
Firm C
Firm B
Firm A
C ontrol
C ontrol
Firm A
ii) Indirect control through cross-ownerships
In Korea, direct cross-ownership where company A owns company B’s shares, while 
company B also owns company A’s shares is legally prohibited. However, indirect 
control of a company occurs through a circulated cross-ownership. In the case of 
cross-ownerships, as in Figure 3, similar to the case of indirect control through a 
pyramid, the weakest part of the control chain is assumed to be the equity controlling 
shareholders, which is 34% (cash flow rights are 24.6%).
iii) Indirect control through non-profit corporations
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1999) calculated the control rights of the controlling 
shareholder under the assumption that the non-profit corporation was a 100%
15 0.21 + 0.27x0.13 AA, , A
Cash flow rights = ---------------------------------=  0 .2 4 6 0 , See the appendix for calculations
1-0.18x0.16x0.13
of a cash flow rights.
controlled subsidiary of the controlling shareholders. As has been seen there is no 
difference here between control rights and cash flow rights. The methodology of 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) will be here followed and the control rights of 
the controlling shareholders are calculated by assuming that controlling shareholders 
had 100% control of the non-profit corporation.
3.2.2 Who controls firms?
The stocks of Korean companies are mostly in the hands of the family and relatives 
of the founders of the company, and I cannot see the extent of separation of 
ownership and management of a company, as is characteristic of Anglo-Saxon 
management (La Porta et al 1999).
The chaebol business group, which is characteristic of many major Korean
companies, has a number of different forms of stock ownership depending on its
scale. A relatively small business group mostly takes a form of ownership, which can
be termed ‘owner managed style' where the founder or his family directly owns a
great amount of stocks in one name. In a larger business group, they take the form of
what is called 'cross-holding style' where businesses within one group hold each
other's stocks. These two forms share the common feature that the power to control is
concentrated in the founder and his or her family. This study classifies companies
into diversified ownership companies and ultimate owners at given cut-off levels16
base on La Porta et al (1999) and Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000). Companies
with ultimate owners are again classified into four types: (i) family, (ii) government,
16 To determine effective control at any intermediate levels as well as the ultimate level, we need 
to use a cut-off point above which we assume that largest shareholder has effective control over 
the intermediate and final corporations.(Claessens et al 1999).
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(iii) financial institutions with diversified owners, and (iv) corporations with 
diversified owners. This thesis also analyses the difference in the ownership 
distribution among the independent companies and the business segments of the 30 
largest corporate groups. The ownership distribution according to the type of ultimate 
owner at each cut-off level is shown in Table 1-1, which depicts the frequencies by 
designating an indicator 1 in the corresponding type of the company and 0 if not.
The status of control right distribution according to the type of ultimate owner shown 
in this Table 1-117 is shows some variation from the results of Claessens, Djankov 
and Lang (2000). For example, there are more companies dominated by families at 
the cut-off level, there are a smaller number of companies whose ultimate owners are 
the government and financial institutions, and more companies with diversified. At 
first, this difference can be attributed to sampling variation. Furthermore, Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000) included such companies as banks, merchant banks, 
insurance companies and security corporations in the realm of financial companies 
when selecting their sample companies. The present study, however, excluded these 
companies for limited ownership of financial companies, government regulation of 
business management and uniqueness of balance sheets. In the case of financial 
corporations, due to the limitations imposed on ownership, there is a strong 
possibility the companies themselves will be classified as diversified at each cut-off 
level. In particular, as there are instances where the government is the controlling 
shareholder of a bank, there is a greater distribution in relative terms in the study of 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000).
17 The data from <Table 1-1> to <Table l-9> are for 370 out of 760 publicly listed firms in Korea 
Stock Exchange for 1996. The same conditions for sample selection in Section 4.1.
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Tablel-1 Control of Publicly Traded Companies in Korea_____ (Year: 1996)
Widely
Held
Family State Widely
Held
Financial
Widely
Held
Corporate
Others
10% cut-off
Independent 
Company 
Largest 
Group 30
0.0830
0.1810
0.8906
0.6857
0.0075
0.0000
0.0038
0.0190
0.0075
0.1143
0.0075
0.0000
All Company 0.1108 0.8324 0.0054 0.0081 0.0378 0.0054
20% cut-off
Independent 
Company 
Largest 
Group 30
0.3019
0.4952
0.6642
0.3524
0.0075
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0189
0.1524
0.0075
0.0000
All Company 0.3568 0.5757 0.0054 0.0000 0.0568 0.0054
30% cut-off
Independent 
Company 
Largest 
Group 30
0.6075
0.8190
0.3698
0.1238
0.0075
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0113
0.0571
0.0038
0.0000
All Company 0.6676 0.3000 0.0054 0.0000 0.0243 0.0027
40% cut-off
Independent 
Company 
30 Largest 
Conglomerates
0.8566
0.9524
0.1358
0.0190
0.0038
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0038
0.0286
0.0000
0.0000
All firms 0.8838 0.1027 0.0027 0.0000 0.0108 0.0000
The control right trends per ultimate owner indicate a difference in the types of 
ownership between independent firms and businesses belonging to the 30 largest 
conglomerates.18 As a whole, there are greater instances where the family owns the 
independent firms, while businesses belonging to the 30 largest conglomerates show
18<Table 1 -1 > to <Table l-9> are analysed with Kwang Sun Chung and Park Hong Cheol (2001).
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a greater tendency of the ownership to be divided into companies with diversified 
ownership and ones whose ultimate owners are diversified. At the 20% cut-off level 
that was used by Lang et al (1998) and Stijn, Djankov and Lang (1999), companies 
with diversified ownership stood at 30.19% for independent firms, companies whose 
ultimate owners are families were at 66.42%, and those whose ultimate owners are 
diversified were 1.89%. On the other hand, for the businesses belonging to the 30 
largest conglomerates, the figures reached 49.52%, 35.24% and 15.24% respectively. 
This difference can be attributed to the fact that in the case of large-scale corporate 
groups, various affiliates own the stocks of the company. Table 1-2 shows the status 
of stock ownership of large-scaled corporate groups from 1991 to 2000.
Tablel-2 The stock distribution of Conglomerate groups in Korea
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Family 13.9 12.8 10.3 9.7 10.5 10.32 8.5 7.9 5.4 4.5
Affiliated
Company
33.0 33.4 33.1 33.1 32.8 33.82 34.5 36.6 45.1 38.9
Ratio of 46.9 
Inside share
46.2 43.4 42.7 43.3 44.14 43.0 44.5 50.5 43.4
Source: The Fair Trade Commission.
Table 1-2 shows that in 1996, only 10.32% of the 30 largest conglomerates were 
directly owned by the family. Businesses belonging to these conglomerates were 
therefore classified as companies with diversified ownership and the companies with 
diversified ownership are ultimate owners that applied cut-offs at each level in this 
study. Examining different types of companies with diversified ownership can 
support this point. In Table 1-1, at the 10% cut-off level, independent companies and
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the 30 largest conglomerates recorded 0.75% and 11.43% respectively, and at the 
20% cut-off, they recorded 1.89% and 15.24% respectively. Such results can 
indirectly explain the existence of pyramid or cross-ownership of stocks. There are 
only a few cases where ultimate owners are financial institutions with diversified 
ownership. In the case that the ultimate owner is a financial institution, at the 10% 
cut-off level the figure was 0.81% (independent firm: 0.38%, 30 largest 
conglomerates: 1.9%), and at the 20% level the figure was 0%. These suggest that in 
Korea the main causal feature of ownership patterns was the limitations imposed on 
stock ownership of other companies by financial institutions.
3.2.3 Corporate governance according to the size of the company
This section will examine further the type of distribution of ultimate control of the 
company by the size of the company. The total market value and the market value of 
the company were used as proxy values for the company size. The scale of the 
company was divided into top 20 companies, mid 50 companies and bottom 50 
companies. Table 1-3 and Table 1-4 show the distribution of the controlling 
shareholders according to corporate size at each cut-off level and show that as the 
size of the company becomes larger, ownership becomes more diversified. When the 
size of the company diminishes, there are more companies owned by the family. In 
particular, when the scale of the company is classified according to total market 
value, this phenomenon is more prominent. At the 20% cut-off level, diversified 
ownership of the top 20 companies, mid 50 companies and bottom 50 companies 
reached 75%, 30% and 20%, respectively. With family ownership, these figures
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reached 5%, 64% and 74% respectively, illustrating that the type of ownership differs 
according to the scale of the company.
Tablel-3 The Separation of Ownership and Control Across Type of the Largest 
Controlling Shareholder and Company Size; Total market value (Year: 1996)
Widely
Held
Family State Widely Held Widely Held Others 
Financial Corporate
10% Cut O ff
Largest 20 0.3500 0.4500 0.1000 0.0000 0.1000 0.0000
Middle 50 0.0800 0.8800 0.0000 0.0200 0.0200 0.0000
Smallest 50 0.0600 0.9200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0200 0.0000
All firms 0.1108 0.8324 0.0054 0.0081 0.0378 0.0054
20% Cut O ff
Largest 20 0.7500 0.0500 0.1000 0.0000 0.1000 0.0000
Middle 50 0.3000 0.6400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0600 0.0000
Smallest 50 0.2000 0.7400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0600 0.0000
All firms 0.3568 0.5757 0.0054 0.0000 0.0568 0.0054
30% Cut O ff
Largest 20 0.8500 0.0000 0.1000 0.0000 0.0500 0.0000
Middle 50 0.6400 0.3200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0400 0.0000
Smallest 50 0.6000 0.4000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
All firms 0.6676 0.3000 0.0054 0.0000 0.0243 0.0027
40% Cut O ff
Largest 20 0.9500 0.0000 0.0500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Middle 50 0.8800 0.1200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Smallest 50 0.8600 0.1400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
All firms 0.8838 0.1027 0.0027 0.0000 0.0108 0.0000
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Tablel-4 The Separation of Ownership and Control Across Type of the Largest 
Controlling Shareholder and Company Size: The market value of the company
(Year: 1996)
Widely
Held
Family State Widely
Held
Financial
Widely
Held
Corporate
Others
10% Cut O ff
Largest 20 0.4000 0.4000 0.1000 0.0000 0.1000 0.0000
Middle 50 0.0600 0.9000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0400 0.0000
Smallest 50 0.1000 0.9000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
All firms 0.1108 0.8324 0.0054 0.0081 0.0378 0.0054
20% Cut O ff
Largest 20 0.7000 0.0500 0.1000 0.0000 0.1500 0.0000
Middle 50 0.3000 0.6200 0.0000 0.0000 0.0800 0.0000
Smallest 50 0.3200 0.6600 0.0000 0.0000 0.0200 0.0000
All firms 0.3568 0.5757 0.0054 0.0000 0.0568 0.0054
30% Cut O ff
Largest 20 0.8500 0.000 0.1000 0.0000 0.0500 0.0000
Middle 50 0.6200 0.3400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0400 0.0000
Smallest 50 0.5800 0.3800 0.0000 0.0000 0.0400 0.0000
All firms 0.6676 0.3000 0.0054 0.0000 0.0243 0.0027
40%> Cut O ff
Largest 20 0.9500 0.0000 0.0500 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Middle 50 0.8400 0.1400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0200 0.0000
Smallest 50 , 0.8600 0.1400 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
All firms 0.8838 0.1027 0.0027 0.0000 0.0108 0.0000
In order to conduct a more in-depth study of relationship between ownership types 
and the scale of the company, this study weights the distribution of the control rights 
according to the type of controlling shareholder with the total market value of the
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company as shown in Table 1-4. A striking difference can be seen between Table 5 
and Table 1-1. Diversified ownership types are on the rise, while family ownership is 
declining, demonstrating that the company size affects the type of ownership of the 
company. Meanwhile, the reason that there is a sharp increase of government 
ownership is attributable to two companies KEPCO and POSCO, which account for 
the top two companies in terms of total market value in Korea.
Tablel-5 The distribution of Control Right Across The Type Ultimate 
Ownership: Total market value___________________________ (Year: 1996)
Widely
Held
Family State Widely
Held
Financial
Widely
Held
Corporate
Others
10% cut-off
Independent 0.1040 0.3803 0.5035 0.0013 0.0041 0.0068
Company
Largest Group 30 0.2470 0.6178 0.0000 0.0087 0.1265 0.0000
All Company 0.1692 0.4886 0.2739 0.0047 0.0599 0.0037
20% cut-off
Independent 0.1961 0.2870 0.5035 0.0000 0.0066 0.0068
Company
Largest Group 30 0.7091 0.1579 0.0000 0.0000 0.1330 0.0000
All Company 0.4300 0.2282 0.2739 0.0000 0.0642 0.0037
30% cut- o ff
Independent
Company
0.3285 0.1628 0.5035 0.0000 0.0016 0.0035
Largest Group 30 0.8821 0.0494 0.0000 0.0000 0.0685 0.0000
All Company 0.5810 0.1111 0.2739 0.0000 0.0321 0.0019
40% cut- o ff
Independent 0.5387 0.0483 0.4121 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000
Company
Largest Group 30 0.9810 0.0121 0.0000 0.0000 0.0069 0.0000
All Company 0.7404 0.0318 0.2241 0.0000 0.0037 0.0000
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3.2.4 How are firms owned?
In the Korean chaebol business group, the cultural importance of blood relations is 
apparent. As a result, when the owner remains in active service as the owning 
manager, he will appoint his blood relatives (such as his sons or brothers) as officials 
of the business concern and will usually assign a blood relative to be registered 
owners of the stocks. Furthermore, in the change of generations, in most cases he will 
have his eldest son take over the business under a Confucian tradition that the eldest 
child has special authority to the inheritance. That does not exclude other sons, 
however, and he will find an appropriate source of revenue and divide it among them. 
In addition, his finances could be extended to relatives of the paternal line and other 
in-laws.19
1) Means of reinforcing control rights
This study, with the view of examining which means reinforce the control rights of 
the controlling shareholder, examines the degree of indirect control of firms by such 
means as pyramid structure, cross-ownership of stocks and non-profit companies at 
the 20% cut-off level. Furthermore, this study examines whether there are 
shareholders that own more than 10% of the voting rights (apart from the controlling 
shareholders) and whether the controlling shareholders are partaking in management. 
Table 1-6 shows that the controlling shareholder reinforces the control rights.
19In a Korean chaebol business group where the management owner and his family posses everything, 
a non-family employee narrows his chances for promotion as his position becomes higher.
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Tablel-6 The Type of Controlling Shareholder Reinforces the Control Rights
(Year: 1996)
Pyramid Cross-
Holding
Non-profit
corporation
Single
shareholder
executive
Independent 0.1514 0.0324 0.1081 0.9351 0.8811
Company
Largest Group 30 0.5094 0.0943 0.1887 0.8868 0.4717
All Company 0.2311 0.0462 0.1261 0.9244 0.7899
* shown only if ultimate owner exist in 20% cut-off
Table 1 -6 illustrates how much of the pyramid structure is employed to reinforce the 
control rights of the controlling shareholder. The table suggests that 23.11% of the 
sample group is using the pyramid structure. In the case of independent companies 
and the 30 largest conglomerates, 15.14% and 50.94%, respectively, use the pyramid 
structure. In sum, the 30 largest conglomerates use the pyramid structure three times 
more than the independent companies. Only 4.62% of the sample companies use 
cross-ownership of stocks. This number can be broken down to 3.24% and 9.43% of 
independent firms and 30 largest conglomerates respectively, which is less than the 
use of stock pyramid structure. Also, the table shows that 12.61% of sample firms, 
10.81% of independent companies, and 18.87% of the 30 largest conglomerates 
reinforce control rights of the controlling shareholder by using non-profit 
organizations.
Table 1-6 also shows whether there was another stockholder to restrain the 
controlling shareholder and also whether this shareholder was included in
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management as to reinforce his or her control rights. To this end, the study first 
examined the other shareholders with more than 10% of equity. This is an important 
factor because such other shareholders can become an obstacle for the controlling 
shareholder in influencing management. Table 1-6 reports that 92.44% of the 
companies did not have other major shareholders. A breakdown of this figure shows 
that 93.51% of independent firms and 88.68% of 30 largest conglomerates did not 
have other major shareholders.
2) Focusing of control rights and cash flow rights
Next is an examination of the degree o f the control rights and cash flow rights, 
focusing on the controlling shareholder. This study calculates the control rights of the 
ultimate owners by using the methodology of Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1999). 
This is slightly different from the calculations methods used previously, as illustrated 
by figure 4.
<Figure 4> Control right of controlling shareholder
15% 35%
Contra IShareho Her Company B
Com pany A
Contra IShareho Her
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Previously it was assumed Firm B had a special relationship with the controlling 
shareholder, and thus added equity of Firm B with the equity of one major 
shareholder. According to this method, the equity of the controlling shareholder 
would amount to 50%. However, now, only a small degree of equity connected with 
Firm B is added to equity of one major shareholder. If this method were to be 
applied, then the equity of the controlling shareholder would be 40% by adding the 
direct ownership of stocks (15%) with the stocks that are indirectly controlled by 
pyramids (25%). Table 7 shows the control rights of the controlling shareholder 
calculated using the Claessens, Djankov & Lang (1999) methodology.
Tablel-7 Statistic Distribution in Control Right of Controlling Shareholder
(Year: 1996)
o rd 1 "Mean Standard
Deviation
Median Quartile 3rd Quartile
Independent firms ,
Direct Control 
Rights 
Indirect Control 
rights
0.2460
0.0276
0.1247
0.0691
0.2399
0.0000
0.1557
0.0000
0.3287
0.0000
Control rights 0.2736 0.1207 0.2720 0.1869 0.3561
Largest Group 30
Direct Control 
Rights 
Indirect Control 
rights
0.1084
0.1086
0.1152
0.1108
0.0700
0.0861
0.0000
0.0000
0.2040
0.1818
Control rights 0.2170 0.1111 0.1982 0.1423 0.2893
All Firms
Direct Control 
Rights 
Indirect Control 
rights
0.2091
0.0493
0.1364
0.0897
0.2078
0.0000
0.1041
0.0000
0.3022
0.0716
Control rights 0.2584 0.1207 0.2499 0.1663 0.3349
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As a whole, the average control rights of the controlling shareholders were 25.84%. 
For the independent firms and the 30 largest firms, this figured amounted to 27.36% 
and 21.70% respectively. Only 2.76% of the equity of independent companies is 
owned through an indirect method such as the pyramid structure, cross-ownership of 
the stocks and non-profit firms. This figure for the companies belonging to the 30 
largest conglomerates is four times that of the independent firms, amounting up to 
10.86%. On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, Table 1-7 shows that the ownership 
of controlling shareholders is under-reported in comparison to the previous study. To 
examine the extent of under-reporting of ownership, I have used the previous method 
by simply adding equity of the corporations that have a special relationship with the 
major shareholders to the equity of the major shareholders to calculate equity owned 
by the major shareholders in the 30 largest conglomerates. The results are shown in 
Table 1-8. The variation resulting from the different methods employed by Table 1-7 
and Table 1-8 is approximately 3%.
Tablel-8 Ownership of 30 Largest Conglomerates__________(Year: 1996)
Total 1)
Publicly Traded Companies 2) All Firms3)
Mean Standard
Deviation
Median Mean Standard
Deviation
Family 10.32 9.74 11.63 5.3 10.84 11.52
Affiliated firms 33.82 15.21 14.54 12.95 13.74 13.54
Inside
shareholders
44.14 24.95 13.75 14.54 24.58 11.34
Notes: 1) Inside ownership of total affiliated companies in 30 largest conglomerates.
2) The manufacture companies among publicly listed 30 largest conglomerates.
3) The sample companies among 30 largest conglomerates.
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Next, Table 1-9 reports how much of the cash flow rights the controlling 
shareholders own and the difference between the cash flow rights and the control 
rights. The difference between the cash flow rights and control rights was calculated 
by using the ratio of cash flow to voting rights.
Tablel-9 Focusing of Cash flow rights and Control rights_____ (Year: 1996)
Number
of
firms
Mean Standard
Deviation
Median Quartile 3rd
Quartile
Cash Flow Rights
Independent 
Company 
Largest Group 30
257
94
0.2601
0.1379
0.1216
0.1110
0.2601
0.1078
0.1705
0.0387
0.3360
0.2132
All Firms 351 0.2273 0.1304 0.2232 0.1214 0.3155
Control Rights
Independent 257 0.2736 0.1207 0.2720 0.1869 0.3561
Company
Largest Group 30 94 0.2170 0.1111 0.1982 0.1423 0.2893
All Firms 351 0.2584 0.1207 0.2499 0.1663 0.3349
Cash flow rights/ control rights
Independent 257 0.9474 0.1573 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Company
Largest Group 30 94 0.6103 0.3668 0.6007 0.2501 1.0000
All Firms 351 0.8571 0.2760 1.0000 0.8881 1.0000
Theory suggests that both cash flow and voting rights are important and the 
incentives to expropriate vary with cash-flow rights (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Table 1-9 shows descriptive statistics on the separation of ultimate cash-flow and
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control rights in the hands of the largest controlling holder has at least 5% of the vote. 
The cash flow rights owned by controlling shareholders amount to an average of 
22.73% and the concentration of control rights in the hands of the largest block- 
holder is 25.84%. The ratio of cash flow rights to control rights is 85.71% on 
average. The separation of ownership and control is independent firms are higher 
than largest group 30 (0.94%: 0.61%). For example, the typical large control holder 
in independent firm has 10 ultimate votes for each 9.5 direct shares that he or she 
holds. In contrast, the typical largest group 30 control holder has 10 ultimate votes 
for each 6 shares that he or she holds. This demonstrates that the controlling 
shareholder owns lower cash flow rights compared to his or her control rights.
4. The data and measurement
The objective of this section is to describe the method of sample selection to be used 
for my empirical analysis of relation ownership and firm valuation and to discuss the 
procedures to be employed for empirical tests of the model based on two hypotheses.
4.1 Sample selection
For the empirical analysis, I select 370 out o f760 publicly listed companies (as of the 
end of 1996) for the corporate governance analysis of section 2, and 1,892 companies 
that have been publicly listed in the Korea Stock Exchange for the period of 1988 -  
1997. The information on stock ownership of public companies was acquired from 
the database of the Korea Listed Companies Association (KLCA). The corresponding 
information of ownership structure for non-public companies was acquired from the
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database of Korea Investors Service (KIS) and the National Information and Credit 
Evaluation (NICE) for calculating pyramids and cross-holding ownership structure. 
The KIS/FAS software of the Korea Investors’ Services was used to find financial 
information of public companies to calculate the variables and carry out the 
regression analysis.
In order to compose research materials out of the 760 public companies during 1988 
to 1997,1 selected 1,892 sample companies that meet the following conditions:
• Companies that were public for less than 5 years were excluded from the sample.
• Companies whose day of settlement is not in December were excluded from the 
sample.
• Financial institutions were excluded from the sample because of the limitation on 
corporate governance, government regulation of their business activities, and 
their unique balance sheet.
• Companies with insufficient information on financial information and ownership 
were excluded from the sample.
4.2 The measurement of the firm valuation
4.2.1 Assessment of corporate value
1) Corporate value
Tobin’s Q is the ratio between the market value of assets and its substituted value. If 
a corporation has outstanding investment opportunities, investments in R&D for 
future development, investments in advertisements, exceptional managerial
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executives, and many intangible assets, then the market value of the corporation as 
well as Tobin’s q will become higher. Tobin’s q ratio is widely known for its 
characteristics and usefulness in corporate value assessment and is used widely. 
However, not only is it difficult to gather the various data that are needed for 
calculating the q ratio, because there is a high possibility of error in estimating the 
replacement cost of equity, many scholars have a heightened level of interest in 
developing a substitution index for the q ratio.20 In Korea, there are many errors in 
finding the q ratio because the replacement cost or market value must be estimated by 
each researcher under given assumptions. Lindenberg Ross (1981) modified Tobin’s 
Q ratio and the market to book value ratio (M/B) was presented as the substitution 
variable for the q ratio. In addition, as substitution for corporate value, industry the 
Tobin’s Q is based on Berger Ofek (1995: 47). Industry the Tobin’s Q (Industry- 
M/B) is defined as the log of the ratio between firm’s actual performance (true q) and 
its imputed q. Imputed q is the asset weighted average of theoretical q of each 
segment. Theoretical q is the industry average using stand alone firms in same 
industry. This study examining corporate value (Tobin’s Q) will use both the market 
to book value ratio (M/B) and industry market to book value ration (Industry-M/B). 
If a corporation has outstanding investment opportunities, investments in R&D for 
future development, investments in advertisements, exceptional managerial 
executives, and many intangible assets, then the market value of the corporation as 
well as Tobin’s q will increase.
20 In U.K or the United States, fundamental data for calculating the Q ratio of each corporation is 
being systematically provided in databases such as compustat and are actively used in studies.
4. 2. 2 Control variables
(1) Company size (SIZE)
A natural logarithm applied to the size of the assets is used to measure the size of the 
company. The company scale is expected to have an influential relationship with 
other variables in the following ways.
Larger firms have better disclosure, more liquid trading, more attention from 
analysts, and more diversified activities leading to lower risk of financial distress 
(Claessens et al 2002). Furthermore, In East Asia, smaller firms may be less 
diversified, leading to smaller discounts (Claessens et al 1999). Jensen, Solberg and 
Zom (1992) argued that the factors that influence insider ownership were the 
percentage of liability, characteristics of dividend, managerial risk, R&D, the number 
of agencies, and the company scale. Using these factors, a transactional analysis was 
carried out to show that the company scale had a significant relationship: Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) as well as McConnell and Servaes (1990) claimed that the bigger 
the company scale, the lower the equity of the major stockholders due to the 
restrictions on the wealth of the major stockholder and a decline in the equity for 
control. In addition, the larger the scale of a company, the equity of the major 
shareholders will decrease owing to the risk-averse traits of the major stockholders. 
On the other hand, in the case of Korea, where institutional investors and foreigners 
who clearly favour blue-chip shares hold external majority shares, a positive 
relationship is expected between external majority shares and the company scale. In 
addition, the bigger the company scale, the company will have greater ability to cover 
liability, which in turn will raise the leverage ratio. There is also the possibility that
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the more years have passed after the company has been established, the scale of the 
company will be greater.
(2) Affiliated Company.
In order to control the affiliated company effect, if the affiliate belongs to the 30 
largest conglomerates, as designated by the Fair Trade Commission in terms of total 
assets in April of the year the analysis, then ‘ 1 ’ was added to the dummy variable. 
Companies belonging to corporate groups are expected to be extensively diversified 
and the scale of the company to be large. This is due to the fact that an internal 
capital market is formulated within the company, and thus external capital can be 
easily raised on the basis of a relatively high credibility.
(3) Other variables.
Capital expenditure (CES) is change in the gross capital expenditure for sum of 
individual tangible fixed assts such as property, plant and equipment divided by the 
previous year-end’s capital stock. Research and development (R&D) is change in the 
gross intangible assets for experimental and research expense divided by the previous 
year-end’s capital stock. Advertising ratio (ADR) is defined advertising expenditure 
over total assets.
4.3 Descriptive statistics on the concentration of cash flow rights and control 
rights of Korean corporations.
Table 1-10 reports descriptive statistics on the concentration of ultimate cash-flow 
rights of Korean corporations in the hands of the largest controlling holder. In the 
case of concentration of cash flow rights, during the entire period of 1988 -  1997, the
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average was 23.3% and a quarter of cash flow rights was found to be greater than 
31%. Annually, a trend of gradual decrease from an average of 26.4% in 1988 to 
22.7% in 1996 was found followed by an increase to 23.3% in 1997. In the 3rd 
quartile, cash flow rights also showed a decrease from 33.6% in 1988 to 30.9% in 
1996, then again a slightly increase to 31.9% in 1997.
Tablel-10 Descriptive Statistics for Concentration of Cash-Flow Rights in 
1988-1997.
Year Number of 
Corporations
Mean Standard
Deviation
Median 1st
Quartile
3rd
Quartile
1988 122 0.264 0.167 0.252 0.153 0.336
1989 148 0.242 0.130 0.247 0.146 0.313
1990 181 0.247 0.135 0.248 0.143 0.329
1991 204 0.259 0.140 0.247 0.167 0.345
1992 109 0.189 0.155 0.15 0.079 0.261
1993 222 0.237 0.138 0.227 0.143 0.328
1994 238 0.226 0.127 0.217 0.126 0.312
1995 235 0.219 0.126 0.219 0.117 0.308
1996 211 0.218 0.146 0.217 0.106 0.309
1997 222 0.227 0.135 0.239 0.116 0.322
Total 1892 0.233 0.139 0.230 0.128 0.319
As reported in Table 1-11, the concentration of control rights in the hands of the 
ultimate ownership is similar to the concentration of cash flow rights. The average 
during the period from 1988-1997 was 27.4% and a quarter of control rights was 
35%. Annually, we observe a trend of a gradual decease from an average of 30.3% in 
1988 to an average of 26.0% in 1996, followed by an increase to 28.1% in 1997. In
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the 3rd quartile, cash flow rights also showed a decrease from 33.6% in 1988 to 
33.4% in 1996, then an increase to 36.4% in 1997.
Tablel-11 Descriptive Statistics for Concentration of Control rights in 1988- 
1997.
Year Number of 
Corporations
Mean Standard
Deviation
Median 1st
Quartile
3rd
Quartile
1988 122 0.303 0.156 0.252 0.153 0.336
1989 148 0.280 0.122 0.268 0.205 0.352
1990 181 0.282 0.129 0.269 0.192 0.348
1991 204 0.291 0.132 0.277 0.200 0.369
1992 109 0.189 0.155 0.160 0.079 0.261
1993 222 0.281 0.132 0.279 0.130 0.329
1994 238 0.267 0.124 0.261 0.178 0.345
1995 235 0.263 0.118 0.247 0.184 0.345
1996 211 0.263 0.136 0.251 0.173 0.334
1997 222 0.281 0.128 0.275 0.196 0.364
Total 1892 0.274 0.132 0.266 0.187 0.350
Table 1-12 reports the ratio of cash flow to control rights and the mean from 1988 to 
1997 was found to be 84%. When analyzed by year, with 85.7% in 1988, 85.2% in 
1992 and 80% in 1997, a continuous dissociation between the cash flow rights and 
control rights can be observed.
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Tablel-12 Descriptive Statistics for Ratio of Cash-Flow Rights to Control 
Right in 1988-1997.     |______
Year Number of 
Corporations
Mean Standard
Deviation
Median 1st
Quartile
3rd
Quartile
1988 122 0.857 0.287 1 0.934 1
1989 148 0.866 0.281 1 0.921 1
1990 181 0.880 0.271 1 0.901 1
1991 204 0.880 0.263 1 0.908 1
1992 109 0.852 0.291 1 0.897 1
1993 222 0.838 0.290 1 0.766 1
1994 238 0.841 0.288 1 0.829 1
1995 235 0.830 0.297 1 0.823 1
1996 211 0.819 0.311 1 0.783 1
1997 222 0.800 0.302 1 0.684 1
Total 1892 0.844 0.289 1 0.842 1
Given these results, an evaluation was made to determine whether it is possible to 
analyse the relationship between the corporate value and ownership structure (the 
cash flow rights, the control rights) using a nonlinear relationship analysis with the 
points of structural changes.
5. Empirical test
The OLS model is based on the cross section that can occur when using the panel 
data collected for 10 years from 1988 to 1997. There is a cause for concern that there 
may be a biased estimate because it violates an important fundamental assumption in 
establishing the regression analysis of independent variable and the assumption of 
exogenous independent variables. In order to resolve this issue, a within estimate
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technique is used in which individual (firm- specific) effects and time effects were 
restricted using the fixed effects and all assumptions are verified.
5.1 Test results of Hypothesis 1 on the relation between firm value and 
ultimate ownership
According to the relationship between ownership structure and the value of the firm 
as discussed in section 2, the incentive for the controlling shareholder to expropriate 
the minority shareholders for their self-interests depends on how much cash flow 
rights they own. When the cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder are low, 
then such incentives and proxy costs increase due to the conflict of interest between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Therefore, the lower the cash 
flow rights of the controlling shareholder, the lower the value of the firm.
Tablel-13 Regressions of Cash-Flow Rights and Firm Value
M/B
Model (1) Model (2)
Industry-M/B 
Model (3) Model (4)
Intercept 0.6482***
(2.19)
1.0851***
(2.42)
0.0356*
(2.06)
0.1568*
(1.33)
Cash <0.14 0.0411*
(2.02)
0.0496**
(2-49)
0.0930
(0.66)
0.1228
(1.06)
0.14 < Cash < 0.24 -0.4787**
(-2.37)
-0.6199***
(-3.12)
-0.0974
(0.66)
-0.0642
(0.44)
0.24 < Cash < 0.50 0.3251
(1.26)
0.3218
(1.27)
0.0824
(0.76)
0.1404
(1.29)
0.50 < Cash 0.0597
(0.18)
0.1093
(0.34)
0.0459
(0.22)
0.0632
(0.31)
RD 1.9574***
(3.75)
1.598**
(2.04)
ADR 1.0748
(-0.57)
-0.9994
(-0.60)
CES 0.0376***
(3.45)
0.0412**
(2.34)
DRC 0.2288***
(4.24)
0.1445***
(4.57)
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SIZE -0.0436***
(-4.78)
-0.0143**
(-2.64)
Adjusted R 2 ■ 0.0280 0.0209 0.0098 0.0096
No of Observation 1892 1892 1892 1892
Piecewise linear ordinary least-squares regressions analysis of firm value in Tobin’q (M/B), 
and firm value in Industry-Tobin’q (Industry-M/B), on cash flow rights and control variables. 
The firm value on ownership structure model is based on data for 1892 from 1988 to 1997. 
The regressions are performed using a fixed- effects ( time and industry) specification.
The Research and development (RD) and Advertising (ADR), Capital expenditure (CES), 
Financial leverage (DRC), Firm size (SIZE) are included as control variable. The dependent 
variable is the share of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder (ownership). Numbers 
in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of significance:*** 1%,**5%,* 10%. 
Cash £ 0 . 1 4 =  cash flow rights if cash flow rights < 0.14, = 0.14 if cash flow rights > 0.14. 
0.14 < Cash <0 . 24  = 0 if cash flow rights < 0.14, = cash flow rights-0 .1 4  if 0.14 < cash 
flow rights < 0.24, = 0.24 if cash flow rights > 0.24.
0.24 < Cash < 0.50 = 0 if cash flow rights < 0.24, = cash flow rights-0.24 if 0.24 < cash 
flow rights < 0.50, = 0.50 if cash flow rights > 0.50.
0.50 < Cash = 0 if cash flow rights of ultimate owner < 0.50, = cash flow rights -  0.50 if 
cash flow rights > 0.50.
As reported in Table 1-13, in the case of the Tobin’s Q variable, with intervals of 
cash flow rights less than 14%, the regression coefficient in model (1) is estimated at 
0.0411 (t=2.02) for the whole period.21 On the other hand, with intervals of cash flow 
rights between 14% and 24%, the regression coefficient is -0.4787(t=-2.37) 
respectively. Here as cash flow rights increases, firm value decreases. In industry 
Tobin’s Q, intervals of cash flow rights less than 14%, the regression coefficient in 
model(3) is estimated at 0.0930 (t=0.66) for the whole period. On the other hand, in 
the intervals of cash flow rights between 24% and 50%, the regression coefficient is -  
0.0824(t=-0.76). Here as the cash flow rights increases, the firm value decreases.
21 The Piecewise regression model normally chooses two methods to adapt structural break points. 
The first method is try to find structural break points to best fitness of the model or explanation for 
statistical significant through continuously simulation. The second method is to try the Piecewise 
regression in structural break points which are decided in advance, based on a theoretical background. 
This study uses the first method. Alternately, I test linear relation between cash flow rights and firm 
value, consistent with Claessens et al (2002) and curvilinear regression analysis, consistent with 
McConnell and Servases (1990). I do not find that the coefficient of cash flow rights and firm value is 
statically significant in both linear and curvilinear models. These statistical results are not presented in 
this study.
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When observing results of model (3) and model (4), there are no significant 
differences in the relationship between cash flow rights and firm value regardless of 
whether control variables were included or excluded. These results are inconsistent 
with Claessens et al (2002), and provide empirical evidence that cash flow rights held 
by controlling shareholders are positively related to Tobin's Q with statistical 
significance. The less cash flow rights of controlling shareholders, the more conflict 
of interests between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. Again, 
here controlling shareholders are inclined to expropriate minority shareholders, thus 
creating agency costs and reducing firm value.
However, as seen in Table 1-13, cash flow rights and corporate performance of 
Korean corporations showed positive (+) relationships in the segment for 14% or 
less, which supports the convergence of interest hypothesis.22 This shows that agency 
costs can decrease as ultimate owner’s shares increase. Segments of cash flow greater 
than 14% to less than 24%, and the segment of cash flow greater than 25% to less 
than 50% showed a negative (-) relationship. This shows a managerial 
entrenchment23 in which an administrator decision to increase in his own equity 
corresponds to his private wealth and therefore decreases firm valuation. This is in 
concurrence with claim made by Stultz (1988) that when equity of the administrator 
reaches 50%, the possibility of corporate take-over is zero and firm value also 
reaches its minimum level. However, a result of empirical analysis in Table 1-13, 
intervals of cash flow rights more than 50% is positively related to firm value 
(Tobin’s Q), but the results are statistically insignificance. This supports the 
argument of Morck-Shleifer-Vishny (1988) that the relation between shareholding
22 See Section 2 for convergence of interest hypothesis,
23 See Section 2 for managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
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and firm value is expressed as a different mixture of the conflict of interest alignment 
and management entrenchment for each interval. Finally, the results confirm the fact 
that there are both positive and negative of firm value associated with increased 
ownership concentration. For ownership concentration levels between 14% and 24% 
the relationship is negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with the 
cash flow right of ultimate owner range is due to managerial entrenchment problems 
and expropriation of minority shareholders.
Tablel-14 Regressions of Control Rights and Firm Value
M/B
Model (1) Model (2)
Industry M/B 
Model (3) Model (4)
Intercept 0.5668
(1.04)
0.0006
(1.49)
0.0799***
(2,60)
0.1208
(1.03)
Control < 0.15 0.1422**
(2.81)
0.1284**
(2.56)
0.5867**
(2.00)
0.5363*
(1.84)
0.15 < Control < 0.24 -0.2746*
(-1.98)
-0.2325
(-1.54)
-0.0580
(-0.66)
-0.4118
(-0.46)
0.24 < Control < 0.50 -0.1667
(-0.76)
-0.2619
(-1.22)
0.1168
(0.93)
-0.0484
(0.38)
0.50 < Control -0.2316
(-1.11)
-0.2687
(-1.31)
-0.0510
(-2.60)
-0.0553
(-0.46)
RD 1.8609
(1.69)
1.4849*
(1.90)
ADR -0.9610
(-0.51)
-0.9376
(-0.54)
CES 0.0361**
(3.31)
0.0380**
(2.16)
DRC 0.2207***
(4.08)
0.1416***
(4.48)
SIZE
,
-0.0427***
(-4.70)
-0.0141**
(-2.16)
Adjusted R 2 0.0232 0.0192 0.0113 0.0138
Number of 
Observation
1892 1892 1892 1892
Piecewise linear ordinary east-squares regressions analysis of firm value in Tobin’s q (M/B),
and firm value in Industry-Tobin’s q (Industry-M/B), on control rights and control variables. 
The firm value on ownership structure model is based on data for 1892 from 1988 to 1997. 
The regressions are performed using a fixed- effects ( time and industry) specification. The 
Research and development (RD) and Advertising (ADR), Capital expenditure (CES),
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Financial leverage (DRC), Firm size (SIZE) are included as control variable. The dependent 
variable is the share of cash flow rights held by the largest shareholder (ownership). Numbers 
in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of significance: ***1%, **5%* 10%. 
Control < 0.15 = control rights if control rights < 0.15, = 0.15 if  control rights of ultimate 
owner > 0.15.
0.15 < Control ^ 0 . 2 4  = 0 if control rights < 0.15, = control rights-0 .15  if 0.15 < control 
rights < 0.24, = 0.24 if control rights > 0.24.
0.24 < Control < 0.50 = 0 if  control rights < 0.24, = control rights-0.24 if 0.24 < control
rights < 0.50, = 0.50 if control rights > 0.50.
0.50 < Control = 0 if control rights of ultimate owner < 0.50, = control rights -  0.50 if
control rights > 0.50.
As reported in Table 1-14,24 the intervals of control rights being less than 15%, 
regression coefficient (b) is positive and statistically significant, which supports the 
convergence of interest hypothesis, for the whole period (1988-1997). On the other 
hand, in the intervals of control rights being between 15% and 24%, and 24% and 
50%, regression coefficient is -0.2746 (t=-1.98) and -0.1667 (t=-0.76) respectively. 
Here as control rights increases, firm value decreases. Also, in the intervals of cash 
flow rights being more than 50% where agency costs are higher, but statistically 
insignificant. These results support the argument of Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that 
large shareholders address the agency problem of not having enough control over the 
assets of the firm to have their private interests respected. However, I do not find that 
the relationship between control rights and firm value is negative and linear, a result 
that is consistent with Claessens et al (2002). Therefore, these results are similar with 
Table 1-3, and are related with cash flow rights and the firm value. The relationship 
between control rights of shareholding and firm value is manifested as a different
24 This table uses the Piecewise regression model to find structural break points to best fit the model 
or explanation for statistical significant through continuous simulation. Also, I test linear relation 
between control rights and firm value, consistent with Claessen et al (2002) and curvilinear regression 
analysis, consistent with McConnell and Servases (1990). I do not find that the coefficient of control 
rights and firm value is statically significant in both linear and curvilinear models. I do not present 
these statistical results in this study.
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mixture of the conflict of interest alignment and management entrenchment for each 
interval.
5.3 Hypothesis 2 on the relation between the divergence between the cash 
flow rights and control rights of controlling shareholders affects firm value.
In hypothesis 2 ,1 try to identify how the divergence between the cash flow rights and 
the control rights of the ultimate shareholders affects the firm value. The coefficient 
of Cash/Control, indicating the divergence between the two factors, was estimated to 
be a positive number with statistical significance. Cash/Control will be closer to zero 
as the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights become larger. By 
contrast, when the divergence between the two does not exist, namely, when the 
controlling shareholders directly control firms instead of holding through pyramids or 
cross shareholding, then the value is near one. These results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that as the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights of 
controlling shareholders becomes greater, there is incentive to expropriate minority 
shareholders, reducing firm value.
However, the variable “Cash/Control” only denotes the divergence between cash 
flow and control rights and does not reflect how much control rights are held by 
controlling shareholders. Regardless of the size of the divergence between cash and 
control rights, the extent of control rights held by controlling shareholders could 
affect firm value. Hence I add the variable “(Cash/Control)*HiControl” to measure 
how the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights affects firm value 
when controlling shareholders possess relatively high control rights.
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Table 1-15 Cash-flow Right, Control Rights, and Corporate Valuation
Explanatory
Variable
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
W B Industry M/B
Intercept 0.8528***
(4.93)
0.8495***
(4.96)
0.0888
(0.28)
0.7198***
(3.92)
Cash -0.1358
(-1.07)
-0.53641
(-1.21)
Cash/Control 0.1148**
(2.34)
0.0854*
(1.88)
0.4111
(0.038)
0.0726
(-1.16)
Cash/control
*HiControl
0.0738
(1.74)
0.08763
(1.65)
RD 1.8797***
(4.65)
1.5455***
(3.78)
1.2249**
(2.85)
0.2234**
(2.27)
ADR -0.919
(-0.44)
-0.07171
(-0.93)
-0.0392
(-0.00)
-0.2209
(-0.98)
CES 0.0363
(0.33)
-1.3032
(-0.77)
0.0117
(0.12)
-1.2842
(-0.76)
DRC 0.2164***
(4.00)
0.1988***
(3.54)
0.7659***
(4.48)
0.6877***
(4.35)
SIZE -0.0387***
(-4.23)
-0.7004***
(-5.40)
-1.6900***
(-4.47)
-0.6999***
(-5.40)
Adjusted
R 2
0.0226 0.0236 0.2240 0.2255
Number of 
observation
1892 1892 1892 1892
This table present ordinary least-squares regressions analysis of firm value in Tobin’s Q 
(M/B), and firm value in Industry-Tobin’s Q (Industry-M/B), on divergence between cash 
flow rights and control rights and control variables. The firm value on ownership structure 
model is based on data for 1892 from 1988 to 1997. The regressions are performed using a 
fixed- effects (time and industry) specification. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The 
dependent variable is divergence between cash flow rights and control rights held by the 
largest shareholder (Cash/Control) and Hi is a dummy variable indicating high control range. 
Hi equals one if control rights are greater than 30 percent, otherwise zero. Cash is the share 
o f cash flow rights held by ultimate owner, The research and development (RD) and 
Advertising (ADR), Capital expenditure (CES), Financial leverage (DRC), Firm size (SIZE) 
are included as control variable. Asterisks denote the level of significance: ***1%, **5%, 
* 10%.
Table 1-15 shows that regression coefficients Cash/Control and 
(Cash/Control)*HiControl are positive, but the coefficient for 
(Cash/Control)*HiControl does not have statistical significance. This outcome 
suggests that regardless of how much control rights are held by controlling
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shareholders, when cash flow rights are less than control rights, controlling 
shareholders tend to increase their own private interests by expropriating the riches of 
minority shareholders. This results in reducing the firm value.
5.4 Comparative result with group affiliated firms and independent firms
As reported in Table 1-16, I estimated that control rights of less 15% by group 
affiliated firms are positively associated with corporate valuation and that control 
rights of more than 15% are negatively associated with valuation. The magnitude of 
the coefficient on the Industry M/B (model 2) is less than for the Tobin’s Q model 
(model 1). Also, the magnitude of the coefficient on the control rights is somewhat 
more than that for independent companies. I find further evidence of expropriation as 
the coefficient on Cash/Control by Group-affiliated companies is positive and 
significant, and the coefficient for the interactive variable for high control stakes is 
also positive but not statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient on the 
Cash/Control variable is significantly greater than for independent companies, 
suggesting expropriation by group-affiliated companies is more than that by 
independent companies.
Tablel-16 Regression with group affiliate firms and Independent firms
Group-affiliated firms Independent firms
M/B (1) Industry 
M/B (2)
M/B (1) Industry 
M/B (2)
Intercept 1.50279**
(3.71)
1.5329*
(5.79)
1.0338*
(3.90)
1.0344*
(3.93)
Control < 0.15 1.2003**
(2.83)
1.2209**
(2.87)
0.5891
(0.90)
0.5902
(0.92)
0.15 < Control < 0.24 -0.0088
(-0:03)
-0.1050
(-0.29)
-0.02089
(-0.47)
-0.02421
(-0.39)
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0.24 < Control < 0.50 -0.3896**
(-2.47)
-0.4802**
(-2.67)
-0.3972**
(-2.26)
-0.4027**
(-2.45)
0.50 < Control 0.2087
(0.92)
0.2944
(0.96)
0.2172
(0.39)
0.2242
(0.42)
Cash/Control 0.2087***
(3.81)
0.2301***
(4.98)
-0.0386
(0.73)
-0.1993
(-1.64)
Cash/control*
HiControl
0.0362
(1.06)
0.0007
(0.3)
RD 2.9528***
(4.04)
2.9852***
(4.06)
1.8735***
(3.70)
0.9267**
(2.74)
ADR 0.2224
(0.08)
0.0831
(0.03)
-1.7666
(-0.70)
-1.4995
(-0.60)
CES -0.0143
(-0.36)
-0.0127
(-0.32)
0.0346**
(2.79)
0.0366**
(2.94)
DRC -0.0457
(-0.66)
-0.0494*
(-0.72)
0.3952***
(2.79)
0.3777***
(4.95)
SIZE -0.0589
(-4.90)
-0.0599***
(-4.97)
-0.0284**
(-2.22)
-0.0278**
(-2.18)
Adjusted R 2 0.0059 0.0047 0.0480 0.0244
Piecewise linear ordinary east-squares regressions analysis of firm value in Tobin’s Q (M/B)
and firm value in Industry-Tobin’s Q (Industry-M/B) on control rights and control variables. 
The firm value on ownership structure model is based on data for 1892 from 1988 to 1997. 
The regressions are performed using a fixed- effects (time and industry) specification. The 
Research and development (RD) and Advertising (ADR), Capital expenditure (CES), 
Financial leverage (DRC), Firm size (SIZE) are included as control variable. The dependent 
variable is the share of control rights held by the largest shareholder (Control), divergence 
between cash flow rights and control rights held by the largest shareholder (Cash/Control) 
and Hi is a dummy variable indicating high control range. Hi equals one if control rights are 
greater than 30 percent, otherwise zero. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks 
denote the level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Control < 0.15 = control rights if control rights < 0.15, = 0.15 if control rights of ultimate 
owner > 0.15.
0.15 < Control < 0.24 = 0 if control rights < 0.15, = control rights -  0.15 if 0.15 < control 
rights < 0.24, = 0.24 if control rights > 0.24.
0 .24 < Control < 0.50 = 0 if control rights < 0.24, = control rights-0.24 if 0.24 < control 
rights < 0.50, = 0.50 if control rights > 0.50.
0.50 < Control = 0 if control rights of ultimate owner < 0.50, = control rights -  0.50 if 
control rights > 0.50.
Overall, when the relationship between corporate performance of Korean 
corporations and ownership are observed, the powerful influence of conglomerates 
can be seen. In particular, the top 30 Chaebol employ the pyramidal structure for 
increased control rights and cross-holding structure. It was found that dissociation
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between control rights and cash flower rights influence corporate performance. This 
is an important support for hypothesis 2 because it reveals that affiliated companies 
have a significant effect. Evaluation control variables and corporate performance 
variables are as follows. Debt ratio also has some relationship to firm value. As in 
Table 1-13 to Table 1-17, there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between leverage and corporate performance for whole firms, independent firms, and 
large firms. The positive relationship between debt ratio and corporate performance 
can be made only when the high leverage creates favourable outcomes, i.e. reducing 
agency costs associated with excessive investment. However, independent (non- 
chaebol) firms of Korea seem to be able to increase their corporate performances 
through higher leverage since they were constantly short of capital. On the other 
hand, reckless expansion through leverage or agency costs associated with under­
investment due to leverage, will cause unfavourable effects on corporate 
performance.
In case of independent companies, Investment expenditures have a statistically 
significant positive relationship with corporate performance. Investment decisions 
themselves, either for affiliated companies (chaebol) or independent companies, 
contribute to increasing corporate performance. McConnell & Muscarella (1985) 
have empirically established that the more investments companies make, the more 
opportunities for growth, and thus the higher Tobin’s q through higher share prices. 
As for the ratio of intangible assets, as is in theoretical predictions, the more 
advertisement costs and R&D spending, the higher firm value. In particular, R&D 
spending shows very high statistically significance. However, since the scale of
75
companies is inversely related to corporate performance, companies seeking to 
maximize their scales result in excessive investment at the expense of profitability.
5.5 The divergence between the cash flow rights and control rights of 
controlling shareholders affects firm value with years
Table 1-17 analyzes the corporate value and relationship between divergence of 
control rights and cash flow rights during 1988 -  1997. Correlation coefficients of 
Cash/Control were found to be 0.0726 for 1989, 0.2123 for 1993, 0.2216 for 1996, 
and 0.0803 for 1997. This shows that the relationship between Cash/Control and 
corporate performance of Korean firms for 10 years slightly increased. But the 
sudden drop in the correlation coefficient in 1997 can be seen. Stock values fell 
drastically with sudden collapse of Korean economy and many firms were withdrawn 
from the stock market. This can be seen as the reason for difference compared to 
other years.
Tablel-17 The divergence between the cash flow rights and control rights of 
controlling shareholders affects firm value with years.__________ _________
Total
(1988-1997)
1989 1993 1996 1997
Intercept 0.7198***
(3.92)
1.0528**
(2.57)
0.1840
(1.25)
0.1181
(1.41)
0.2378
(1.07)
Cash/Control 0.0726**
(1.16)
0.1681**
(2.02)
0.2123*
(1.83)
0.2216*
(1.85)
0.0803*
(1.78)
Cash/Control
♦Hi
0.08763
(1.95)
0.1070*
(1.74)
0.0697
(0.70)
0.1158**
(2.49)
0.0570
(1.53)
RD 1.8234
(4.27)
1.7146***
(3.35)
1.9391***
(2.42)
1.3932***
(2.59)
1.3821***
(2.88)
ADR -0.2209
(0.98)
-0.3948*
(-1.77)
-0.2744
(-1.16)
-0.2777
(0.93)
-0.1505
(-0.97)
CES -1.2842
(-0.76)
-0.2422*
(-1.75)
-0.2529
(-0.75)
0.4881***
(3.54)
0.0121***
(2.40)
DRC 0.6999***
(3.40)
0.3096**
(2.81)
0.8508**
(2.58)
0.6193**
(2.37)
0.7549**
(2.43)
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SIZE -0.0413***
(-4.93)
-0.0160
(-0.87)
-1.8600
(-0.09)
-1.0300
(-1.31)
-0.0207*
(-2.21)
GROUP 0.1093***
(3.54)
0.0329
(0.68)
0.0810**
(1.27)
0.0742**
(2.41)
0.0186
(0.70)
Adjusted
R 2
0.2255 0.2531 0.2718 0.2665 0.2053
Piecewise linear ordinary least-squares regressions analysis of firm value in Tobin’s Q (M/B) 
and firm value in Industry-Tobin’s Q (Industry-M/B) on control rights and control variables. 
The firm value on ownership structure model is based on data for 1892 from 1988 to 1997. 
The regressions are performed using a fixed- effects (time and industry) specification. The 
Research and development (RD) and Advertising (ADR), Capital expenditure (CES), 
Financial leverage (DRC), Firm size (SIZE) are included as control variable. The dependent 
variable is divergence between cash flow rights and control rights held by the largest 
shareholder (Cash/Control) and Hi is a dummy variable indicating high control range. Hi 
equals one if control rights are greater than 30 percent, otherwise zero. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of significance: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
These results imply that the pattern of conflicted ownership structure increased and 
expropriates the minority shareholder with consequent agency cost during the decade 
before the East Asian Crisis. I remain the question that why the conflicted is related 
to more negative firm value in economy development.
Overinvestment is often point out as on of the fundamental causes which is agency 
cost problem can explain this value reduction and brought about the Asia economic 
crisis. Ryou and Kim (2003) find that overinvestment is most frequently for chaebol 
firms. They (2003: 36) note ‘over investment by chaebols supports the view that 
loosening strict restrictions on lending in the financial sector to chaebols backfired. 
Under the catchphrase of “globalization”, the Korean government allowed greater 
freedom in investment decision for conglomerates.’ I would expect the effect of 
investment behaviour of divergence between cash flow rights and control rights of 
ultimate owner on firm value are negative. I hence will investigate this issue in 
Chapter 2.
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On the other hand, Denis et al (1997), Rajan et al (2000) Lins and Sevaes (2002) 
show that firm diversification reduce value, and agency problems between 
shareholders and managers are the cause of value-reducing diversification. Claeseens 
et al (1988) show that firm diversification in more economic development among 
East Asia reduce value, and that agency problems can explain this value reduction. If 
the degree of diversification represents the seriousness of agency problems reflecting 
controlling shareholders’ desire to diversify without considering minority 
shareholder’s interests. I would expect negative relation between firm value and the 
degree of diversification. I hence will investigate this issue in Chapter 3.
6 Conclusion
This study has attempted to define the effects of corporate ownership structure or 
corporate governance system on corporate performance. Targeting Korean 
corporations of which the governance systems are different from the ownership 
structure of the corporations in either the United States or the U.K., certain theories 
have been selected for use in this research. First of all, I analysed the forms of the 
corporate ownership structure and the corporate governance systems of Korea prior 
to receiving financial assistance from the IMF in 1998. In particular, I divided the 
corporations into independent corporations and the large conglomerates (Top 30 
Chaebol) characteristic of Korean corporate structures, and investigated corporate 
ownership structure and corporate value issues centring around agency issues arising 
from the pyramidal structure and the cross-holding structure of ownership.
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This study made efforts to first minimize temporal errors and errors in company 
characteristics using 10 years of panel data from 1988 to 1997. When calculating the 
ownership structure of large companies, even data on the shareholding ratio of 
unlisted subsidiaries was included to maximize data use. Most robust studies 
(Classens, Djangkov and Lang (2000,2002), Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000), 
Mitton (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), Joh (2003)) do not include unlisted 
subsidiaries for calculating the ownership ratio of pyramidal and the cross-holding 
structure. However, the database on the stock equity of non-public companies 
provided by Korea Investors’ Service (KIS) and the National Information and Credit 
Evaluation Inc. (NICE) provides information on the equity of the registered 
corporations. Some of this information has been omitted and because ownership 
information of non-public companies is not widely known, they have been excluded 
from the sample group in most cases. Hence, owing to the lack of information, there 
is a possibility that there may be some under-reporting, mostly on the account of the 
independent companies. Therefore, it is assumed that a greater number of companies 
are employing the pyramid structure and it is possible that the gap between the 
independent companies and the 30 largest companies in such employment will 
probably be smaller.
In this framework, there is an incentive for the managers to adopt investment and 
financing polices that benefit themselves, but reduce the payoff to outside 
stockholder or minority shareholder. Thus, the value of the firm depends on the 
fraction of ultimate ownership. This study empirically tested for relations of 
ownership structure and corporate value. I provided evidence on the agency cost 
hypothesis by examining (i) the cash flow rights, the control rights, and the
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divergence between the cash flow rights and the control rights of ultimate owner (ii) 
firm valuation efficiency on ownership structure, and (iii) changes of corporate value 
for panel data (1988-1997) in the sample of Korean listed manufacturing companies.
The results are as follows;
(1) The relation of ownership structure (the cash flow rights, the control rights) and 
the corporate value is non-linear in OLS test.
(2) The divergence between the cash flow rights and the control rights of ultimate 
shareholders affects the firm value.
(3) The divergence between the cash flow rights and the control rights of ultimate 
shareholders which creates a conflicted ownership structure increased to expropriate 
the minority shareholder and agency cost during the 10 year period before East Asia 
crisis.
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Appendix A
(1) Direct cross-holding ownership
Figure Al shows direct cross ownership of shares in which corporation A owns 
shares of corporation B and corporation B owns shares of corporation A.
<Figure A l>  Direct cross-holding ownership
Firm A
Control
Control
Firm A
Firm B
Si and S2  show the equity ratio of the controlling shareholder in each corporation 
A and B signify equity ratio of corporation A and B each own. From the above the 
cash flow rights of the controlling stockholders possess can be shown using sum 
of the following infinite geometric sequence.
S^+  S 2£-+- S 2bab-i- S  xabab+ S'2&a&z&+ + °°
When the above equation is arranged, it can be shown as equation 1-(1), and 
further arrangement yields equation l-(3).
S , [1+  ab+  ••• + Cab) * ' ]] +  S 2b [1+«£+•■■ +  (0 & ) " ' 1] 1-(1)
5 , ( 1— o i * ' 1) S o A Q — a b n~-]) , w-  lim 1 ----- -■+ litn 2 T    l-(2)
*_ioo Q*0 1  fMoo Q>0 1
_ s , S 2b 
1 1 - a h
J  j +  2 b
l - a i  l-(3)
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Therefore, in direct cross ownership of shares as in Figure Al the cash flow rights 
of each controlling shareholder possesses can be expressed as follows
S t + S ,b
CFR =_ i
1 — ab
(2) Cyclic cross-holding ownership
In Korea, direct cross ownership of shares is prohibited by law therefore 
corporations who use cross ownership of shares use cyclic cross ownership of 
shares as shown in Figure A l ,
<Figure A2> Cyclic cross-holding ownership
Firm CControl
Firm A
Control
Control
Firm B
Firm A
Here, Si, S2 , S3 signify direct ownership of each controlling shareholders and a, b, 
and c signify the equity ratio of corporations A, B, and C. In this case, similar to
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the above, cash flow rights of each controlling shareholder can be shown as the 
sum of the infinite geometric sequence shown below.
S] + S2c + S3bc + S}abc + S2cabc + Szbcabc H 1- <*>
Arrangement of the above equation yields the following.
S| *-'1 ]+ -I- (aAc)*-0]
+ 2-(l)
=  lim
n-cc
4- lift
S ^ t t -  [ S . c d -  a t e - 1)
i - * c — r S a  l-ate—
S 3f t g Q -  obcn^ )  |
1—ate J
2-(2)
Therefore, the cash flow rights each controlling shareholder posses in cyclic cross 
ownership of shares as in Figure A2 can be expressed as follows.
Q F R  —  ^1 +  ^ 2 c  ^3 b e
\ — abc
On one hand, when the above equation is examined, numerator S] + S2c + S3bc if 
the cash flow of controlling shareholder that is calculated using the pyramid after 
one cycle, and abc in the denominator 1-abc is the product of percent ownership 
that is linked through the cycle.
(3) Application and demonstration of the simplified equation
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Let us calculate the cash flow rights of controlling shareholders using the 
simplified equation found above. Figure A3 shows the structure of cyclic cross 
ownership of shares.
<Figure A3> Cross-holding -  The simplified equation
ControlFirm A
Firm C
Control
Control Firm B
Firm D
Firm A
First, cash flow rights of controlling shareholder connected through the pyramid, 
namely the equation that will be used as the numerator is Si + S2d  + S3cd .
On the other hand, because the part that is continuously connected through the 
cycle is abd, 1-abc is the denominator. Therefore, cash flow rights of controlling 
shareholders from above can be expressed as follows.
Q pjl =  S3cd
I - a b d
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Now, to check the validity of the equation that is calculated using the simplified 
equation above, let us unfold the equation through its steps. Right of cash flow the 
controlling shareholders possess in cross ownership of shares can be expressed as 
follows.
[ S' 1H- S 2^ +  S'jj'saQ +  t S xabd+- S^dabd-'r S$<ccktbd\
■+-[ S xaJt>dabd+ S %daba4abd-\- S 3cdabdabd\ +  ••• -l-co
Arrangement of the above equation yields equation 3-(2).
S, [H~(aAaE)+ •" + + {abd)
+ S,cd[ 1 + (abd) + ■ • • + (abd)"-' ] 3-(l)
S2d S^cd
T= M + i - o M +  i -a b d
S , - S^cH- S 2c d  
i - o b d 3-(2)
Therefore, right of cash flow the controlling shareholder has in figure A3 is as 
follows.
CFR
_ Sl + S 2d  + S3cd  
1 -  abd
Because the above equation equals the right of cash flow calculated using the 
simplified equation, right of cash flow of controlling shareholder can be easily 
calculated by applying the simplified equation in the first cycle.
Reference: La Porta et al (1999), Claessens (2000)
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Chapter 2: Ownership Structure, Investment and Firm 
Valuation in Korean Companies
1. Introduction
The causes of the East Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 have engendered much 
discussion and this study aims to analyse and develop the debate. This study focuses 
primarily on the effect of firm valuation on investment behaviour in a context where 
there are agency problems with divergence between cash flow rights and control 
rights arising from poor corporate governance. During the crisis of 1997, Korea was 
offered International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans on the condition that Korea would 
improve its system of corporate governance. This was an exceptional and 
unprecedented demand; conditions previously imposed upon other countries by the 
IMF have only demanded the restructuring of specific financial institutions rather 
than the entire system of corporate governance.
A fundamental cause of the East Asian Economic crisis has often been considered to 
be patterns of overinvestment by Korean firms. Multiple theories have been modelled 
to explain and describe the causes of the crisis. At the macroeconomic level, key 
reasons are thought to include the ambiguity surrounding implicit and explicit 
government guarantees for bad loans; financial liberalization policies; a shift from a 
sector-specific industrial policy to functional intervention;25 and the prevalence of 
soft-budget constraints. At the firm level key sources of overinvestment included
25 See Chapter 1, Section 3.1.1.
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problems of agency cost between managers and shareholders; misallocating capital 
owing to poorly planned diversification;26 and the tendency towards the allocation of 
capital through internal capital markets.
First, I need to examine how an ownership structure, combined with systems of poor 
governance, can affect investment through misallocations of resources or capital. It 
will also be debated whether firm performance or value can be negatively affected by 
overinvestment combined with a divergence between control rights and cash flow 
rights. Bebchuk et al (2000) and Almeida et al (2006) both argue that the spreading 
of the cost of overinvestment between shareholders in a business group creates 
significant incentives to over invest in firms that have pyramidal ownership 
structures. This scenario is more likely to occur when the group’s retained earnings 
are very large. The use of pyramid structures, therefore, might inadvertently destroy 
the value of a firm if too much cash is made available to the family. This is the 
setting in which a variation on the oft-cited ‘free cash’ problem is played out.
According to Jensen (1986,1993), the private benefits from controlling more assets 
lead managers to take on wasteful, negative net present value (NPV) investment 
projects. This is known as overinvestment or ‘empire-building’. Conversely, the 
private costs of additional investment may result in managers foregoing some 
positive NPV investment projects. Managers tend to display a preference for 
diminishing their workload; in plain words they are inclined to shirk. As investing 
requires more time to be spent overseeing a firm’s activities, the trend will be for
26 More details are in Chapter 3, ‘Corporate governance, diversification and firm value’.
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managers to under-invest.27 Two very different types of investment behaviour are 
engendered by these two agency problems. As a result, the different investment 
behaviours tend to distinguish between the tangible expenditures of fixed capital and 
research and the intangible expenditures of Research and Development (R&D). 
Outcomes of R&D are uncertain or unpredictable and most of this type of 
expenditure goes towards human resources.
It is therefore assumed that the existence of a controlling ownership leads to a 
different pattern of investment decision-making which results in a characteristic 
investment pattern. In such contexts, I can measure of the extent to which ownership 
structure influences investment behaviour; the study will also explore some 
comparable issues in Korean firms’ investment practices pre-East Asian Economic 
Crisis. Examination of the context of agency problems arising from poor corporate 
governance will help to explain how ownership structure affects investment 
behaviour in terms, of capital and R&D expenditures.
Chapter 1 of this study comprises a discussion of ownership structure and firm value 
in Korean companies; it also includes evidence to support the agency-cost hypothesis 
and examines how the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights affects 
firm value. The relationships within ownership structures, in terms of cash flow and 
control rights, are demonstrated to be non-linear with the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) test. The divergence between the cash flow rights and the control rights of the 
ultimate shareholders also affects firm value. This pattern holds true even after other
27 Generally, I consider underinvestment a situation in which shareholders do not undertake a positive 
NPV project and overinvestment a situation in which they undertake a negative NPV project (Harris 
and Raviv, 1991; Parri'no and Weisbach, 1999).
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variables are considered and controlled for, such as capital expenditure, leverage, 
R&D, advertising or firm size.
Cho (1998) argues in this context that Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Stultz (1988) 
found a relationship between ownership structure and firm value. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) state that ownership structure is strongly related to firm value as a 
result of its effect on investment. Cho (1998) explain the relationship as a two-stage 
process. First, ownership structure affects investment patterns, which then leads to a 
subsequent impact on firm value. This argument is adopted here and will be tested by 
using the case of Korea prior to the East Asian Economic Crisis. In addition, the 
study will examine how ownership structure in systems with poor governance 
affected investment behaviour in and during Korea’s period of financial liberalization 
(1988-1998).
The focus of this study is to examine how a ‘pyramid’ ownership structure involving 
cross-holdings can affect two main types of capital expenditure investment and R&D, 
and how this consequently affects firm value. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that 
the ownership structure of a firm affects its corporate value because it acts as a 
significant variable on investment level. Despite ongoing debate about this subject, 
much of the analysis remains theoretical and few empirical studies have been 
conducted to test the validity of models and confirm the posited theory of 
overinvestment. Furthermore, few studies have explored the relationship between 
investment behaviours as seen within the framework of how both capital expenditure 
and R&D relate to ownership structure. The present study aims to fill this gap; it also 
investigates the relationship between investment behaviour and debt policy in
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ultimate ownership structures (chaebol and non-chaebol) during financial 
deregulation and liberalization. Overinvestment is strongly related to over-borrowing 
from banks and traditionally Korean banks have lacked a strong and efficient system 
for monitoring debt-holders.
Section 2 includes a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on investment, 
ownership and value relationships. Section 3 focuses on agency cost, corporate 
governance and financial liberalization policies. Within this context, I develop 
hypotheses regarding the effect of corporate governance, as well as investment and 
debt policies, on investment behaviour. Section 4 outlines the methodology used to 
calculate investment, including both capital expenditure and R&D expenditure, and 
the use of control variables. In Section 5, equations are constructed to represent the 
investment patterns of Korean firms; these will incorporate quantitative variables, 
such as market value, debt ratio and cash flows and will include simultaneous 
equation regression (2SLS) analyses. A brief summary concludes the section.
. i
2. Theoretical background
2.1 Fixed capital expenditure, agency cost and firm value
Overinvestment in cash flow, investment and investment opportunity has been the 
focus of several studies of agency cost. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
firm-level investment should not be related to internally generated cash flows. In a 
theoretical scenario, with perfect capital markets and perfect information, no 
relationship would exist between investment activities at the firm level and internally
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generated cash flows. If additional cash were required by a firm to fund investment 
activity, it could be simply raised from external capital markets. Conversely, if excess 
cash were available beyond that needed to fund available positive NPV projects, a 
firm would then distribute the cash flow to external markets. There is inevitably a 
disparity between this perfect world and the ways in which firms actually operate; in 
fact, a variety of hindrances inhibit the raising of cash from external capital markets. 
Additionally, significant transaction costs are associated with monitoring 
management to ensure that any free cash flow reaches external capital markets. Such 
capital market frictions can serve collectively to support a positive relationship 
between a firm’s investment activities and its internally generated cash flow.
Several studies, however, have shown the existence of a positive relationship 
between investment expenditure and cash flow (e.g. Hubbard, 1998). There are two 
ways of explaining the dependent variables behind this relationship. First, I can see 
this as an agency problem, where managers engage in wasteful expenditure in firms 
with free cash flows (Jensen, 1986; Stultz, 1990). An agency cost explanation has 
been put forward by Jensen (1986) and Stultz (1990); this suggests that difficulties 
associated with monitoring expenditure create the potential for management to spend 
the excess cash flow on projects that are of benefit from a management perspective, 
but which prove costly from a shareholder perspective. The crux of the free cash flow 
hypothesis is that when managers’ aims are different from shareholders’ the potential 
exists for the squandering of any internally generated cash flow that is in excess of 
that required to maintain existing assets and finance new positive NPV projects. 
Second, it has been argued that the existence of a positive relationship reflects 
imperfections in the capital market: costly external financing creates the potential for
95
internally generated cash flows to increase in response to feasible investment 
opportunities (e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Hubbard, 1998).
The implications of the free cash flow hypothesis on firm investment activity have 
been investigated in a number of papers. Lamont (1997) and Berger and Hann (2003) 
offer evidence that supports the hypothesis of cash-rich segments cross-subsidising 
the less profitable segments in diversified firms. They do not argue, however, that the 
evidence provided by these papers could also be seen as consistent with the theory 
that market frictions inhibit the ability of a firm to raise capital externally. Therefore, 
their evidence may not indicate overinvestment. Similar evidence is also provide by 
Harford (1999) and Opler, Pinkowitz, Stultz and Williamson (1999). The Harford 
sample consists of 487 takeover bids, and attempts to document that firms that are 
cash-rich tend to make more acquisitions; the authors suggest that these ‘cash-rich’ 
acquisitions tend to be followed by declining operating performance. Opler et al 
(1999) argued that companies holding excess cash tend to have higher capital 
expenditures, spending more on acquisitions even when faced with poor investment 
opportunities. However, what appears to be perhaps the most convincing evidence of 
the overinvestment of free cash flow is found in Blanchard, Lopez-di-Silanes and 
Vishny (1994). This study found that eleven firms that received unanticipated cash 
from legal settlements then went on to indulge in wasteful expenditure.
All the prior research agrees on the common ground of an agency-based explanation 
supporting a positive association between investment and internally generated cash 
flow. The drawback of such studies, however, is their use of relatively small sample 
populations, and lack of any direct measurement of overinvestment or free cash flow.
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As a result, such findings may not necessarily be reliably extrapolated to larger 
sample populations, nor can they be held to be directly and unarguably explained by 
the agency-cost thesis. It can be further posited that a positive association suggested 
by their data may merely indicate that cash flows can be used as a proxy for 
investment opportunities (e.g., Alti, 2003).
Agency-based theories are not the only explanations put forward for the link between 
firm-level investment and internally generated free cash flow. A significant amount 
of research has been devoted to examining the role of financing constraints ( Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1991; Fazzari and 
Petersen, 1993; Whited, 1992; Hubbard, 1998). Another study, (Myers and Majluf, 
1984) describes the central role of information asymmetries in increasing the capital 
cost for firms which find themselves forced to raise external finances, resulting in a 
reduction in feasible investment. When internally generated cash flow is made 
available, in conjunction with a lower cost of capital, such firms will then invest 
more.
Other work focuses on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow by comparing high 
dividend-paying firms with their obverse counterparts. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988), Whited (1992) and Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), for example, 
compare a range of organisational structures with various abilities to raise external 
finance, and examine how they relate to debt constraints. Their results found 
evidence of greater investment sensitivity to cash flow for firms that appear to be 
financially constrained, such as low dividend-paying firms, firms holding high levels 
of debt, and firms with limited resources. More recent research, however, casts doubt
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on those earlier results: Kaplan and Zingales (1997,2000), found such sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow persists even for firms who do not face financing constraints. 
A measure was constructed, using ex ante financing constraints, from a small sample 
of firms and this found a negative relationship between the sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow. This finding makes the financing constraint hypothesis less clear-cut 
and more doubtful.
2.2 Investment by Korean chaebols
Investment decisions by chaebols are the focus of several studies; (as opposed to 
concentrating more generally on ownership structure). Shin and Park (1999) and Kim
(2002) completed studies demonstrating that chaebols, in contrast to standalone 
firms, tend to have an average lower Tobin q but higher ratios of investment. While 
keeping variables for the number of investment opportunities constant, they found 
that chaebols tend to invest more. However, this conclusion is also subject to the 
reservation mentioned above, where the results may, in fact, represent a disparity 
between too much investment by chaebols or too little investment by standalone 
firms.
In examining cases of internal market reallocation, Shin and Park (1999) argue that 
there are no significant differences among chaebols between investments by high-q 
and low-q firms; however, high-q firms are the higher investors by a significant 
margin among standalones. Chaebol-affiliated firms with good investment 
opportunities tend to invest less than standalone firms according to Kim (2002); 
conversely, chaebol affiliates with poor investment opportunities tend to invest more
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than comparable standalone firms. Hahn (1999) argues that in Korea prior to the 
crisis of 1997, the top five chaebols tended to invest more in high-risk subsidiaries. 
Ueda (1999) focuses on the subset of the Korean heavy machinery and chemical 
industries during 1970-1990 in his study of investment behaviour and attempts to 
illustrate patterns of over- or underinvestment in the anticipated marginal products of 
capital. His method was to take cases where the anticipated marginal products of 
capital for a specific industry were lower than the average and interpret this as 
evidence of overinvestment in that industry.
Diversification is often associated with a misallocation of capital investment towards 
less profitable and more high-risk business sectors, which therefore tends to lead to 
patterns of overinvestment and inhibits innovation. Claessens eta l{  1998) examined 
the misallocation of capital hypothesis, finding that firms in Indonesia, Korea, 
Taiwan and Thailand appeared to have experienced a decline in short-term 
performance as a result of vertical integration. This suggests the possibility that a 
main cause of the East Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 was overinvestment.28
2.3 Ownership structure, R&D and firm value
R&D expenditure represents a special type of investment where results are neither 
immediate nor definite. Holmstrom (1989) identifies five major characteristics of 
innovation (and by extension R&D). First, the existence of a long-term project; 
second, a high probability of failure; third, an unpredictable outcome; fourth, labour- 
intensivity; and fifth, idiosyncratic R&D expenditure, may therefore be entirely
28 More detail is found in Chapter 3, ‘Ownership structure, diversification and firm value in Korean 
companies.’
unproductive, or at least may only translate into profits after many years. Such 
uncertainty and lack of quantitative measurements create difficulties for investors 
wishing to know the value of R&D expenditures. However, despite this, investment 
in R&D is essential for both the growth and survival of firms, especially in sectors 
such as pharmaceuticals and technology. In terms of innovation, therefore, decisions 
regarding the extent of R&D expenditure become very important for corporations and 
are usually made at the discretion of the management. Therefore, it can be seen that a 
separation of ownership and control in the firm causes agency-cost problems 
resulting from the information asymmetries between owners and managers. This can 
have a significant negative impact on the firm’s decision-making processes and, in 
particular, on decisions concerning investment in the firm’s growth.
The causes of information asymmetry are the managers’ inability to provide 
information about their firms and the reluctance of many investors to examine firm 
activities. Understanding information asymmetry between managers and shareholders 
is vital for comprehending how incentives exist for managers to over- or under-invest 
in R&D. This is the key for understanding the relationship between different types of 
ownership and innovation. Even without agency problems, asymmetric information 
could result in firms under-investing which would be a significant source of 
inefficiency (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The more information provided for the 
shareholder the easier it becomes to place a value on R&D investments. If a firm has 
a large proportion of shareholders who actively seek information, the lower the 
information asymmetry in the firm and thus the lower the potential for managers to 
be subjected to short-term pressures.
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Large shareholders have more at stake and therefore a greater incentive than smaller 
shareholders to obtain detailed information. Concentrated ownership can often result 
in liquidity problems for shareholders as large shareholders or ‘blockholders’ cannot 
sell significantly large holdings in a company without a proportional lowering of its 
stock price. Investors therefore are mutually dependent on managers to create value 
and turn over profits, while managers strongly depend on investors’ confidence in the 
firm. This dependence therefore results in a long-term relationship between investors 
and managers and increases incentives to reduce information asymmetry among 
investors. It is not surprising, therefore, that several studies have demonstrated the 
existence of a positive association between the level of stock concentration and R&D 
investments in firms in the United States (e.g. Hansen and Hill, 1991; Hill and Snell, 
1989). As a result, in a context where managers’ and owners’ interests have already 
been aligned, such as firms where owners are stewards, the influence of large 
investors should not affect R&D investment.
Little empirical research has been conducted into the relationship between agency 
cost and innovation. Here, this relationship will be examined and explained, drawing 
on both management strategy studies and finance studies. Hill and Snell (1989) and 
Hansen and Hill (1991), in their studies of U.S. firms, demonstrate a positive 
relationship between the level of stock concentration and R&D investments. Love et 
al (1996) in studying Scottish firms, posits that foreign ownership of companies 
results in a greater likelihood of product innovation. However, Dixon and Seddi 
(1996) suggest that whether ownership is domestic or foreign does not significantly 
impact on R&D activities. Francis and Smith (1995) use U.S. data to argue that 
diffusely held firms show less tendency towards innovation than closely held firms
(firms with either a high concentration of management ownership or with a 
significant equity block held by an outside investor). Using the Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) approach to examine the relationship between insider ownership and 
Tobin’s q for high R&D firms, Cui and Mak (2002) describe an N-shaped 
relationship. They go on to argue that higher levels of ownership can substitute for 
poor board governance in such firms. Lee and O’Neill (2003) compared relationships 
between ownership concentration and R&D activity in both Japan and the United 
States. They reported that although ownership concentration is positively associated 
with R&D in the United States, no such relationship exists in Japan. However, in a 
study of Japanese and U.S. firms, Lee (2005) reports the opposite result: that stock 
concentration is positively related to innovation with a low level of R&D investment, 
but negatively related to innovation at higher levels, in the U.S and Japan. Using 
R&D expenditure data Jensen (1993) demonstrates the ineffectiveness of internal 
corporate governance control mechanisms, but Chung, Wright and Kedia (2003) 
report that the type of corporate governance is a significant dependent variable in 
modelling the relationship between firm value (measured by Tobin’s q29) and R&D. 
For firms with a greater proportion of external directors and greater access to analysis 
it seems that the valuation effect of R&D is greater.
Such results suggest that concentrated ownership and shareholder monitoring are an 
effective combination in alleviating high agency and contracting costs associated 
with innovation. As a result, a company’s management and the organisation of 
innovation activities depend on the type of company ownership structure, or the 
legalities of corporate governance. Research has shown significant market responses
29 See Section 4.
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to announcements of increases in R&D expenditures (Chan et al, 2001). Such 
reactions vary according to the industry; the reaction can be significantly positive for 
high-technology firms but markedly negative for low-technology firms.30 This 
implies an investment opportunity hypothesis (using Tobin’s q), whereby firms with 
promising growth opportunities find R&D investments worthwhile, whereas other 
firms might find such investments wasteful.
Szewczyk et al (1996) examines the effect that free cash flow (financial constraints) 
can have on cross-sectional differences in market responses to R&D. Jensen (1986) 
reports that free cash flow tends to result in wasteful investments by managers rather 
than any distribution to shareholders. For firms with a high free cash flow, R&D 
investments carry an arguably higher cost. Conversely, R&D investments by firms 
with a low free cash flow increase the probability of the firm seeking new external 
financing. A firm’s willingness to undergo the potential agency cost of external 
financing may be a favourable signal to investors. As a result, any announcement- 
period with abnormal returns for increases in R&D will be inversely related to free 
cash flow. Any free cash flow may result from the firm’s investment opportunities.
Debt and dividend policy are much less important variables for constraining R&D- 
induced agency problems. Jensen (1986,1989) defines agency problem as a dispute 
about free cash flow and it seems that such mechanisms are not well-suited to 
managing the agency problems induced by R&D. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith and Servaes
(2003) used R&D to measure asymmetric information and found that agency 
problems are a prime cause of increased cash holdings, concluding that high levels of
30 Chan et al (2001)
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R&D are associated with higher cash levels. It seems plausible, however, that many 
firms engaging in R&D maintain higher cash levels to self-finance R&D activities. 
Firms cannot pay out cash when involved in high levels of R&D activity. It seems the 
solution is not higher dividends; it is widely understood that firms with high growth 
options (e.g. a typical high-R&D firm) will have a lower dividend payout ratio (La 
Porta et al, 2000).
Galende and Fuente (2003) and Ortega-Argiles et al (2005) examine some samples 
of Spanish manufacturing industries for 2001 in terms of their financing mechanism. 
They found that a high level of debt in a company suggests that incremental 
innovations are being generated as opposed to radical innovations. The intangibility 
of many radical technological investments results in increased transaction costs and 
information asymmetries. Both of these factors can dissuade a firm from debt 
financing, whereas the availability of internal funds may mean that the greater risks 
involved with radical innovations can be more effectively confronted.
Ortega-Argiles et al (2005) demonstrates that the relationship between a high degree 
of ownership concentration and the use of debt financing (which can dissuade a firm 
from incurring R&D expenditure), is not a significant variable in the creation of 
R&D output. Debt financing, therefore, can inhibit innovative activities, because of 
the high specificity of many technological investments, activities incurring high risk, 
and pre-existing information asymmetries. However, there are more complex issues 
related to debt policy: following the Myers-Majluf ‘pecking order’ theory, R&D 
could be expected to be financed by retained earnings rather than by debt. However, 
Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that having ‘unique’ assets tends to be associated
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with lower debt levels: consumers will buy unique products only if they are confident 
that the firm will survive to provide after-sales service. They also note that the lack of 
a secondary market and non-collaterability are both factors that serve to mitigate 
debt-financed R&D activity. Furthermore, Shi (2003) also indicates that R&D 
activity, which increases the market value of equity, also has an impact in increasing 
bond default risk and risk premium to debt. Ceteris paribus, bond holders may 
therefore be unwilling to bear the increased risks related to greater R&D activity. 
However, Zantout (1997) reports that shareholder gains from R&D announcements 
are not always associated with bondholder losses, which would seem to indicate that 
debt can even be valuable to R&D-intensive firms. Galende and De la Fuente (2003) 
discuss some significant effects of business financing mechanisms; they argue that 
high financial debt leads to the generation of incremental innovations rather than 
radical innovations. Bah and Dumontier (2001), however, report that R&D-intensive 
firms hold lower levels of debt than comparable non-R&D-intensive firms. 
Generally, it is accepted that R&D is associated with less debt in the firm’s capital 
structure.
2.3 Investment (fixed capital and R&D) and firm value in expropriating 
minority shareholders
Most previous studies (Hoshi andKasyhap, 1990; Hoshi etal, 1991; Lamont, 1997; 
Shin and Stultz, 1998) ignore R&D expenditure and only one empirical study is 
available examining the relationship between pyramid ownership and innovation in 
Canadian firms. A study by Morck et al (1998) shows a lack of support by 
established firms for radical innovations. Indeed, entrenched managers can even be 
seen as holding a vested interest in blocking innovation (Act et al, 1995). Morck et al
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(1998) found that heir-controlled31 firms do appear to be less innovative than 
entrepreneur-controlled firms or widely held firms. A comparison between different 
countries supports this by demonstrating that countries with extensive inherited 
wealth have less aggregate private-sector spending on innovation.
Morck et al (1998) posits that heir-controlled Canadian firms show low industry- 
adjusted financial performance, labour capital ratios and R&D spending when 
compared with firms of the same age and size. They argue that the share price of 
heir-controlled Canadian firms fell relative to those of comparable firms, on receipt 
of the news of the ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA): capital market openness is a key provision of the treaty. Under NAFTA, 
heir-controlled Canadian firms’ labour capital ratios increased, while the level of 
heir-control fell. This suggests that openness, especially of capital markets, may 
mitigate the ill effects of concentrated shareholder or heir control. If this is true, 
capital market openness matters for more reasons than usually stated in standard 
international trade and finance models.
2.4 Financial liberalization in corporate governance
Another source of overinvestment is financial liberalization. McKinnon and Pill 
(1996) also assert that many liberalizing economies have suffered from the over- 
borrowing that has resulted directly from over-consumption and overinvestment. 
Chang et al (1998) argue that excessive investments in the private sector in Korea led
31 Morck et al divide billionaires who are not self-made into different categories. Heirs who 
control firms indicate that they are clearly not billionaires because of their entrepreneurial 
talents; these heirs include those to great business fortunes and political dynasties. There are 
also heir-entrepreneurs, who have both inherited and greatly increased substantial fortunes.
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to the crisis of 1997 and this had been made possible by a policy of rapid and ill- 
designed financial liberalization.
Member firms within the Top 30 Chaebols are interconnected through an extensive 
network of reciprocal shareholding agreements. Korean banks are expected to play an 
active monitoring role in a firm’s investment decisions as they are allowed to own up 
to 10% of the equity of firms. In fact, Korean banks provide many firms with 
substantial equity and debt financing.32 For example, in 1997 the equity ownership 
held by Korean banks accounted for 9.42% of the shares listed on the KSE. 
Furthermore, the Korean government has often used its control of banks to exercise 
control over firms. This suggests that Korean banks have a significant potential for 
performing the role of an active investor but have traditionally not exercised a 
monitoring role. One reason for this is that Korean banks have traditionally held 
shares primarily to allocate their portfolio assets rather than to exercise voting rights. 
Second, concentrated equity ownership by chaebol owners, combined with cross­
shareholding practices within chaebol firms, effectively prevents banks from playing 
the monitoring role of a large shareholder. Finally, most bank loans are guaranteed by 
cross-debt guarantees among chaebol member firms. This suggests that banks have 
little incentive or room to undertake the role of an active monitor (Bae et al, 2002).
Ryou and Kim (2003) demonstrate three ways that capital account liberalization
affected capital inflows in the 1990s: first, there was an aggressive search for higher
returns on capital by banks and financial institutions in developed countries where
growth levels were slow and domestic markets were highly competitive. This was the
32 Under Article 200 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1962, which was in effect until March 1997, 
investors were not allowed to acquire more than 10% of the equity of other firms without the 
permission of the Korean Securities and Exchange Commission.
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major cause of the expansion of private capital flow to the developing countries, 
especially in the mid-1990s when Japanese banks followed their corporate foreign 
investors in lending much of their short-term capital to East Asian countries. Second, 
a large differential between domestic and foreign interest rates resulted in incentives 
for Korean banks to accommodate local lending by borrowing abroad. Third, the 
increase in the mid-1990s of the credit ratings of Korean banks and corporations in 
the international financial market meant that they could enjoy easier access to 
investment funds from abroad.33 It can be argued therefore that the consequence of 
financial liberalization during the 1990s was an increase in capital inflows to the 
Korean economy. The capital account surplus and rising bank borrowing from abroad 
in the 1994—1996 period can therefore be better explained by ‘push’ rather than ‘pull’ 
factors.
3. Developing a testable hypothesis
Theoretically, the impact of ownership structure on firm investment could be 
explained in two ways. Under the incentive alignment hypothesis,34 high ownership 
could reduce the incentive for the largest shareholder to expropriation. On the other 
hand, under the entrenchment hypothesis,35 ultimate owners gain nearly full control
33 Capital flow and interest rates (US$ billion and %)
Variable (year) 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Capital account balance % -2.9 2.6 6.4 6.6 2.7 10.3 16.8 23.3 1.3
Bank’s borrowings 0.6 2.1 3.9 1.6 0.5 7.6 10.6 9.7 -9.7
Loan rates o f Korea % 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.5 8.5 8.5 9.0 11.0 15.32
Prime rates of Japan % 5.75 8.25 6.63 4.50 3.30 3.00 1.63* 1.63* 1.63*
Euro dollar Libor 8.25 7.56 4.13 3.31 3.38 6.50 5.81 5.56 5.81
Source: Ryou and Kim (2003), Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistics, various issues. IMF, 
International Financial Statistics, various issues. * This table indicates that the gap between Korea 
and Japanese loan rates grew extensively from 1995.
34 Jensen and Meckling (1976) and greater detail in Chapter 1.
35 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and greater detail in Chapter 1
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of the firm and use it to generate private control benefits that are not shared by 
minority shareholders. Pyramid and cross-holding structures allow a separation of 
their control rights from cash flow rights and serve to expropriate minority 
shareholders.
Different investment behaviours tend to distinguish between the tangible 
expenditures of fixed capital and the intangible expenditures of R&D. Returns on 
R&D are uncertain or unpredictable, and most of its expenditure goes towards human 
resources (personnel expenses). Under the overinvestment hypothesis, the private 
benefits from controlling more assets lead managers to take on wasteful, negative net 
present value (NPV) investment projects (empire building). Conversely, under the 
underinvestment hypothesis, the private costs of additional investment may result in 
managers foregoing some positive NPV investment projects.
Let us assume that entrenched controlling shareholders or managers could expect 
better returns and private benefits from tangible assets than intangible ones. I could 
also expect some divergence between control rights and the cash flow rights of 
ultimate owners when increasing capital expenditure in the context of poor 
investment opportunities. In the same way, managers or owners could be expected to 
be reluctant to invest in R&D in an environment of good investment opportunities. 
The degree of this incentive may change according to the level of ownership. In order 
to examine this relationship, the following hypothesis is constructed:
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Hypothesis 1: I f  the ultimate or entrenched manager has higher private benefit or 
interest from investing in capital expenditure when compared to R&D, then it is 
expected they will follow strategies to maximise this private benefit. This means that 
they may choose to invest inefficiently in fixed assets when it is not optimal to do so, 
from a firm value perspective.
I discuss the effect of debt ratios on overinvestment in the context of capital market 
opening and financial liberalization in Section 2.4.36 Corsetti et al (1999) argue that 
moral hazard jointly determines investment, excessive borrowing and current account 
deficit in an economy with a poorly supervised and regulated financial sector. 
Demetriades and Fattouch (2001) showed that the volume of unproductive credit 
increased sharply during the 1993-1996 period.
17I also investigated the link between investment behaviours and debt ratio , 
comparing group-affiliated firms and independent firms. The following hypothesis is 
developed in order to examine this relationship:
Hypothesis 2: In the context o f a poor monitoring system o f banks, the debt policy o f  
firms influences investment behaviour. It is expected that this relation changes with
36 Agency problems between shareholders and bondholders (there are two types of under the weak 
monitoring system for bondholder or bank agency cost of debt: underinvestment problems (i.e. debt 
overhang problems, Myers, 1997) and asset substitution effects (i.e. overinvestment problem, Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).
See section 2.4 In an alternative explanation, Litov (2006) studies how improved governance 
mechanisms affect firm financing. He points out that, paradoxically, managers’ endogenous 
choices in favour of riskier investment policy can serve to indicate the strength of the corporate 
governance in place. He notes (2006, page 2) ‘Well-monitored (or well-governed) managers are 
more likely to undertake risky (and value-enhancing) projects because it is easier to distinguish 
between “bad” managerial luck and “bad” managerial judgment in a monitored environment.
Firms with riskier investment policies would have lower levels of debt compared to firms with 
safer investment policies. In equilibrium better governed firms would choose lower debt levels 
compared to badly governed firms’.
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the degree o f financial liberalization. In a climate o f higher liberalization, over- 
borrowing is expected, leading to an overinvestment problem.
4. Data and methodology
This study uses data from the Korean Investors Service Line (KIS-LINE, which is a 
Korean financial database for publicly traded companies). The sample includes 1892 
non-financial Korean companies trading in the Korea Stock Exchange from 1988 to 
1 9 9 ? 3 8  j i ^  combination 0f  the 1,892 companies with a 10 year period of analysis 
forms an unbalanced panel in accordance with the appropriate panel data 
methodology (Verbeek and Nijman, 1992).
I use the Fair Trade Commission’s annual report to identify which firms are affiliated 
with a chaebol and which are independent.39 Firms affiliated with the top 30 chaebol 
are designated by ‘affiliated firms’ and firms not associated with these chaebol 
‘independent’.
Following chapter 1 ,1 suggest a piecewise linear regression of firm value on cash 
flow rights of ownership structure and OLS linear regression of firm value on 
divergence between cash flow rights and control rights of ownership structure. The 
results show that the relation of control ownership and firm value is non-linear, a 
result similar to that of Morck et al (1988) and that the divergence between the cash 
flow rights and the control rights of ultimate shareholders affects negatively the firm
38 More detail in Section 4.1, Chapter 1.
39 k ptc  legitimately defines a business group as “ a group of companies, more than 30 percent of 
whose shares are owned by some individuals or by companies controlled by those individuals”
The KFTC identifies business groups and announces them every year.
111
value. This relation holds after controlling for other well-known determinants of firm 
value such as capital investment research and development, advertising, leverage, 
firm age, firm size in a fixed effect model.
I estimate the following models of the investment to investigate whether 
ownership structure affects investment.
INV (CES, RD) = F (TOBINQ, CFREE, RISK, CFCR, OWN1 OWN2 OWN3 
OWN4, SIZE)
INV (CES): The ratio of capital expenditure to fixed assets.40 
INV (RD): The ratio of research and development to fixed assets.
TOBINQ: The firm’s market to book ratio.
CFREE: Cash flow to the beginning of the total asset ratio.
RISK: Standard deviation in changes in profit rate.
CFCR: Divergence between cash flow rights and control rights.
OWN1-OWN4: Cash flow rights in ownership structure.
SIZE: Logarithm of the total asset.
Capital expenditure (CES) is the change in the gross capital stock over a year. The 
gross capital expenditure is the sum of individual tangible fixed assts such as 
property, plant and equipment divided by the previous year-end’s capital stock. 
Research and development (R&D) is the change in the gross intangible assets for 
experimental and research expenses divided by the previous year-end’s capital stock. 
In the case of cash flow rights41, following chapter 1, I undertake a piecewise 
analysis by defining some significant break-points or thresholds. Hence, I have
40 The measure of investment is the same as in Hoshi and Kasyhap (1990) and Hoshi et al. (1991).
41 More detail is in Chapter 1.
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defined four variables (OWN 1, OWN2, OWN3, Own 4) aimed to reflect the different 
influence of ownership structure depending on the level of cash flow rights of 
ultimate ownership. OWN1 equals the percentage of cash flow rights of ultimate 
owners having lower than 14%. The level of cash flow rights chosen as breakpoints is 
14% and 24%. OWN2 is defined as the percentage of cash flow right ownership 
minus 14% provided that ultimate owner does not have more than 24% of the shares. 
OWN3 is defined as the percentage of cash flow right ownership minus 24% 
provided that ultimate owner do not have more than 50% of the shares. OWN4 equals 
a percentage of cash flow rights of ultimate owner having higher than 50%.
Cash-flow (CFREE) is used to take into account the financing problems that are 
encountered in an imperfect finance market. This means, as is suggested by the 
Modigliani and Miller theory, that investment is independent of the financing 
methods if the cost of using the cash-flow is the same as using external finance. 
However, there is an agency problem between creditors and debtors as suggested by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) where the type of investment is influenced by the cash­
flow as it costs less than other financing methods. As a result, firms that have 
different levels of cash flows must have corresponding different scales of investment. 
This idea was first formulated by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), who analyze 
the correlation between funds constraints and investment. They find that the cost of 
funds varies accordingjo the type of financing used and as a result firms use the 
cheapest first, which leads to what is known as ‘Financing Hierarchies.’ Using cash
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flow, which tends to be regarded as the cheapest fund, definitely affects the level of 
investment,42
Growth or investment opportunity is measured by Tobin’s Q (TOBINQ). The firm’s 
market to book ratio is used to measure Tobin’s Q as in (Smith and Watts 1992), i.e. 
(the firm’s book value of total assets + market value of outstanding shares- book 
value of equity)/firm’s book value of total assets. Chan, Martin, and Kensinger 
(1990) and Zantout and Testsekos (1994) analyse proxy growth opportunities using a 
binary (high, low) technology variable. Firm size (SIZE) may be positively related to 
investments because of economies of scale and scope.
I link this approach with the ownership structure factor to investigate the correlation 
between ownership structure and the internal financing constraints of investment 
from the standpoint of the relationship between cash-flow-investment sensitivity in 
investment opportunities. I also include debt ratio in the model in order to analysis 
investment behaviour in the financial liberalization period (1988-997). It is argued 
that a high debt ratio involves a high credit risk, and makes it difficult for firms to 
access external finance and, therefore, may constrain the investment. Next, I test 
whether the ownership structure affects investment, and explore the relationship 
between corporate governance, investment and the value of the company.
Cho (1998) focuses on whether the ownership structure affects investment, and 
explains the relationship between corporate governance, investment and the value of
42 Hoshi et al. (1991) investigate empirically Japanese firms based on the same approach, and 
show that compared with independent firms. Keiretsu firms have lower sensitivity of investment to 
cash flow.
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the company. Cho (1998) describes how corporate governance impacts on investment 
and in its turns how investment affects the value of the company. Cho (1998) also 
examines the possibility that the ownership structure, investment and the value of the 
company are endogenous rather than exogenous factors. The simultaneous regression 
analysis shows that the endogenous traits of the ownership structure affected this 
assumption and that investment affects the value of the company and that the value of 
the firm affects the ownership structure. Therefore, I conduct a simultaneous equation 
analysis of ultimate ownership, corporate value, and investment for Korean 
companies in 1988-1997, using a 2SLS method to estimate the parameters in the 
following equation:
Ownership structure = FA (Corporate value (TOBINQ), Investment (INV), 
Volatility of earnings (RISK), Cash free (CFREE), Asset size (SIZE)) (1-1)
Corporate value = FB (Ultimate ownership (CF, CFCR), Investment (INV), 
Financial leverage, (DRC), Asset size (SIZE)) (1-2)
Investment = FC (Ultimate ownership (CF, CFCR), Corporate value (TOBINQ), 
Volatility of earnings (RISK), Cash free (CFREE)) (1-3)
These equations are similar to the one estimated by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
Cho (1998). I estimate investment separating capital expenditures and R&D, and 
insider ownership is cash flow rights of ultimate ownership and divergence between 
cash flow rights and control rights. Volatility can be measured by looking at the 
standard deviation in changes in the profit rate over the most recent five year period.
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Profit rate is defined as profits made without any extraordinary items, divided by 
total assets. Debt can negatively affect the rate of investment if it prevents firms from 
raising necessary funds (Long & Ravenscraft 1993; Myers 1977) or curtails 
overinvestment by compounding agency problems between managers and 
shareholders (Jensen 1989). Leverage is defined following Froot, Scharfstein, & 
Stein, (1994) and Myers & Majiluf (1984) and R&D intensity and advertising 
intensity are used as proxies for intangible knowledge-based resources. (Chatteijee & 
Wemerfelt 1991).
5. Empirical results
5.1 Ownership structure and investment
5.1.1 Analysis of the variables influencing ownership structure and 
investment patterns
Average values for the rate of investment and its determinants are summarized in 
Table 2-1. The sample period is set between 1988 and 1997, years that well illustrate 
the volatile changes in investment occurring in the late 1980s. The overall fixed 
capital investment (CES) rate is 9%, and the R&D rate is 0.6%. As expected, rates of 
investment in fixed CES and R&D show that the affiliated firms invested more than 
the independent firms. The level of divergence between cash flow rights and control 
rights may be defined as follows. Low divergences show a higher-than-mean cash 
flow rights minus control rights, and high divergences show lower-than-mean cash 
flow rights minus control rights.
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Growth opportunities measured by Tobin’s q were greater for independent firms 
(non-30 top chaebol) than for affiliated firms (top 30 chaebol) and greater in 
situations of low divergence between cash flow rights and control rights. The lower 
Tobin’s q result of affiliated firms compared to independent firms is similar to the 
findings of Lang and Stultz (1994) and Shin and Park (1999). The debt/asset ratio 
between the two types of firms also showed a marked difference during the period 
from 1988 to 1997. However, the volatility of return measured by the standard 
deviation of profit was greater for independent firms than for affiliated firms. 
Descriptive statistics indicate that, on average, affiliated firms had lower growth 
opportunities and lower cash flow than independent firms but were highly leveraged 
and invested more heavily.
Table 2-1 Summary statistics for variables used in econometric analyses for
Sample 1892 of Korean companies_____________________ (Mean, 1988-1997)
Variable All Affiliated
firms
Independent
firms
Low
divergence
High
divergence
CES 0.0987 0.0973 0.0875 0.0984 0.0954
RD 0.0062 0.0075 0.0051 0.0067 0.0060
TOBINQ 1.0699 1.0497 1.0825 1.0322 0.9840
DRC 0.7197 0.7672 0.6831 0.7255 0.7179
CFREE 0.0178 0.0144 0.0224 0.0170 0.0186
RISK 0.0233 0 . 0 2 0 0 0.0257 0 . 0 2 0 1 0.02426
This table present means of variables for Top 30 chaebols (Affiliated firms) and non -  
chaebols (Independent firms), and level of divergence of cash flow rights and control rights 
(Low divergence define higher than mean of cash flow rights minus control rights, High 
divergence define lower than mean of cash flow rights minus control rights). The sample is 
comprised of 1892 firms observed in any year between 1988 and 1997. Capital expenditure 
(CES) is change in the gross capital stock over a year. The gross capital expenditure for sum 
of individual tangible fixed assts such as property, plant and equipment divided by the 
previous year-end’s capital stock. Research and development (R&D) is change in the gross
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intangible assets for experimental and research expense divided by the previous year-end’s 
capital stock. Firm value or investment opportunity measured by Tobin’s q (TOBINQ), that 
is, (firm’s book value of total assets + market value of outstanding shares- book value of 
equity)/firm’s book value of total assets. Debt ratio (DRC) defines total debt divided by total 
assets. Free cash flow (CFREE) defines cash flow to the beginning of the total asset ratio. 
Volatility of return (RISK) is standard deviation in changes in profit rate during the past five 
years. Profit rate is defined as profit before extraordinary items divided by total assets.
5.1.2 Results for Hypothesis I on the relationship between ultimate ownership 
and investment
The results in Table 2-1 suggest that affiliated firms with high divergence between 
cash flow rights and control rights ownership (CFCR) (hereafter referred to as ‘high 
divergence ownership’) have poorer investment opportunities, but have higher capital 
expenditure ratios and lower R/D ratios than independent firms. The Tobin’s q 
investment model suggests that a value-maximising firm will invest as long as the 
market value of the firm is greater than the book value of the firm. As discussed in 
Section 2, when poor investment opportunity (lower Tobin’s q) is linked with a 
higher rate of cash investment, this will result in overinvestment. Correspondingly, 
higher investment opportunity (higher Tobin’s q) linked with lower investment will 
result in underinvestment.
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Table 2-2 Regressions Relating Investment and ownership______ (1988-1997)
Capital expenditure 
(1) (2)
R&D expenditure 
(3) (4)
OWN1 0.1114 0.1317 -0.0136* -0.0135*
(0.40) (0.47) (-1.75) (-1.75)
OWN2 0.2469* 0.2510* -0.0073* -0.0149**
(1.88) (1.90) (-2.01) (-2.16)
OWN 3 0.1173 0.0966 -0.0022 -0.0016
(0.74) (0.61) (-0.51) (-0.38)
OWN4 -0.0487 -0.0109 0.002 0.0404
(-0.24) (-0.31) (0.43) (0.79)
CFCR -0.1291*** -0.1364*** 0.011 0.0013
(-2.94) (-3.04) (0.97) (1.07)
TOBINQ -0.0140
(-1.33)
0.0408**
(2.49)
RISK 0.1918
(1.00)
0.0084
(1.60)
CFREE 0.1063*
(1.94)
-0.0047***
(-3.17)
SIZE 0.0685***
(3.70)
0.0010***
(5.94)
Adj. R 2 0.0108 0.0157 0.0111 0.0264
Piecewise linear ordinary least-squares regressions analysis of investment to capital 
expenditure and investment to research and development (R&D) expenditure, on cash flow 
rights and control variables. The total number of observation is based on data for 1892 from 
1988 to 1997. The regressions are performed using a fixed- effects (time and industry) 
specification. Firm value (Tobin’s q), risk (RISK), Cash flow (CFREE) and Firm size (SIZE) 
are included as control variable. The independent variable is the share of cash flow rights 
held by the largest shareholder (OWN) and divergence between cash flow rights and control 
rights (CFCR). Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of 
significance: ***1%, **5%,* 10%.
OWN1: Cash < 0.14 = cash flow rights if cash flow rights < 0.14, = 0.14 if cash flow rights 
of ultimate owner ^  0.14.
OWN2: 0 1 4  < Cash < 0 .2 4  =0 if cash flow rights <0.14, = cash flow rights-0 .14  if 0.14 
-  cash flow rights < 0.24, = 0.24 if cash flow rights -  0.24.
OWN3: 0 -2 4  < Cash < 0 .5 0  = 0 if cash flow rights <0.24, = cash flow rights-0.24 if 0.24 -  
cash flow rights < 0.50, = 0.50 if cash flow rights ^  0.50.
OWN4:0.50 < Cash -  o if cash flow rights of ultimate owner < 0.50, = cash flow rights -  
0.50 if cash flow rights ^ 0.50.
This study found (Chapter 1) that when the interval of cash flow rights is between 
14% and 24% (OWN2) the regression coefficient and divergence between cash flow 
rights and control, rights (CFCR), and firm value is significantly negative. As 
reported in Table 2-2, the coefficient OWN2 are significantly positive for capital
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expenditure, but significantly negative for R&D expenditure. The divergence 
between cash flow rights and control rights of shareholders (CFCR) is significantly 
negative for capital expenditure, but insignificantly positive for R&D expenditure.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that as the divergence between cash 
flow rights and control rights of shareholders increases, there is an incentive to 
expropriate minority shareholders (agency problem) leading to a reduction in firm 
value.43 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that ownership structure affects corporate 
value because of its effect on investment, and Jenson (1986, 1993) argues that 
managers adopt wasteful, negative net present value investment projects because they 
gain private benefits from controlling more assets. My results imply that large agency 
costs do affect investment behaviour between capital expenditure and R&D 
expenditure. I also found that divergence between cash rights and control rights 
affected investment behaviour when comparing capital expenditure with R&D 
expenditure.
Table 2-3 shows investment levels in capital expenditure and R&D for both affiliated 
and independent firms in the pooled sample. The coefficient of Tobin’s q is positive 
and statistically significant for both types of firms. Overall, firm investment 
behaviour was significantly dependent on its internal source of funds and with the 
firm’s growth opportunity. I have therefore shown that there is a relationship between 
internal cash flow and investment for both the affiliated firms (chaebol) and the 
independent firms.
43 More detailed account in Chapter 1.
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Table 2-3 Regressions Relating Investment and ownership in Affiliated firm 
and Independent Firm____________________  (1988-1997)
Capital expenditure 
Affiliated Independent 
Firms Firms 
(1) (2)
R&D expenditure 
Affiliated Independent 
Firms Firms 
(3) (4)
OWN1 0.3134 -0.1756 -0.0164 -0.0147
(0.93) (-0.33) (-1.54) (-1.13)
OWN2 0.2045 0.3199* -0.01078* -0.0059
(1.03) (1.71) (-1.72) (-1.30)
OWN3 0.3526 0.0952 -0.1261 0.0018
(1.29) (0.48) (-1.44) (0.698)
OWN4 0.0914 0.2405 0.049* 0.0353
(1.01) (1.03) (1.94) (0.35)
CFCR -0.1419*** -0.0191 0.2604** 0.0018
(-2.84) (-0.18) (2.92) (0.39)
TOBINQ 0.0339* 0.0648* 0.0032** 0.0007**
(1.85) (1.93) (2.30) (2.20)
RISK -3.0294*** 0.4118* 0.0670** 0.0057
(-4.18) (1.99) (2.91) (1.15)
CFREE 0.0952 0.0818** -0.0002 -0.0042***
(0.91) (2.62) (-0.06) (-2.61)
SIZE 0.0299*** 0.0841** 0.0017*** 0.0007***
(2.39) (2.99) (5.17) (3.79)
Adj. R 2 0.0156 0.0173 0.0560 0.0457
Piecewise linear ordinary least-squares regressions analysis of investment to capita 
expenditure and investment to research and development (R&D) expenditure, on cash flow 
rights and control variables for comparing between affiliated firms and independent firms. 
The total number of observation is based on data for 1892 from 1988 to 1997. The 
regressions are performed using a fixed- effects (time and industry) specification. Firm value 
(Tobin’s q), risk (RISK), Cash flow (CFREE) and Firm size (SIZE) are included as control 
variable. The independent variable is the share of cash flow rights held by the largest 
shareholder (OWN) and divergence between cash flow rights and control rights (CFCR). 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of significance: ***1 %, 
**5%,* 10%.
OWNl:CasA < 0 .1 4  = cash flow rights if  cash flow rights < 0 .1 4 , = 0.14 if  cash flow rights 
o f  ultim ate ow ner — 0.14.
OWN2: 0.14 < Cash <> 0.24 = o if cash flow rights < 0.14, = cash flow rights -  0.14 if 0.14 
-  cash flow rights < 0.24, = 0.24 if cash flow rights -  0.24.
O WN3: 0.24 <  Cash < 0 .5 0  =  o if cash flow rights <  0.24, =  cash flow rights-0.24 if 0.24 -  
cash flow rights < 0.50, = 0.50 if cash flow rights -  0.50.
OWN4:0.50 < Cash = 0 if  cash flow rights o f  ultim ate ow ner < 0.50, = cash flow rights -  
0.50 if  cash flow rights ^ 0.50.
As illustrated in Table 2-3, the correlation coefficient between capital expenditure 
and free cash flow is not statistically significant for chaebol firms. However, the
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correlation between capital expenditure and market-to-book ratio (investment 
opportunity) is positive and significant for both affiliated and independent firms at 
the 10% level. However, the chaebol firms have a lower Tobin’s q (investment 
opportunity) than the independent firms.
This result suggests that the investment behaviour of independent firms is financially 
constrained. The affiliated (ichaebol) firms can be related not only to their growth 
opportunity but also cash flow from external sources such as borrowing from other 
financial institutions or other affiliated chaebol firms. Chaebol firms are restricted 
from financing other companies’ projects freely as they are independent legal 
entities. However, they can contribute to other firms’ financing of projects or obtain 
bank loans through cross-payment guarantees (Shin and Park, 1999).
As shown in the first and third regression analysis of Table 2-3, the coefficient of 
divergence between CFCR for affiliated firms is significantly positive for the capital 
expenditure model and significantly negative for the R&D expenditure model. In 
contrast, the evidence of expropriation as the coefficient for CFCR by group- 
affiliated firms is positive and significant (see Table 1-16, Chapter 1). These results 
imply that divergence between cash rights and control rights has the opposite effect 
on investment behaviour in terms of capital expenditure and R&D expenditure. I 
explored the divergence between CFCR in situations where the controlling ownership 
led to overinvestment in capital expenditure and underinvestment in R&D 
expenditure. However, the coefficient of divergence for CFCR is insignificant for 
both capital expenditure and R&D expenditure in independent firms. This is because 
independent firms (non-top 30 chaebol) do not have a large disparity between cash 
flow rights and control rights.
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5.1.3 The results of Hypothesis II regarding ownership structure and 
investment in times of financial liberalization
The liberalization of financial accounting in the 1990s lowered financial costs of 
firms in general. At the same time, the banking sector increased its local loans 
through borrowing in the international capital market. In addition, a boom in the 
stock market that followed the opening up of markets to foreign investment helped in 
the direct financing of the listed firms. In this context, I investigated the relationship 
between ultimate ownership structure {chaebol and non-chaebol)44 and investment 
behaviour in a period of financial liberalization. The sample periods were chosen to 
give the same number of years for two sub-periods—before and after financial 
liberalization— 1988-1992 and 1993-1997.45
Table 2-4 Statistics comparing means of affiliated firms and independent 
firms
Affiliated Firms 
1988-1992 1993-1997
Independent Firms 
1988-1992 1993-1997
CES 0.0825 0.1062 0.1052 0.0650
R&D 0.0050 0.0070 0.0032 0.0040
TOBINQ , 1.0018 1.0867 1.0752 1.0800
LDRC 0.4470 0.4587 0.3968 0.4139
SDRC 0.2953 0.3127 0.2509 0.2735
CFREE 0.0072 0.0059 0.0270 0.0021
RISK 0.0234 0.0189 0.0274 0.0273
44 Korean business groups, chaebols, are known to have weaker corporate governance structures 
than non-chaebol firms (See also Chapter 1).
4 5  See more detail in Appendix B: Capital market opening; foreign investors are allowed to invest 
directly in Korean stock markets with ownership ceilings (1992)
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This table present means of variables for Top 30 chaebols (Affiliated firms) and non-chaebol 
(Independent firms). The sample is comprised of 1892 firms observed in any year between 
1988 and 1997. Capital expenditure (CES) is change in the gross capital stock over a year. 
The gross capital expenditure for sum of individual tangible fixed assets divided by the 
previous year-end’s capital stock. Research and development (R&D) is change in the gross 
intangible assets for experimental and research expense divided by the previous year-end’s 
capital stock. Firm value or investment opportunity measured by Tobin’s q (TOBINQ), that 
is, (firm’s book value of total assets + market value of outstanding shares- book value of 
equity )/firm’s book value of total assets. Long term debt ratio (LDRC) defines long term debt 
divided by total assets. Short term debt ratio (SDRC) defines short term debt divided by total 
assets. Free cash flow (CFREE) defines cash flow to the beginning of the total asset ratio. 
Volatility of return (RISK) is standard deviation in changes in profit rate during the past five 
years. Profit rate is defined as profit before extraordinary items divided by total assets.
Table 2-4 presents a statistical summary of means for the main variables: the capital 
expenditure ratio, R&D ratio, Tobin’s q, debt ratio and cash flow, for both affiliated 
and independent firms, and for both before and after the period of financial 
liberalization. These statistics indicate that affiliated firms increased their investment 
in both CES and R&D after financial liberalization. For independent firms, CES 
dropped from 0.1052 before financial liberalization to 0.0650 afterwards, but R&D 
expenditure slightly increased from 0.0032 to 0.0040. Tobin’s q ratios were higher in 
both groups: the mean value increased from 1.0018 to 1.0867 for the affiliated firms 
and from 1.0750 to 1.0800 for the independent firms. In the period after financial 
liberalization, the affiliated firms on average had a higher investment ratio than the 
independent firms, even if the Tobin’s q of the affiliated firms remained similar to 
that of independent ,firms. This may suggest that the problem of overinvestment by 
Chaebol (the affiliated firms) remained after financial liberalization. The debt/asset 
ratio (both long-term and short-term) exhibited marked differences between affiliated 
firms and independent firms both before and after periods of financial liberalization. 
The mean value of the debt/asset ratio (both long-term and short-term) for the 
affiliated firms was higher than that of the independent firms in the period before 
financial liberalization (long-term debt: 0.4470 versus 0.3968, short-term debt:
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0.2953 versus 0.2509), as well as after financial liberalization (long-term debt:
0.4587 versus 0.4139, short-term debt: 0.3127 versus 0.2735). In both groups, the 
debt/asset ratio increased significantly after financial liberalization. If I assume that 
the problem of overinvestment by Chaebol existed after financial liberalization, I 
could further suggest that the debt ratio was also related to investment behaviour for 
those firms.
Table 2-5 Regressions Relating Investment in 1988-1992
Capital expenditure 
(1) (2) (3)
R&D expenditure 
(4) (5) (6)
Variable All Affiliated
firm
Independent
firm
All Affiliated
firm
Independent
firm
TOBIN
Q
-0.0047
(-0.37)
0.0195
(0.88)
-0.0086
(-0.53)
0.0002
(0.81)
0.0006
(0.80)
-0.0001
(-0.12)
CFREE -0.0971
(-0.81)
-0.0787
(-0.04)
-0.0835
(-.0.55)
-0.0018
(-0.36)
0.0023
(0.36)
-0.0083
(-1.81)
RISK -2.6456***
(-4-37)
-3.0564***
(-3.43)
-2.4482**
(-3.03)
0.0327**
(2.61)
0.0583*
(1.66)
0.0675***
(3.04)
LDRC -0.4002***
(-4.29)
-0.0144
(-0.11)
-0.4498**
(-3.04)
0.0041**
(2.16)
0.0128**
(2.60)
-0.0067
(-1.56)
SDRC -0.5837***
(-5.11)
0.0179
(0.10)
-0.7441***
(-5.05)
-0.0051
(-0.57)
0.0090
(1.29)
-0.0108**
(-2.27)
SIZE -0.0271
(-0.34)
0.1205*
(1.82)
-0.2470
(-1.60)
0.0180*
(1.90)
0.0053**
(2.04)
-0.0003
(-0.10)
Adj. R 2 0.0790 0.0782 0.1100 0.045 0.1413 0.0665
Ordinary least-squares regressions analysis of investment to capital expenditure and 
investment to research and development (R&D) expenditure, on debt ratio ( long term debt 
(LDRC) and short term debt (SDRC)) and control variables for comparing between affiliated 
firms and independent firms. The total number of observation is based on data for 1892 firms 
from 1988 to 1992. The regressions are performed using a fixed- effects (time and industry) 
specification. Firm value (Tobin’s q), risk (RISK), Cash flow (CFREE) and Firm size (SIZE) 
are included as control variable. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the 
level of significance; ***1%, **5%,*10%.
Table 2-5 shows that the effect of cash flow on investment patterns for Korean firms 
is not statistically significant, but investment in capital expenditure does have an 
effect on the debt ratio (long- and short-term) in all samples. However, although the
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coefficient of investment in capital expenditure and the debt ratio for independent 
firms is negative and statistically significant, it is insignificant for affiliated firms in 
the period 1988-1992. R&D expenditure shows a positive relationship with long­
term debt in affiliated firms and a negative relationship with short-term debt in 
independent firms during periods of less financial liberalisation. The regression 
results in Table 2-5 suggest that the investment in capital expenditure of independent 
firms affects the debt ratio (both short-term and long-term). The resulting debt- 
servicing obligations help to discourage overinvestment of free cash flow by 
entrenched managers. However, for the affiliated firms the relationship of investment 
and the debt ratio is insignificant.
Table 2-6 Regressions Relating Investment in 1993-1997
Capital expenditure 
(1) (2) (3)
R&D expenditure 
(4) (5) (6 )
Variable All Affiliated
firm
Independent
firm
All Affiliated
firm
Independent
firm
TOBINQ 0.0148
(0.41)
0.0141
(0.62)
-0.0067
(-0 .2 2 )
0.0004
(0 .1 2 )
0 . 0 0 0 1
(0 .1 1 )
0 . 0 0 0 1
(0.35)
CFREE 1.9407***
(2.54)
-0.0814
(-0.74)
2.5094***
(3.15)
-0 . 0 0 0 1
(-0.03)
0.0003
(0.07)
-0.007
(-0.38)
RISK -2.4625***
(-3.17)
-3.5141***
(-4.61)
-2.9132***
(-3.42)
0.0282*
(1.70)
0.0644*
(1.67)
0.0106
(0.60)
LDRC 0.9655***
(2 .6 6 )
-0.0196
(-0.17)
1.2026***
(3.39)
0.0032*
(1.77)
0.0023
(0.69)
0.0036*
(1.75)
SDRC 1.7761***
(3.95)
-0.2408
(-1.47)
2.6852***
(4.89)
0 . 0 0 2 0
(0 .8 6 )
-0.0008
(-0.67)
0.0044**
(1.84)
SIZE 0.0621
(0.43)
0.1050*
(2.14)
-0.005
(-0.03)
0.0007
(0.57)
0.0253*
(1.91)
-0.0038
(-1.48)
Adj. R 2 0.4766 0.4729 0.4341 0.0219 0.0215 0.0273
Ordinary least-squares regressions analysis of investment to capital expenditure and 
investment to research and development (R&D) expenditure, on debt ratio ( long term debt 
(LDRC) and short term debt (SDRC)) and control variables for comparing between affiliated 
firms and independent firms. The total number of observation is based on data for 1892 firms 
from 1993 to 1997. The regressions are performed using a fixed- effects (time and industry) 
specification. Firm value (Tobin’s Q), risk (RISK), Cash flow (CFREE) and Firm size 
(SIZE) are included as control variable. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks 
denote the level of significance: ***1%, **5%,* 10%.
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Table 2-6 results show positive relationship between investment (capital expenditure) 
and cash flow after a period of financial liberalization. Investment in capital 
expenditure has a positive relationship with the debt ratio (long- and short-term). This 
is statistically significant in all samples. Table 2-5 shows the opposite result, with the 
investment-debt ratio in a negative relationship. The coefficient of the debt ratio and 
investment in capital expenditure for independent firms is positive and statistically 
significant, but for affiliated firms it is statistically insignificant for the years 1993 
to 1997. R&D has a positive relationship with both long-term and short-term debt in 
independent firms, but this relationship does not hold for the affiliated firms.
The regression results shown in Table 2-6 suggest that the investment in capital 
expenditure and R&D of independent firms is positively related to the debt ratio.
For independent (non-chaebol) firms the relationship between both short-term and 
long-term leverage and investment changed from negative before financial 
liberalization to positive after financial liberalization. The positive aspect of leverage 
is its disciplinary role in reducing free cash flow problems (Jensen, 1986) after 
financial liberalization. However, the results suggest that the relatively high cost of 
external finance leads to investment that is largely limited to internal funding. This 
holds even if Korean firms could enjoy easier and cheaper access to investment funds 
after a period of financial liberalization.46 For chaebol firms leverage is less
46 See Section 2.4
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important, particularly in the long term, which might be due to the existence of the 
internal capital market as illustrated by Park and Shin (1999).47 
However, a firm’s debt policy might adopt a different role depending on its 
maturities: short-term debt may be more useful in reducing free cash flow problems, 
and because the practice of rolling over short-term debts will put the firm under more 
frequent scrutiny of the capital market (Flannery, 1986; Diamond, 1991), it could 
raise the firm’s standing with external investor. On the other hand, short-term debt 
can cause a serious liquidity problem, especially when the economy is in financial 
distress. Kim and Lee (2003) argue that if there is economy-wide financial stress, 
credit rationing is likely to occur, resulting in a liquidity crisis. The positive role of 
leverage is thus less likely to be effective during a crisis. Therefore, the role of 
leverage in the performance of Korean firms during the East Asian crisis may be 
consistent with the agency-based theory.48Chaebol firms typically have a higher 
leverage, both shortrterm and long-term, than non-chaebol firms. This is consistent 
with Choi et al (2000), who argue that a high incidence of short-term leverage was 
one of the major causes of the Korean financial crisis.
47 Shin and Park (1999, pp. 172-173) note ‘The cross-payment guarantee among affiliated firms 
helps chaebols to finance through bank loan and corporate bounds. The cross-payment guarantees, 
with cross share-holdings, link member firms to each other and reduce the member firms’ risk of 
financial distress and bankruptcy by creating an internal capital market among the chaebol firms. 
To facilitate the internal capital markets, chaebol firms also increased their ownership of non-bank 
financial intermediaries in the 1980s when the government liberalized the financial markets’.
48 Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that financial distress can intensify the conflicts of interests 
between bondholders and shareholders. Kim and Lee (2003, page 343) note ‘The stock market 
pays a lot of attention to the firm’s ability to repay loans, especially short-term loans, when most 
financial institutions are not willing to renew short-term credit due to their own liquidity problems 
in economy-wide financial distress. This might lead to very poor performance of the firms with 
very high leverage, especially those with very high short-term leverage’.
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5.2 Ownership structure and investment in firm valuation
This section analyses the effect of ownership structures on the firm value through 
investment decision making. Using 2SLS statistical analysis, I address whether the 
ownership structures function as endogenous rather than exogenous variables; to 
achieve this I analyse how the ownership structure affects investment. Demsetz 
(1983) and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) raise the issue of endogeneity of ownership 
structure, and many subsequent studies (Cho, 1998; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 
1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; McConnell, Servaes and Lins, 2003) all show 
that firm value affects ownership structure. One of the factors that determine family 
ownership is firm performance. Much of the existing literature shows that firms with 
greater controlling family ownership perform well because family interests are more 
vested in those firms; other studies, however, argue that that causality runs in the 
other direction, from firm performance to family ownership (Cho, 1998; Himmelberg 
et al, 1999). This makes sense in firms in which the controlling family has ultimate
i
control; those who have ‘inside information’ may decide to own more shares in firms 
that are performing well, while they let their affiliated companies own the poorly 
performing firms. Given the mixed empirical results on bilateral causality between 
ownership and firm valuation, this study addresses the issue of causality by exploring 
how the determinants of ownership structure are affected by firm valuation.
Table 2-7 shows the 2SLS estimation results of the simultaneous regression in which 
the cash flow rights of the ultimate ownership is used for both the corporate value 
and investment regressions for the whole period (1988-1997). The first three 
columns of Tables 2-7 and 2-8 contain the regression estimates obtained by using 
capital expenditures as a measure of investment. The last three columns of Tables 2-7
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and 2-8 contain regression estimates obtained by using R&D expenditures as a 
measure of investment.
Table 2-7 Simultaneous equation analysis of cash flow rights, corporate 
value, and investment____________________ (1988-1997)
Variable Capital expenditures model 
Ultimate Corporate Investment 
Ownership value
R&D expenditure model 
Ultimate Corporate Investment 
Ownership value
CONS 0.39***
(2.99)
-0.52
(-0.73)
1.29***
(2.70)
1.16
(0 .8 8 )
-2.67
(-0.76)
0.032***
(3.43)
TOBINQ -0 . 0 1
(-1 .1 2 )
1 .1 2 ***
(3.98)
-0.13
(0.54)
0.03**
(2 . 1 1 )
RISK 0 . 1 1
(0.13)
-0.60***
(4.06)
0.06
(0.33)
-0.003
(-0.56)
CFREE 0.03
(0.99)
1.89***
(3.05)
0.05
(0.46)
-0 .0 0 2 *
(-1.78)
CF 0.70**
(2 .1 1 )
0.49**
(2.58)
0.05
(1.06)
-0.04***
(-3.21)
DRC 0.76***
(2.99)
0.250***
(3.14)
ADR - 1 . 0 1
(-0.40)
0.07
(0.14)
INV -0 . 0 2
(-1.05)
0 . 0 1
(0.49)
0.54
(0.47)
0.34*
(1.97)
SIZE -0.31***
(-3.63)
0 . 0 0 2
(0 . 1 2 )
0.07***
(3.10)
-0.05
(-0 .6 6 )
0.06
(0.57)
0.06*
(1.90)
Adj. R 2 0.0018 0.0732 0.0417 0 . 0 1 2 2 0.0165 0.0619
This table present simultaneous equation analysis of ultimate ownership, firm value, anc 
investment 1892 published Korean companies froml988 tol997, using the two-stage least 
squares method to estimate the flowing equation: Ownership structure = F (Corporate value 
(TOBINQ), Investment (INV), Volatility of earnings (RISK), Cash free (CFREE), Asset 
size (SIZE)). Corporate value = G (Ultimate ownership (CF), Investment (INV), Financial 
leverage (DRC), Asset size (SIZE)). Investment =H (Ultimate ownership (CF), Corporate 
value (TOBINQ), Volatility of earnings (RISK), Cash free (CFREE)). In the above equation, 
ultimate ownership is measured as cash flow rights of largest shareholder. Two measures of 
investment are used and the model is repeated to use first, capital expenditures, and second, 
research and development (R&D) expenditure to measure investment. The regressions are 
performed using a fixed- effects (time and industry) specification. Firm value (Tobin’s Q), 
risk (RISK), Cash flow (CFREE) and Firm size (SIZE) are included as control variable. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics Asterisks denote the level of significance: ***1%, 
**5%,*10%.
As evidenced in Table 2-7, Tobin’s q is not an important determinant of cash flow 
rights of ultimate ownership. This result does not imply that the managers in firms
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with higher corporate values or with better investment opportunities hold a larger 
fraction of their firm’s shares.
If a firm is less financially constrained, it can invest more when it has good 
opportunity because it can finance good (positive) projects using either internal cash 
flows or external funds. I find that capital expenditure is sensitive to market-to-book 
ratio (as a Tobin’s q proxy) which represents growth opportunity as perceived by the 
market. Also, the cash flow rights of the ultimate owner and corporate performance 
are statistically positive and significant. However, I do not find a significant 
relationship between capital expenditure and corporate performance.
The coefficients of R&D in investment and corporate performance models are 
positive and statistically significant. The cash flow rights of the ultimate ownership 
structure affects corporate value, a finding that is different from the OLS corporate 
value regression results reported in Chapter 1. The coefficient of the cash flow rights 
and the corporate value are in positive linear relation with statistical significance, 
similar to the results of Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2002). Also, the ownership 
regression analysis does not show any cause-and-effect relationship between 
corporate value and the cash flow rights of ultimate ownership. This conclusion is not 
consistent with Cho (1989).
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Table 2-8 Simultaneous equation analysis of the divergence between cash flow 
rights and control rights, investment and corporate value (1988-1997)
Variable Capital expenditures model 
Ultimate Corporate Investment 
Ownership value
R&D expenditure model 
Ultimate Corporate Investment 
Ownership value
CONS -0.03
(-1.28)
-0.94
(-1.53)
- 0  91 * * * 
(-5.76)
0.030
(1.09)
-0.13
(1.47)
0.03***
(3.25)
TOBIN
Q
0 . 0 2
(1.59)
2.07**
(2.99)
-0.18
(0.45)
0.304**
(2.27)
RISK 0.05
(0.35)
-2.43***
(3.02)
0.17
(0.61)
-0.003
(-0.62)
CFREE 0.09
(1.60)
1 92***
(3.31)
0 . 1 1
(0.58)
-0 . 0 1 2
(-1.67)
CFCR 0.70*
(1.91)
0.27**
(2.18)
0 .1 0 *
(1.95)
-0 . 0 0 1
(-1.61)
DRC 0.67***
(4.12)
0.67***
(4.32)
ADR 0.078
(0 .2 0 )
0.072
(1.92)
INV -0.03
(-1.28)
0.04*
(1.78)
0.048
(0.48)
0  7 4 *** 
(3.34)
SIZE -0.32***
(-4.63)
0.05
(1.04)
0.0485**
(2.23)
-0.08
(-0.67)
0.03
(0 .0 1 )
0.0585***
(2.90)
Adj. 
R 2
0.1025 0.0650 0.0453 0.0104 0.0138 0.0570
This table present simu taneous equation analysis of ultimate ownership, firm value, anc
investment 1892 published Korean firms froml 988 to 1997, using the two-stage least squares 
method to estimate the flowing equation: Ownership structure = F (Corporate value 
(TOBINQ), Investment (INV), Volatility of earnings (RISK), Cash free (CFREE), Asset size 
(SIZE) ). Corporate value = G (Ultimate ownership (CFCR), Investment (INV), Financial 
leverage (DRC), Asset size (SIZE)). Investment =H (Ultimate ownership (CFCR), Corporate 
value (TOBINQ), Volatility of earnings (RISK), Cash free (CFREE)). In the above equation, 
ultimate ownership is measured as divergence between cash flow rights and control rights of 
largest shareholder .Two measures of investment are used and the model is repeated to use 
first, capital expenditures, and second, research and development (R&D) expenditure to 
measure investment. The regressions are performed using a fixed- effects (time and industry) 
specification. Firm value or investment opportunity (Tobin’s Q), risk of firm (RISK), Cash 
flow (CFREE) and Firm size (SIZE) are included as control variable. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of significance: ***1%, **5%,*10%.
Table 2-8 shows results of the simultaneous regression in which divergence between 
the cash flow rights and the control rights is used for both the corporate value and 
investment models in the two-stage least squares estimation. As reported here, the 
corporate value is not an important determinant of divergence between cash flow
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rights and control rights. There is a significant positive relationship between the 
effect of both R&D and capital expenditure on firm value. Consistent with Fazzari et 
al (1988), the regression results indicate that liquidity and corporate value positively 
affect capital expenditure. In conclusion, the findings in this section suggest that the 
cash flow rights of the ultimate ownership structure affect the investment, investment 
affects corporate value, and ownership directly affects firm value, but the corporate 
value does not affect the ownership structure. However, in the R&D expenditure 
model, the impact of divergence is statistically insignificant. These statistical results 
are due to the specific characteristics of the Korean manufacturing industry. 
According to agency theory, R&D is regarded as a strategy to maximize company 
profitability, so firms are naturally assumed to be pursuing R&D strategy to 
maximize stockholder profit. However, the samples of this study show that the ratio 
of Korean manufacturing sales to average research development funds was in reality 
a mere 0.62%. This could be interpreted as showing that Korean manufacturers have 
tended to expand competitively through raising market control, rather than by 
providing higher quality goods through R&D endeavours.
In other words, the Korean manufacturing industry before the Asian crisis may be 
characterized as an organization-led developing industry. These specific 
characteristics reflect its interlocking with foreign trade policy, based on prime costs; 
its leaning towards efficiency rather than the achievement of goals; and prime cost 
superiority strategies rather than differentiation strategies. Also, the relationship 
between company value and advertising expenditure was not confirmed by the 
statistics. This effect could have been caused by the samples used in the study. In the 
firms sampled, advertisement expenses show considerable variations due to the 
grouping of very different industry groups into the same broad classification of
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manufacturers. For example, heavy chemical industries and food industries were 
placed in the same category, although they had very different characteristics and 
business strategies.
6 Conclusion
This study examined how the separation of ownership and control in business group 
firms and independent firms affects investment (both capital expenditure and R&D) 
and firm value. I considered two alternatives of the principal-agent problem. In the 
first alternative, the, ultimate owners receive private benefits from investment in 
capital expenditure and this can lead to overinvestment. In the second alternative, the 
ultimate owner invests privately in R&D, and this can lead to underinvestment. I 
showed that these alternative behaviours of the ultimate owner were often criticised 
as being one of the main problems leading to the Korean financial crisis in 1997. 
Additionally, I tested the relationship between corporate leverage, ultimate corporate 
ownership structure and investment during a period of financial liberalization. I used 
the data on investment and its determinants for listed manufacturing Korean firms for 
the ten years from 1988 to 1997.1 also performed robustness checks, using both OLS 
and 2SLS estimation techniques.
The major findings of this study may be summarised as follows:
(1) Divergence between cash flow rights and control rights has ah opposite impact 
on investment behaviour in terms of capital expenditure and R&D expenditure. I 
confirmed that investment in independent companies (non-chaebol) is more cash
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flow sensitive. For these firms, I find a stronger positive relationship between cash 
flow and investment opportunities than for affiliated firms (Top 30-chaebol) for both 
capital expenditure and R&D.
(2) Investment does not affect growth opportunities (Tobin’s q) for both affiliated 
firms and independent firms, but investment has a strong influence on corporate 
leverage, when comparing the 1988-1992 and 1993-1998 periods of differing 
financial liberalization. I found that the coefficient of investment and debt ratio 
among the sample of independent firms was negative before financial liberalization 
(1988-1992) but became positive after financial liberalization (1993-1998). 
However, for affiliated firms, the relationship of investment and debt ratio was 
insignificant.
(3) The cash flow rights in ultimate ownership structure and the divergence between 
cash flow rights and control rights both affect investment. Investment affects 
corporate value, but corporate value does not affect the ownership structure in a 
2SLS test.
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Appendix B
M ajor Financial Liberalization Measures in Korea during the 1990s
1) Interest rates deregulation (in four stages: 1991 to July 1997)
- By 1997, all lending and borrowing rates, except demand deposit rates, were 
liberalised
2) More managerial autonomy for the banks and lower entry barriers to 
financial activities
- Freedom for banks to increase capital, to establish branches, and to determine 
dividend payments (1994)
- Enlargement of business scope for financial institutions (1993)
: continuous expansion of the securities business of deposit money banks (1990, 
1993, 1994, 1995)
: freedom for banks and life insurance companies to sell government and public 
bonds overthe-counter (1995)
: permission for securities companies to handle foreign exchange business (1995)
- Abolition of the limits on maximum maturities for loans and deposits of banks 
(1996)
3) Foreign exchange liberalisation
- Adoption o f  the M arket-Average Foreign Exchange Rate System (1990)
- Easing o f  the requirement for documentation proving “real” (i.e., non-financial) 
demand in foreign exchange transactions (1991)
- Setting up o f  foreign currency call markets
- Revision o f  the Foreign Exchange M anagement Act (1991)
: changing the basis for regulation from a positive system to a negative system
- Introduction o f 'free  W on' accounts for non-residents (1993)
- Allowance o f  partial W on settlements for the export or import o f  visible items 
(1993)
- Foreign Exchange Reform Plan (1994)
: a detailed schedule for the reform o f the foreign exchange market structure
- A very significant relaxation o f  the Foreign Exchange Concentration System (1995)
4) Capital market opening
- Foreign investors are allowed to invest directly in Korean stock markets with 
ownership ceilings (1992)
- Foreigners are allowed to purchase government and public bonds issued at 
international interest rates (1994), equity-linked bonds issued by small and medium­
sized firms (1994), non-guaranteed long-term bonds issued by small and medium­
sized firms (Jan. 1997), and non-guaranteed convertible bonds issued by large 
companies (Jan. 1997)
- Residents are allowed to invest in overseas securities via beneficiary certificates 
(1993)
- Abolition of the ceiling on the domestic institutional investors' overseas portfolio 
investment (1995)
- Foreign commercial loans are allowed without government approval in so far as 
they meet the guideline established in May 1995
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- Private companies engaged in major infrastructure projects are allowed to borrow 
overseas to pay for domestic construction cost (Jan. 1997)
- Liberalisation of borrowings related to foreign direct investments related (Jan. 
1997)
5) Policy loans & credit control
- A planned termination of all policy loans by 1997 is announced (1993)
:a step-wise reduction in policy loans to specific sectors (e.g., export industries and 
small and medium-sized firms)
- Simplifying and slimming down the controls on the share of bank's loans to major 
conglomerates in its total loans
Source: Chang et al. (1998)
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Chapter 3: Ownership Structure, Diversification 
and Firm Value in Korean Companies
1 Introduction
The focus of this study is firstly the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm diversification when there are expropriated minority shareholders causing 
agency problems; and secondly, the relationship between firm diversification and 
firm valuation, particularly regarding the ability of internal capital markets to 
leverage economic development. I re-examine and extend the scope of recent papers 
(Claessens et al, 1999,2002; Lins and Servaes, 2002; Fauver et al, 2007) that analyse 
the value of firm diversification, to focus closely on the ownership structure, firm 
diversification and firm valuation in Korea during its period of pre-crisis economic 
development from 1988 to 1997.
Many studies have examined the valuation effects of corporate diversification in both 
developed and developing countries. At the heart of the debate lies the question of 
whether diversification destroys the value of firms in the United States.49 If so, it 
would seem to be a questionable course of action for managers or ultimate owners. 
However, in developing countries, firm diversification has been shown to increase 
firm performance,, although many studies show it has mixed benefits in an 
international context.50
49 See Lang and Stultz (1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), 
Scharfstein and Stein (1997), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) andRajan, Servaes and Zingales (1999).
50 Fauver et al (2007), Lins and Servaes (1999, 2002), Claessens et al (1999, 2002)
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Regarding the diversification discount, in their U.S.-based theory and empirical 
results, Denis et al (1.997) argue that agency cost51 is related to the level of firm 
diversification. They dismiss the linkage between value loss and firm diversification 
and find that in U.S. firms the effects are lessened by higher managerial and 
blockholder ownership. Lang and Stultz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Servaes 
(1996) find that diversified firms trade at an average discount relative to single­
segment firms. This finding has often been interpreted as evidence that 
diversification destroys value. Johnson et al (2000) finds that controlling 
shareholders in European business groups have strong incentives to siphon resources 
from member firms to increase their private wealth. Berger and Ofek (1995) find that 
during 1986-1991 the average diversified firm destroyed about 15% of the value of 
any lines of business they would have had, had they operated as standalone 
businesses.
Also, Claessens et al ‘s (1999, 2002) research, based on East Asian countries 
(including Korea), indicated that the group-affiliated firms showed lower profitability 
than the independent firms, and that group-affiliated firms’ diversification 
performance was poorer than that of the independent firms. When diversification 
levels are measured by multi-segment dummy variables, Claessens et al (1999) find 
that the diversified firms discount around 5% compared to single-segment firms, and 
Lins and Servaes (2002) find this discount is approximately 7% in East Asia. 
Bertrand et al (2002) also find that the ultimate owners of the Indian pyramid firms 
have strong incentives to divert resources from firms low down in the pyramid 
towards ones higher up. Bae, Kang and Kim (2002) find that although minority
51 The agency cost hypothesis is that the managers or ultimate owners obtain private benefits from 
diversification that exceed private costs.
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shareholders of firms within the top 30 Korean chaebols typically lose out from their 
acquisitions, the controlling shareholders gain from the same deals.
On the other hand, firms can accrue benefits from diversification through the creation 
of internal capital markets, which are more cost-effective in allocating resources 
compared to external capital markets.52 Khanna and Palepu (2000) compare the 
profitability of Indian firms which belong to industrial groups to that of independent 
Indian firms, and find that value is added by diversified business groups. Lins and 
Servaes (2002) argue that firm diversification is more valuable in emerging markets 
than in developed economies in internal capital markets. Claessens et al (1999, 
2002b) find the discount of firm diversification is less pronounced in diversified 
firms in the poorer economies. Shin and Park (1999) find that Korean firms which 
belonging to the top 30 business groups are subject to fewer financing constraints 
than other Korean firms. Hoshi et al (1991) also investigate the sensitivity of 
Japanese firms’ investment expenditure to liquidity and find that it is lower for firms 
within bank-oriented keiretsu. Fauver et al (2007) contribute to the debate by looking 
at the influence of capital market development and legal system integration on the 
value of corporate diversification in a cross-country analysis. They find that, among 
high-income countries, where capital markets are well-developed and integrated, 
there is a significant diversification discount. By contrast, for the lower income and 
segmented countries, they find that there is either no diversification discount or, in 
some cases, a diversification premium.
52 Khanna and Palepu (1997) and Claessens et al (1999) use the term ‘internal factor market or 
internal market’ more broadly to capture intra-firm markets for raw materials, labor, and financial 
capital, rather than internal market for financial capital (Lamont, 1997; Stein, 1997; Scharfstein and 
Stein, 1997; Shin and Stultz, 1998). This is discussed in greater detail in Section 2.
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Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004) find that diversifying and non­
diversifying firms differ systematically in multiple ways, and results can be skewed 
by the fact that diversified firms often trade at a discount prior to diversifying. When 
this selection bias is corrected for, the diversification discount disappears or becomes 
a premium. These results are supported by research conducted by Graham, Lemmon 
and Wolf (2002). However, results of such studies suggest that diversification in 
itself does not destroy value. Many econometric studies, including Lang (2002), have 
replicated Lang and Stultz (1994) and Berger and Ofek’s (1995) findings, but there is 
disagreement as to whether this can be interpreted as evidence of value destruction. 
Abadie and Imbens (2002), Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004) argue 
that this debate exemplifies the ‘treatment effects’ literature that seeks to establish 
causation from non-experimental data. Several studies have shown that the discount 
is produced simply by sample selection biases.53 This issue will be examined further 
below by using recent econometric techniques.
I suggest that three causes lie behind the varied results for the diversification effect in 
the above empirical tests:
1) Differing efficiency levels of internal capital markets in economies
2) Whether or not agency costs are considered
3) Use of different econometric methods.
The present study considers these three issues. Because our focus is on ownership
structure and corporate diversification, the study will analyse how these factors
53 Villalonga (2005) finds a diversification premium using the Business Information Tracking Series 
(BITS) (a new census database that covers the whole U.S. economy at the establishment level).
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influence corporate valuation from the perspectives of the agency problem and the 
internal capital market. In this context, the motive of Korean companies’ 
diversification pertains to private benefit of the executives or the owners, under the 
set conditions of the ownership structure. The corporate governance system regulates 
the ultimate owner or manager and hence reduces the agency problem. In the 
situation that the corporate governance system does not reduce agency problems, 
ownership structure can act as an important variable in company value. My research 
seeks to analyse empirically how firm performance or firm valuation are influenced 
by ownership structures and by the company’s chosen method of diversification.
The results show that the relationship of ownership structure and the corporate value 
is nonlinear. In Chapter 1 it was demonstrated that the divergence between the cash 
flow rights and the control rights of ultimate shareholders shows a negative 
relationship with firm value. If the ownership structure of a firm has an effect on firm 
value, it may also affect the value of corporate diversification. Furthermore, I go on 
to examine whether the efficiency of internal capital markets creates a diversification 
premium in the Korean economy. The main hypothesis can be summarised as three 
questions:
(1) What are the effects of ownership concentration and type on the level of firm 
diversification?
(2) Does the use of internal capital markets lead to higher values for diversified 
firms?
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(3) Can the effects of ownership concentration on diversified firm value and minority 
shareholders be more easily expropriated in a diversified firm structure, with an 
implied a lower valuation?
The results of the analysis are summarised as follows:
(1) The divergence between the cash flow rights and the control rights of the ultimate 
shareholders does have an effect on firm diversification.
(2) Group-affiliated firms show poorer performance after diversification than 
independent firms. Diversification discounts reported for the whole sample can be 
attributed to group-affiliated firms. This is partly because group-affiliation amplifies 
the negative effects of firm-level diversification on firm valuation (see 1, above).
(3) The diversification performance of group-affiliated firms is related to agency 
cost. In contrast, the benefits of diversification for independent firms appear to offset 
the agency costs of diversification in less developed capital markets and economies.
(4) Additionally, I analyse whether the ownership structures function as endogenous 
rather than exogenous variables. Therefore, the divergence between control rights 
and cash flow affects the diversification, and diversification in turn affects corporate 
value. However, corporate value does not affect ownership structure.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses diversification, 
agency cost and how diversification and firm valuation operate within internal capital
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market theory. In Section 3, my hypotheses illustrate the effect of corporate 
governance on the level of corporate diversification; further my hypotheses test the 
effects of diversification on firm valuation. In Section 4 ,1 describe the methodology 
used to calculate values of firm diversification and control variables, and statistics are 
presented (mean estimates) to clarify the relationship between ownership structure 
and firm valuation. In Section 5, I test and explain the results of the various 
hypotheses, including simultaneous equation regression (2SLS) analyses. A brief 
summary concludes the section 6.
2. Theoretical background
2.1 Motivation of firm diversification
The motivation behind firm diversification has been discussed theoretically from 
many points of view (Montgomery, 1994). The traditional stance is known as the 
market power view, which states that the motive behind diversification is to increase 
market dominance.54 An alternative notion is known as the transaction cost view.55 
Like the traditional view, it also perceives the goal of firms as maximising profits, 
but further believes that the motive behind diversification is to use surplus resources 
efficiently to reduce transaction costs. A third view on diversification is related to the 
internal capital markets. When external capital markets are costly to use, firms 
allocate their capital internally through diversification.56 Finally, one can cite the
54 Perry and Porter (1985), Deneckere and Davidson (1985), Salinger (1988), Hubbard and Palia 
(1999).
55 Constantinides (1986), Magill and Constantinides (1976).
56 Williamson (1971), Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994), Lamont (1997), Stein (1997), Scharfstein
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coinsurance effect hypothesis. By integrating lines of business with different earning 
streams and by reducing earning variability, diversified corporations have more debt- 
servicing capability than individual firms of a similar size.57 Such an increased debt-
CO
servicing capability can increase a firm’s value through a tax-shielding effect. 
However, this is insufficient to define the causes of the negative relationship between 
firm diversification and firm value. Therefore, the effect of corporate ownership 
structure on firm diversification is explained with the agency cost theory. Also, the 
effect of diversification on firm value in internal capital markets will be examined in 
the light of this theory, using the cases of some Korean companies.
2.2 Effect of corporate ownership structure on firm diversification
The agency problem, which appears in the pursuit of corporate diversification, leads 
to a number of phenomena. Even though a diversification strategy may reduce firm 
value, managers may still pursue diversification to increase their own wealth, because 
such strategies can accrue them more private benefits. The potential private benefits 
of managers are as follows. Firstly, through expansion of the firm size, managers can 
enhance their managerial power and prestige and anticipate higher managerial pay 
along with an increasing size of their corporations. Secondly, managers can defend 
the value of their human capital through diversification and can reduce, through 
diversification, the risk of their personal portfolio over and above the risk reduction
(1998).
57 Lewellen (1971).
58 Therefore, in the event one or two business lines of a diversified corporation record loss in a certain 
fiscal year, the separate business lines combined into one corporation will pay less tax than the 
aggregate of the individual taxes paid by each individual business line. In other words, business lines 
have separate earning or loss streams and these bring about a tax-shielding effect after combining the 
profits and losses of all the business lines.
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process for capital investments.59 Even though shareholders can reduce their portfolio 
risk efficiently through diversified investments, managers can also use diversification 
incentives as a device to efficiently reduce their employment risk. Thirdly, managers 
can render themselves more valuable to the corporations by diversifying into lines of 
business which increase the corporate demand for their specialist skills.60 The agency 
hypothesis can explain the three agency costs mentioned above. According to the 
agency cost hypothesis, the following relationship between equity and diversification 
can be derived from various levels of inside ownership and levels of diversification. 
With increasing equity of inside shareholders, the inside shareholders have a greater 
burden from reduced firm value and for this reason they would be reluctant to adopt 
policies which reduce shareholder wealth. Therefore, if diversification were to reduce 
shareholder wealth, a negative relationship between equity ratio of inside 
shareholders, or ultimate owner, and level of diversification would be predicted by 
the agency cost hypothesis. Such a relationship, based on the agency cost hypothesis, 
however, would be established on the assumption that the managerial private benefits 
resulting from the diversification have nothing to do with ratio of ownership equity. 
However, it can be argued that if the private benefits such as the manager’s private 
risk reduction should increase with the equity ownership ratio, the relationships 
between owner-managers, the equity ratio of the firm and corporate diversification 
may not be so clear.
Claessens et al (2002) examined the structure of the cash-flow rights and control 
rights held by ultimate owners and their correlation with the level of diversification. 
Public firms in East Asia are characterised by deviations of control from cash flow
59 Amihud and Lev (1981).
60 Shleifer and Vishny (1988).
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rights caused by cross-shareholdings, stock pyramids and multiple-class stocks. Such 
practices allow owners to gain effective control of their firms with a minimum 
amount of cash investment, making it less necessary to reduce risk through firm 
diversification. There is therefore a weaker link between firms’ performance and 
owners’ wealth, and more opportunity and incentives for expropriation through 
diversification increases. Claessens et al (2002) found that these conflicting interests 
become stronger at higher levels of control and a larger divergence between control 
and cash-flow rights is associated with more diversification, especially at high 
control levels. They reject risk reduction as the reason for diversification and 
therefore support the expropriation hypothesis.
On the other hand, according to the efficient monitoring hypothesis wherein the 
outside block shareholders may efficiently monitor managerial operations, a negative 
relationship can be predicted between the existence of outside blockholders and the 
level of diversification. According to the conflict-of-interest hypothesis, or strategic 
alignment hypothesis, the outside blockholders comply with managerial decisions 
and their existence does not affect the level of corporate diversification. There is 
therefore no clear-cut relationship established between the outside blockholders and 
diversification levels.
2.3 Effect of diversification on firm value
Corporate diversification has double-edged characteristics of generating both benefits 
and costs.
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If diversification increases firm valuation, the operational efficiency hypothesis 
argues that diversification increases corporate value.61 Diversified corporations can 
improve on their operational efficiency through integration and harmony of 
specialised lines of business; this is more efficient and profitable than when such 
specialised lines of business are independently operated.
A superior allocation is feasible where an internal capital market exists, as resources 
can be allocated more efficiently than in the external capital market. As 
underinvestment problems are resolved, more resources can be invested in 
investment options with net present values higher than zero. This is a much higher 
ratio compared to the resources available to single-business corporations. According 
to the internal capital market hypothesis, diversification is an efficient response to 
misrepresentation in the external environments or weak external financial markets.62 
However, as argued by Shin and Stultz (1996), internal capital markets may lead to 
misallocation of capital due to the heterogeneous and complex investment 
opportunities across the firms’ various segments. Fauver et al (2007) show that in 
countries where there is less shareholder protection, internal capital markets 
generated through corporate diversification are more valuable. Johnson et al (2000) 
and Fauver et al (2007) also argue that in situations where capital markets and legal 
systems are less developed, diversified firms perform better. Claessens et al (2002) 
test this thesis by examining how East Asian firms diversify, and find that group 
affiliation serves as an alternative method of firm-level diversification. Lins and 
Servaes (2002) use data from 1995 to investigate the value of firm diversification for
61 Berger and Ofek (1995).
62Claessens et al (1999), Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances and Shleifer (2000), Fauver, 
Houston and Naranjo (1998).
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seven Asian emerging market countries63 and note a significant diversification 
discount for firms with management ownership concentration between 10% and 30% 
and those belonging to industrial groups. However, in contrast, Khanna and Palepu 
(2000) contest that diversification may actually be more valuable in emerging 
markets than in more developed economies. Their thesis focuses on diversified 
business groups in India and argues that the larger diversified groups are in a better 
position to tap external capital. This study does offer some indirect support for the 
hypothesis that the value of diversification depends on the significant variables of the 
level of capital market development and integration.
A potential problem with the conclusions that have been discussed hitherto is that the 
variables of agency costs might be associated with ownership concentration. Agency 
problems can occur when the firm diversifies in order to benefit the manager or 
ultimate owner. This can lead to reduced corporate value in various ways. First, the 
overinvestment problem states that a discretionary allocation of resources aimed at 
negative investment options may lead to reduction in corporate value. The more 
diversified a corporation becomes, the more likely it can use its increased borrowing 
capability and free cash flow to over-invest in investment options with negative net 
present value.64 Second, the cross-subsidization problem states that in the event that 
resources are transferred between the different lines of business to support one with 
poor business performance, this cross-subsidization can delay the exit of the failing 
business segment and the corporate value will be reduced. If the failing business 
segment were to be managed independently, the segment cannot have a corporate 
value less than zero, but if the failing segment is part of the diversified corporation
63 Pooling together Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand.
64 Jensen and Meckling (1976). This issue is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.
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the exit of the failing segment is delayed and can only add negative value.65 Third, 
the information asymmetry cost states that if harmonious management should not be 
attained (as in the case of information asymmetry between the central manager and 
divisional resources), costs are incurred.66 Since information tends to be dispersed 
more in the centralised corporations than in diversified ones, costs of information 
asymmetry are more conspicuous in the diversified corporation. If costs of 
diversification should stem from the agency problem, corporations with a higher 
managerial equity ratio would have no incentive to diversify, but corporations with 
lower managerial equity ratio would push for corporate diversification, resulting in a 
reduction in corporate value (because the managers’ own private benefits would 
exceed the loss). Accordingly, corporations with a lower inside equity ratio will 
suffer a greater reduction in the firm value through diversification, but the 
corporations with a higher inside equity ratio will witness relatively lower reductions 
in the firm value due to non-negative effects.
Financial, legal and regulatory environments all influence the value of diversification 
according to Fauver et al (2007). Optimal organizational structure and corporate 
governance may differ significantly for firms operating in emerging markets in 
comparison to firms operating in more developed and integrated countries. They find 
a significant diversification discount in high-income countries that have well- 
developed and integrated capital markets. In contrast, they find that there is either no 
diversification discount or a diversification premium for the lower income and 
segmented countries. For such firms, benefits accrued from diversification tend to 
balance agency costs.
65 Berger and Ofek (1995).
66 Berger and Ofek (1995).
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3. Formulation of hypotheses for empirical analysis
3.1 Introduction
This section presents empirically testable hypotheses about the effect of ownership 
structure on the value of the firm and the level of corporate diversification. I examine 
whether firm diversification in Korean companies can be attributed to cash flow 
rights of the largest shareholder, control rights of the largest shareholder and 
divergence between the ultimate owner’s control rights and cash flow rights, caused 
by cross-shareholdings or stock pyramids. To test the hypotheses I follow the 
methods of Claessens et al (1999, 2002), Lins and Servaes (2002) and Fauver et al 
(2007).
3.2 Hypotheses on the effects of ownership structure and diversification on 
firm valuation
3.2.1 Hypothesis on the effect of corporate governance on levels of corporate 
diversification
As managerial ownership increases, the interests of managers and shareholders are 
better aligned; managers are less likely to pursue any policy that reduces firm value. 
If diversification reduces the wealth of the shareholder, then a negative correlation 
between the level of diversification and managerial ownership is expected, according 
to the agency cost hypothesis. The following hypothesis has been designed to 
investigate the variables affecting the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm diversification:
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Hypothesis 1: As the cash flow  rights o f the ultimate owner decreases, the level o f  
diversification increases. In contrast, as the control rights o f  the ultimate owner 
increases, diversification increases. 67
If the controlling shareholder uses the pyramid structure and cross-ownership to 
reinforce his control rights, then conflict arises in terms of cash flow rights versus 
control rights.68 As a result of this structure, the controlling shareholder tends to have 
higher control rights than cash flow rights. As this difference increases, the incentive 
for the controlling shareholder to exercise their control rights to pursue private 
interests becomes greater. Therefore, if diversification decreases the wealth of the 
shareholder or does not clearly lead to an increase in firm value, but is instead used to 
fund the controlling shareholder’s private interests, then, the level of diversification 
should increase in proportion to the widening gap between these two rights. The 
second hypothesis examines the relationship between the level of diversification and 
the difference between cash flow rights and voting rights of the ultimate owner:
Hypothesis 2: As the difference between cash flow  rights and voting rights increases, 
the level o f  diversification increases.
3.2.2 Hypothesis about the effect of corporate diversification on the value of 
the firm
Considering that ownership structure affects firm diversification, it is also likely to 
affect the value of a diversified firm. This may be particularly relevant if there is a
67 Claessens et al (2002, p.2742) and La Porta etal (1999) indicate the positive incentive effect related 
to the share of cash flow rights held by large shareholders and that the negative entrenchment effect 
relates to the share of control rights held by large shareholders.
68 La Porta et al (1999), Claessens et al (2002, p.2742), and see greater detail in Chapter 1.
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strong link between ownership concentration and firm diversification and if firm 
diversification has an impact on firm valuation.
Under the convergence-of-interest hypothesis,69 ultimate owners are more likely to 
make efficient choices with respect to firm diversification. Conversely, under the 
entrenchment hypothesis,70 with increasing managerial ownership, ultimate owners 
tend to act in the interest of their private benefits rather than for maximisation of firm 
value. If ultimate owners and their families use pyramid ownership structures to 
separate their control rights from the cash flow, minority shareholders are more likely 
to be exploited. Entrenched managers may choose to run a diversified firm for their 
own personal interest and benefit. As a consequence, companies with low cash flow 
rights of ultimate ownership or with a major divergence between control rights and 
cash flow rights are predicted to have severe loss of value due to diversification, 
while companies with high cash flow rights or low divergence between cash flow 
rights and control rights can expect non-negative effects on their value.
Hypothesis 3: Diversification is likely to decrease firm  value because managers or 
the ultimate owners are expected to pursue private benefits.
It has been suggested in section 2.3 that due to the greater efficiency of internal 
capital markets the benefit of diversification is to increase firm value. The superior 
allocation is permitted where resources can be allocated more efficiently than in the * 
external capital market.
69 Jensen and Meckling (1976) and greater detail in Chapter 1.
70 Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and greater detail in Chapter 1.
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Hypothesis 4: The level o f diversification is positively correlated to firm value when 
internal capital markets are more efficient than external ones.
Firm diversification appears to be more beneficial or at least less costly for firms that 
are headquartered in countries where capital markets are more segmented and less
71developed, and it is expensive to obtain external capital (Fauver et al, 2007). 
According to this argument, the value of diversification in Korean companies is 
expected to decline over time as capital markets become more developed and 
integrated.72
Hypothesis 5: The extent to which diversification affects the value o f a firm depends 
on the level o f  economic development.
4. Sample selection and data description
4.1 Sample selection and dependent variable
This study uses data for over 2,000 companies from the KIS-LINE database73 for 
Korean companies. The sample has been restricted to firms with sufficient segments 
of firm diversification level and financial data to construct empirical measures. Of the
71 Hubbard and Palia (1999) show the value of diversification in the United States during the 
conglomerate wave of the 1960s for this issue.
72 More detailed Appendix B in Chapter 2. Also Bekaert and Harvey’s (1995) measure captures the 
time-varying nature of integration, whereas Edison and Wamock’s (2001) measure provides 
information on the extent of initial openings as well as the evolution of liberalization over time.
73 The KIS-LINE of the Korea Investors’ Services was used to find financial information of public 
companies, to calculate the variables, and carry out the regression analysis. The KIS/FAS is the 
leading provider of credit related information and services for financial and commercial business 
transactions among corporations and consumer individuals in Korea.
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2,980 firms with complete ownership data, 2,187 firms have one or several years of 
the necessary segment and financial data. This sample consists of 9,559 firm-years 
spanning 1988 to 1997.1 define the diversification level of a firm as the number of 
industries in which the firm operates. This number count reasonably captures the 
breadth of the firm. 1892 companies are examined from the 2187 published firms in 
the Korea Stock Exchange during ten years from 1988 to 1997. Also I use the Korea 
fair Trade Commission (KFTC)’s annual report and Financial Supervisory 
Commission’s 1988-1997 guideline to identify whether firms are affiliated with 
chaebol or not.74
Both Tobin’s Q and excess value are measured for corporate valuation.
Tobin’s Q is the ratio between the market value of assets and its replacement value. 
The market to book value ratio (M/B, measured as the sum of market equity and 
book debt divided by book assets) is presented as the substitution variable for Tobin’s 
q ratio according to Chapter 1 and Chapter 2. The Tobin’s q ratio provides the 
opportunity to partially examine profit or loss that results due to diversification. If 
diversification has an influence on the value of a business division, the Tobin’s q 
ratio of diversified corporations may be greater or smaller than the sum of all q ratios 
of each business division (Lang and Stultz, 1994). Excess value of diversification 
(Excess) uses the assessment method of Berger and Ofek (1995). Excess value of 
diversification is defined as the log of the ratio between firm’s actual performance 
(true Q) and its imputed Q. Imputed Q is the asset weighted average of theoretical Q
74 KFTC legitimately defines a business group as “ a group of companies, more than 30 percent of 
whose shares are owned by some individuals or by companies controlled by those individuals” 
The KFTC identifies business groups and announces them every year.
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of each segment. Theoretical Q is the industry average using stand alone firms in 
same industry.75
In order to measure the level of corporate diversification, three types of substitutions 
are used: These three types are Herfindahl Index (HI), multi-segments (DIV_D) and 
the number of segments (SEG_D).
The Herfindahl Index (HI) is the main index for measuring the level of diversification 
of corporations. The Herfindahl Index becomes 1/N when the scope of all business 
divisions are identical, and is equal to 1 when it is a single business corporation. In 
the current study, HI is computed using the sales proportion of business divisions. In 
the case of Korean corporations, I use sales based HI because the sales scope by 
business divisions of independent corporations can be understood to a certain degree 
using disclosed material, but the scope of assets by business divisions is difficult to 
understand. The Multi-Segment (DIV D), following Lins and Servaes (2001), Fauver 
et al, (1998) and Claessens et al (1999,2002), classify firms as single-segment if at 
least 90 percent of their total sales are derived from one two-digit SIC segment. 
Firms are classified as multi-segment if they operate in more than one two-digit SIC 
industries and none of their two-digit SIC segments accounts for more than 90 
percent of total firm sales. Also, I measure a firm’s diversification level as the 
number of its segments (SEG NO) defined at the three-digit SIC level. The 
ownership structure is defined separately to examine the cash flow rights of large 
shareholder, control rights of large shareholder and the divergence between cash flow
75 Total corporate value is calculated by taking the sum of market value of common stock and book 
value o f total debt. Market value of common stock is calculated by multiplying the year end price per 
share by the number of shares outstanding, in the year o f analysis and the book value of debt is the 
amount of total debt recorded in the ledger at closing of accounts.
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rights and control rights of large shareholders. Comparisons are made between group 
affiliated firms and independent firms. The Group affiliated firms is used to reflect 
such traits as internal transactions among the 30 largest companies and examine cross 
funding, and financial benefits accruing to affiliates.
I use ownership structure to capture the degree of potential agency issues for each 
firm. Cash is defined as the cash flow rights of ultimate owner. Control is defined as 
the voting rights of the largest ultimate owner. CFCR is the defined as the difference 
between shares of the cash flow rights of ultimate owner and control (voting) rights 
of ultimate owner.76
4.2 Data description
Table 3-1 displays the relationship of the level of diversification to cash flow rights. 
Here, cash flow rights are negatively associated with the level of diversification. That 
is, overall, the lower the cash flow rights, the higher the diversification level. 
Conversely the higher the cash flow rights, the lower the diversification level. 
Looking at the period as a whole, where cash flow rights are less than 10%, the 
percentage of firms with more than two segments (DIV D) among the whole sample 
decreases from 76.7% to 41%. The Herfindal index (DIV_H) increases from 10% 
cash flow rights up to 50% level but it decreases again for cash flow rights over 
50%.
76 Ownership structure is consistent with chapter 1 and chapter 2
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The number of segments (SEG_NO) based on the 3-digit SIC standard decreased for 
cash flow rights between 2.17 and 1.48, suggesting that the lower the cash flow 
rights, the great the level of diversification. Nevertheless, when analyzing individual 
years, the data do not demonstrate consistent changes in diversification as cash flow 
rights decrease. In 1997, when cash flow rights are between 10% and 20%, 20% and 
30%, the diversifications levels show a momentary increase but shortly after, they 
decrease again. Similarly, in 1993, when cash flow rights are between 20% and 30%, 
the diversification levels show a slight increase but then they decreases again, 
suggesting that the diversification level and cash flow rights are not related by a 
simple negative relationship.
For the ultimate owners in Korea, the higher the cash flow rights, the more burden 
they experience for any given reduction in firm value. Unless diversification leads to 
a tangible increase in value, they would not adopt any diversification strategy. On the 
other hand, when they have lower cash flow rights, they tend to try to increase their 
own private interests such as power and prestige that they can capture by increasing 
the scale of firms through diversification.
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Table 3-1 Descriptive Statistics on the Relationship between the Cash Flow
Rights and Firm Diversification
0%<CA
SH<10%
10%<CA
SH<20%
20%<CA
SH<30%
30%<CA
SH<40%
40%<CA
SH<50%
50%<CA
SH
Total
year
No.firms 351 442 520 374 147 58
DIV_H 0.75 0.78 0.83 0.88 0.91 0.86
SEG_NO 2.17 1.94 1.90 1.48 1.49 1.60
DIV_D 76.7 65.4 58 48.6 41.2 41
1988
No.firms 21 21 40 19 12 9
DIV_H 0.82 0.73 0.86 0.90 0.85 0.95
SEG_NO 1.71 2.09 1.53 1.26 1.58 1.22
DIV_D 83.3 53.2 58 49.2 41.3 40.5
1990
No.firms 25 45 47 42 18 4
D I V H 0.81 0.75 0.81 0.83 0.91 0.87
SEG_NO 2.04 2.00 1.87 1.55 1.33 1.50
D I V D 64.8 63.7 53.8 50.7 41.3 40.6
1993
No.firms 38 54 61 42 17 10
DIV_H 0.72 0.81 0.80 0.86 0.91 0.88
SEG_NO 2.23 1.89 2.05 1.57 1.50 1.70
D I V D 77.6 70.4 62.3 48.5 43 42.5
1997
No.firms 46 48 59 43 23 3
DIV_H 0.76 0.76 0.81 0.90 0.92 0.78
SEG_NO 1.89 2.04 2.03 1.42 1.48 2
DIV_D 85.4 67.1 58.2 53.2 43.6 28.8
This table presents the mean diversification leve s of Korean irms across difference level of
ultimate owner’s the cash flow rights. The diversification level is measured by three 
methods: DIV_H is mean of Herfindal Index. The Herfindahl Index becomes 1/N when the 
scope of all business divisions are identical, and is equal to 1 when it is a single business 
corporation. SEG_NO is mean of the number of firm segments DIV_D is percentage of 
firms with multiple segments. This table present cut off 10% level of cash flow rights of 
ultimate owners (CASH). Total year is from 1988 to 1997.
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Table 3-2 Descriptive Statistics on the relationship between the Control
Rights and Firm Diversification.
0%<Con
<10%
10%<Con
<20%
20%<Con
<30%
30%<Con
<40%
40%<Con
<50%
50%<Con
Total
Year
No.firms 156 394 604 444 216 78
DIV_H 0.72 0.77 0.82 0.84 0.89 0.88
SEG_NO 2.15 2 2.1 1.61 1.65 1.60
DIV_D 0.74 0.77 0.82 0.80 0.88 0.87
1988
No.firms 9 21 40 27 14 11
D I V H 0.75 0.77 0.83 0.91 0.83 0.96
SEG_NO 1.89 2 1.62 1.33 1.57 1.18
DIV_D 0.73 56.5 0.83 0.81 0.87 0.88
1990
No.firms 8 40 57 47 22 7
DIV_H 0.76 0.80 0.79 0.81 0.89 0.86
SEGJSK) 2.25 1.73 2 1.66 1.5 1.71
D I V D 0.75 0.76 0.81 0.79 0.88 0.87
1993
No.firms 17 44 67 59 23 12
DIV_H 0.78 0.74 0.78 0.87 0.90 0.90
SEG_NO 2.12 2.02 2.21 1.60 1.52 1.58
D I V D 0.71 0.75 0.81 0.80 0.87 0.88
1997
No.firms 18 39 74 52 32 7
D I V H 0.68 0.74 0.82 0.86 0.90 0.88
SEG_NO 2.06 2.12 2.20 1.69 1.56 1.57
DIV_D 0.74 0.76 0.82 0.81 0.89 0.87
This table presents the mean diversification levels of Korean firms across difference level of 
the ultimate owner’s control rights. The diversification level is measured by three methods: 
DIV_H is mean of Herfindal Index. The Herfindahl Index becomes 1/N when the scope of all 
business divisions are identical, and is equal to 1 when it is a single business corporation. 
SEG_NO is mean of the number of firm segments DIV_D is percentage of firms with 
multiple segments. This table present cut off 10 % level of control rights of ultimate owners 
(CON). Total year is from 1988 to 1997.
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Table 3-2 shows the level of diversification for the different degrees of control 
rights77. Control rights are partially negatively related to the percentage of firms with 
multi-segments (DIV_D) and the number of segments (SEG_NO). That implies that 
the lower control rights, the higher the level of diversification. However, when the 
control right ranges from 20% to 40%, the level of diversification (SEG-NO or DIV- 
D) decreases slightly but after a while it begins to increase again. This suggests that 
the diversification level is not uniformly associated with control rights. In an 
experiment where the number of segments (SEG NO) and Herfindal index (DIV H) 
are employed as measures of diversification, similar results are found. The analysis 
of the whole period shows that the percentage of firms with more than two segments 
(DIV-D) increased from 74% for control rights of less than 10%, to 87% for control 
right of over 50%. The Herfindal index (DIV_H) increases from 72%, but begins to 
decrease again for the control rights over 50%. The number of segments increases 
from 2.15 to 1.60, indicating that the higher the control rights, the lower the 
diversification level. However, for the year 1993, when the control rights lie between 
20% and 30%, the diversification level moderately rises, but again falls, suggesting 
that the diversification level is not uniformly related to control rights.
Additionally I examine how Korean firms’ diversification patterns correlate with 
their ultimate owners’ control level, comparing between group members (top 30 
chaebol firms and Independent firms.
77 For examples and definitions, see Chapter 1 (Corporate Governance and Firm Value).
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Table 3- 3 Descriptive Statistics on the Diversification and Ultimate 
Ownership ________________________________ _____________
Control level All firms Group member firms Independent firms
Panel A : Average number of segment
10% 2.15 90 2.58 64 1.73
20% 2 198 2.37 196 1.62
30% 2.1 237 2.39 362 1.79
40% 1.61 141 1.66 300 1.55
50% 1.65 64 1.75 152 1.44
50% or above 1.60 22 1.68 56 1.52
Panel B: Fraction of firms 
with multiple segment
10% 0.74 90 0.64 64 0.83
20% 0.77 198 0.69 196 0.85
30% 0.82 237 0.76 362 0.85
40% 0.80 141 0.87 300 0.74
50% 0.88 64 0.87 152 0.90
50% or above 0.87 22 0.85 56 0.89
This table presents the mean diversification level of Korea firms across difference level of 
ultimate owners’ control. A comparison between multi- and single- segment firms is also 
presented. The diversification level is measured by the number of firms segment (Panel A) 
and a dummy variable equal to one if firm has multiple- segments, and otherwise zeros 
(Panel B). The control level is measured by the percentage of control rights of the firm’s 
largest ultimate owners. The ownership of group member firms and independent firms’ data 
are in 10 years (1988-1997)
As reported in Table 3-3, I report mean diversification statistics across different 
levels of ultimate owners’ control for widely-held firms, the average segment number 
is 1.85 (Panel A). Panel B reports the fraction of firms with multiple segments across 
control levels. The multi-segment fraction initially increase from 0.74 at the widely- 
held level to 0.82 at the 20% level, then begins to decrease and increase to 0.88 at the 
40% level. Group member firms are more diversification than independent firms.
The evidence presented by Tables 3-1 to Table 3-3 is consistent with agency cost (the 
expropriation hypothesis) with partial differences expressed by the ownership
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structure. The simple comparisons across control levels do not account, however, for 
the possibility of divergence between cash flow rights and control rights. If they 
exist, such divergence may explain the pattern of diversification.
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1 Test results of Hypotheses 1 on firm diversification and ownership 
structure of Korean companies
In order to analyse the relation between the ownership structure and diversification 
level, using panel data (1988-1997) of Korean firms, I estimate the interval of 
ownership structure (cash flow rights and control rights) according to the result 
reported in Chapter 1.
Ownership structure (cash flow rights and control rights) is regressed against the 
diversification level (number of firm segment).78 As reported in Table 3-4, in case of 
the number of firm segment (SEG_NO), for the intervals of cash flow rights more 
than 24%, the coefficient is negative. Here as cash flow rights increases, the level of 
diversification increases. For the intervals of cash flow rights between 14% and 24%, 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant. This result imply that the higher 
level of firm diversification is driven by firms with cash flow rights of ultimate 
owner range between 14% and 24%, where I find that the likelihood of being 
entrenched is highest and expropriation of minority shareholders. In chapter 1, the
78 This table use the Piecewise regression model is try to find structural break points to best 
fitness of the model or explanation for statistical significant through continuously simulation 
according to segments of cash flow rights and control rights in Chapter 1.
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ownership concentration level between 14 and 24 percent on firm value is negative 
and statistically significant.
Table 3-4 Regression between the Level of Diversification and Ultimate 
Ownership ___________________________________________________
SEG_NO
Cash flow rights 
Model (1) Model (2)
Control rights 
Model (3) Model (4)
Constant 1.9078***
(2 1 .8 8 )
-1.0716*
(-1.87)
01.7620**
(15.46)
-1.2260**
(-2.14)
OWN 1 -0.4358
(0.53)
-0.6200
(0.76)
1.0791
(1.14)
0.9530
( 1 .0 2 )
OWN 2 1.6646
(0 .0 2 1 )
1.5937**
(2.25)
-1.0836
(-1.37)
-1.1265
(-1.44)
OWN 3 -0.5071
(-1.32)
-0.3564
(-0.94)
-0.1306
(0.39)
0.0026
(0 .0 1 )
OWN 4 -1.9078*
(-1.80)
-1.0113*
(-1.84)
0.7167
(1.49)
0.8510*
(1.71)
PRO -0.7555***
(-3.02)
-0.7677***
(-3.07)
DRC -0.2092**
(-2.13)
-0.2031**
(-2.07)
SIZE 0.1322***
(6 .1 2 )
0.1382***
(6.42)
Adjust/ ? 2 0.0297 0.1352 0.0128 0.1313
1) The dependent variable (SEG_NO) in all models is the number of firm segment. 
Control variables are short-term profitability, operating income over sales (PRO), total 
debt to assets (DRC), and the natural logarithm of firm assets (SIZE).
2) Cash flow rights:
OW Nl= cash flow rights < 0.14 OWN2= 0.14 < cash flow rights^ 0.24 
OWN3= 0.24< cash flow rights < 0.50 OWN 4= 0.50 < cash flow rights
3) Control rights:
OW Nl= control rights< 0.15 OWN2= 0.15 < control rights< 0.24 
OWN3= 0.24< control rights < 0.50 OWN4= 0.50 < control rights
4) The total number of observation is based on data for 1892 from 1988 to 1997. The 
regressions are performed using a fixed- effects (time and industry) specification. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of significance: ***1%, 
**5%,*10%.
The related control rights and the level of firm diversification for the intervals of 
control rights less than 50% (OWN1-OWN3) is statistically insignificant. But for the
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intervals of control rights more than 50% (OWN4) in Model (4), the coefficient is 
positive and statistically significant. Especially high control level of ultimate owner 
implies that the opportunities and incentives for expropriation through diversification 
increases.79
5.2 Test results of Hypotheses 2 on the relation between the level of 
diversification and the divergence between the cash flow and control rights of 
ultimate owner.
These results in Hypothesis 2 are in line with the agency costs hypothesis. To 
examine the outcome of controlling other factors that can explain the negative 
relation between ownership percentage (divergence between cash flow rights and 
control rights) and . diversification level, I test with reference to diversification, 
suggesting that diversification is a means for the ultimate owners to expropriate 
wealth from minority shareholders. Greater divergence also implies that the 
opportunity and incentives for expropriation though diversification increases, because 
of the weaker link between firms’ performance and owners’ wealth. These 
conflicting interests become stronger at higher levels of control. Claessens et 
«/,(1999) find that larger divergence between control and cash flow rights is 
associated with an increase in diversification, especially at high control levels.
79 According to managerial entrenchment hypothesis, with increasing managerial equity 
ownership, the managers tend to act in the interest of their private benefits rather than for 
maximization of the firm value and accordingly the firm value will decline.
Table 3-5 Regression between the Level of Diversification and the Divergence 
between the Cash Flow and Control Rights of Ultimate Ownership_________
Model (1)
SEG NO 
Model (2) Model (3)
Constant ■ -0.0883 -0.0813 -0 . 1 2 2 0
(-0 .0 2 ) (-0.18) (-0.26)
CONTROL -0.0391 -0.4286
(-0 .2 0 ) (-1.96)
CASH/CONTROL -0.4341*** -0.4126*** -0.3716*
(-3.72) (-3.41) (-2.04)
(CASH/CONTROL)* -0.0816
HI (-1.43)
PRO -0.7514*** -0.7436** -0.9036***
(-3.02) (-2.98) (-3.58)
DRC -0.1919* -0.1921* -0.2160*
(-1.97) (-1.97) (-2.45)
Log(SIZE) 0.1281*** 0.1282*** 0.1286***
(5.96) (5.94) (5.60)
Adjusted/ ? 2 0.2094 0.2078 0.2032
The dependent variable (SEG_NO) in all models is the number of firm segment. The diversification on 
ownership structure model is based on data for 1892 from 1988 to 1997. The regressions are 
performed using a fixed- effects (time and industry) specification. The dependent variable is 
divergence between cash flow rights and control rights held by the largest shareholder (Cash/Control), 
is control rights minus cash flow rights and HI is a dummy variable indicating high control range. Hi 
equals one if control rights are greater than 30 percent, otherwise zero. CONTROL is the share of 
control rights held by ultimate owner. Control variables are short-term profitability, operating income 
over sales (PRO), total debt to assets (DRC), and the natural logarithm of firm assets (SIZE). Numbers 
in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level o f significance: ***1%, **5%,* 10%.
As shown in Table 3-5, I perform regression analysis using fixed effects and 
employing the number of segments as a measure of the diversification level 
(dependent variable). As a result, the estimated coefficient for CASH/CONTROL is 
negative and significant at the one-percent level, suggesting that a lower divergence 
of cash flows and control rights is associated with less diversification.
This result is consistent with the agency cost hypothesis that the ultimate owners with 
large divergence between cash flow rights and control rights seek a diversification 
strategy to satisfy their own private interest and expropriate to minority shareholders. 
In model (3) in Table 3-5, the effects of divergence at higher levels of control rights
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are tested. I define a dummy variable HI equal to 1 if the owner’s control is greater 
than the sample median, and otherwise 0. When HI is defined above the median level 
(model (3)), the coefficient of CASH/CONTROL is negative and significant but the 
interaction term (CASH/CONTROL)*HI is negative and statistically insignificant.80
Table 3-6 Regression between the Level of Diversification and Ultimate 
Ownership in group-affiliated firms and independent firms (1988-1997)
GROUP-AFFILIATED 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
INDEPENDENT 
Model (5) Model (6 )
Constant 0.2053
(0.23)
0.0699
(0.07)
0.4673
(0.55)
0.2819
(0.06)
0.6111
(0.17)
0.1924
(0.03)
CONTROL 0.4940
(0.13)
0.7517
(0.18)
-0.4015
(-0.18)
0.2947
(0 .1 0 )
CASH/CON
TROL
-0.5551**
(-2 .1 2 )
-0.5597*
(-1.98)
-0.4883*
(-1.82)
-0.4296
(0.24)
0.3948
(0 .2 1 )
0.3161
(0.25)
(CASH/CON
TROL)*HI
-0.6512***
(4.37)
0.0078
(0 .0 1 )
PRO -0.1106**
(-2.18)
-0.1303**
(-2 .2 1 )
-0.2179**
(-0 .2 2 )
0.0914
(0.19)
0.0846
(0.13)
-0.1038
(-0.25)
DRC 0.0304
(0.09)
0.0397
(0 .1 2 )
0.6413
(0.23)
-0.2097
(-0.23)
-0.2147
(-0.24)
0.0854
(0.08)
SIZE 0.1203**
(2.08)
0.0699**
(2.07)
0.1849***
(3.27)
0.1314***
(2.57)
0.1242***
(2.53)
0.0821***
(2.32)
R 2 0.0753 0.0385 0.0319 0.0593 0.0631 0.0218
The dependent variable (SEG_NO) in a 1 models is t le number of firm segment. The
diversification on ownership structure model is comparing between group affiliated firms 
(GROUP-AFFILIATED) and independent firms (INDEPENDENT), based on data for 1892 
from 1988 to 1997. The regressions are performed using a fixed- effects (time and industry) 
specification. The dependent variable is divergence between cash flow rights and control 
rights held by the largest shareholder (Cash/Control), is control rights minus cash flow rights 
and Hi is a dummy variable indicating high control range. HI equals one if control rights are 
greater than the median of samples, otherwise zero. CONTOL is the share of control rights 
held by ultimate owner. Control variables are short-term profitability, operating income over 
sales (PRO), total debt to assets (DRC), and the natural logarithm of firm assets (SIZE). 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of significance: ***1%, 
**5%,*10%.
80 Alterably, I test the (CASH/CONTROL) *HI ,Hi equals one if control rights are greater than 
30 percent, otherwise zero, consistent with Claessens et al, (1999).It is the same result that 
(CASH/CONTROL) *HI is negative and insignificant.
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As reported Table 3-6, comparing between group affiliated firms (GROUP- 
AFFILIATED) and independent firms (INDEPENDENT) in order to examine the 
effect of cash-control rights divergence separately for each class of firms. 
CASH/CONTROL for group affiliated firms are negatively related and statistically 
significant. But CASH/CONTROL for independent firms are statistically 
insignificant.
Comparing model (3) and model (6) in Table 3-6, the coefficient of 
(CASH/CONTROL)*HI is negative and statistically significant for the affiliated and 
the coefficient of (CASH/CONTROL) *HI is statistically insignificant for the 
independent firms. The group affiliated firms, the evidence from model (1) and 
model (3) is consistent with the notion that ultimate owners use diversification to 
accrue private gains at the cost of minority shareholders. In chapter 1, I test the 
relationship between firm valuation and ownership structure in Korean firms and find 
that divergence between cash flow rights and control rights of ultimate owner is 
related to the agency cost or expropriation for minority shareholders.
174
5.3 The evidence on firm diversification and firm valuation of Korean 
Companies
5.3.1 The test result of Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 on firm diversification 
and firm valuation of Korean Companies
Here Korean firms’ diversification patterns will be examined and the extent to which 
they are related to firm valuation. Firm value will be assumed to be having a negative 
effect on the level of firm diversification. It will be seen as the significant variable for 
agency cost as suggested by hypothesis 3. The efficiency of internal markets will also 
be examined to see the extent to which firm value and diversification are positively 
related (hypothesis 4). I estimated both Tobin’s Q model (Tobin’s Q) and excess 
value model (Excess) using the valuation approach proposed by Berger and Ofek 
(1995), on the diversification level (SEG_NO, DIV_H, DIV_D). In models (1) and 
(4) in Table 3-7, SEG_NO is the number of firm segments. In models (2) and (5), 
DIV H is Herfindal Index. In models (3) and (6), DIV_D is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the firm has, a multiple number of segments, and zero if otherwise. Control 
variables are total debt to assets (DRC), advertisement to assets (ADR), research and 
development (RD), capital expenditure to assets (CES) and the natural logarithm of 
firm assets of (SIZE).81
81 These variables are consistent with Chapter 1.
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Table 3-7 Regression between the Level of Diversification and Firm
Tobin’s Q 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Excess
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6 )
Constant 1.0416***
(6.54)
1 .0 1 1 2 **
(6.30)
1.38***
(7.89)
0.1528*
(1.54)
0.4220*
(1.94)
0.3945*
(1.49)
SEG_NO -0.0171*
(-1.81)
-0.0097
(-1.69)
DIV_H 0.0369
(0.19)
0.0637*
(1.94)
DIV_D -0 .1 0 ***
(4.09)
-0.0468*
(1.81)
DRC 0.697***
(19.24)
0.7046***
(18.64)
0.7277**
(19.12)
0.2241***
(9.67)
0.0993**
(3.08)
0.0024
(0.04)
RD 7.2829***
(5.97)
7.4043***
(6.08)
7.8024***
(7.02)
0.8511
( 1 .1 2 )
1.225
(1.58)
3.4246**
(2 .0 1 )
ADR -0.4890
(-0.32)
-0.4780
(-0.27)
-0.5328
(-0.31)
-3.5723***
(-3.33)
-3.5781***
(-3.25)
-3.9971***
(-3.40)
CES 0.0228**
(2.24)
0.0227**
(2.23)
0.0230**
(2.25)
0.0500**
(2.96)
0.0408**
(2.35)
-0.0017
(0 . 1 2 )
SIZE -0.473***
(-5.65)
-0.0451**
(-5.42)
-0.0401**
(-5.38)
-0.0160**
(-3.05)
-0.0146**
(-2.73)
-0.0079
(0.500)
R 2 0.4019 0.4180 0.3515 0.2418 0.2770 0.2079
This table report the OLS regression with time and industry effects result of the relations 
between the Korean firms’ diversification levels and their performance in period of 10 years 
(1988-1997). The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q, from model (1) to model (3) and 
Excess value, from model (4) to model (6 ). The diversification level is measured by three 
methods: DIVJH is mean of Herfindal Index. The Herfindahl Index becomes 1/N when the 
scope of all business divisions are identical, and is equal to 1 when it is a single business 
corporation. SEG_NO is mean of the number of firm segments DIV_D is Percentage of firms 
with multiple segments. Control variables are total debt to assets (DRC), advertisement to 
assets (ADR), R&D (RD), capital expenditure to assets (CES) and the natural logarithm of 
firm assets (SIZE). Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of 
significance: ***1%; **5%; *10%.
Table 3-7 presents the results of the regression analysis which supports hypothesis 3, 
hat the value of the firm is negatively related to the degree of diversification level in 
Korean companies. Regarding the results of “Excess”, the estimated coefficients of 
DIV_D is negative and statistically significant. DIV H shows a positive coefficient, 
which is significant at the ten-percent level, suggesting that diversification by Korean 
firms is, on average, associated with value discounts. When diversification level
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(DIV_D) is measured by the multi-segment dummy variable, this result is similar to 
Claessens et al (1999). As present in the Tobin’s Q model, the estimated coefficient 
of the multi-segment dummy variable (DIV_D) is negative and significant at the 1% 
level. The magnitude of the discount is comparable to those reported in prior studies 
(Lins and Servaes 1998, and Claessens et al 1998). Therefore, I find support for the 
agency cost hypothesis (hypothesis 3) but not for the efficient internal capital markets 
hypothesis (hypothesis 4).
I next investigate whether Korean firms’ diversification patterns are related to the 
firm valuation between group affiliated firms and independent firms.
One cause behind the high proportion of business groups in Korea or East Asia is the 
creation of internal factor markets for capital (Coase 1973, Williamson 1985, 
Claessens et al 1999, Khanna and Palepu 2000). Following this argument, group 
affiliation of firms could be a substitute for firm-level diversification in creating 
internal capital markets.
Table 3-8 Regression between the Level of Diversification and Firm 
Valuation of Group Affiliated Firms in Korea____________ (1988-1997)
Tobin’s Q 
Model (1 Model (2) Model (3)
Excess
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6 )
Constant 0.6636**
(3.12)
0.6465**
(3.04)
0.6454**
(3.04)
0.0498
(0.38)
-1.0801**
(-2.17)
0.0271
(0 .2 1 )
SEG_NO 0.0240
(1.53)
-0.01725*
(1.81)
DIV_H -2.8102
(0.14)
0.0976**
(2.17)
DIV_D 0.0457
(1.53)
-0.0025
(-1.23)
DRC 0.7422***
(7.15)
0.7368***
(7.06)
0.7328***
(6.96)
0.2130***
(8.05)
0.2103***
(7.93)
0.2198***
(8.49)
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RD 6.8894***
(3.67)
7.0189***
(3.73)
6.9777***
(3.72)
0.6630
(0.55)
0.6890
(0.57)
0.5920
(0.49)
ADR -1.5586
(-0.70)
-1.5379
(-0.69)
-1.4337
(-0.64)
-4.7906***
(-3.48)
-4.7858***
(-3.48)
-4.8927***
(-3.55)
CES 0.0197
(1.75)
0 . 0 2 0 0
(1.77)
0 . 0 2 0 1
(1.78)
0.0470**
(2.08)
0.0496**
(2.19)
0.0493**
(2.18)
SIZE -0.0284**
(2.47)
-0.0252**
(2.23)
-0.0285**
(2.48)
-0.0089
(1.25)
-0.0091
(1.29)
-0.0094
(1.32)
R 2 0.2993 0.3057 0.3063 0.2249 0.2127 0.2247
This table report the OLS regression with time and industry effects result of the relations 
between the Korean firms’ diversification levels and their performance in independent firm 
in period of 10 years (1988-1997). The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q, from model (1) to 
model (3) and Excess value, from model (4) to model (6 ). The diversification level is 
measured by three methods: DIV_H is mean of Herfindal Index. The Herfindahl Index 
becomes 1/N when the scope of all business divisions are identical, and is equal to 1 when it 
is a single business corporation. SEG_NO is mean of the number of firm segments DIV_D is 
Percentage of firms with multiple segments. Control variables are total debt to assets (DRC), 
advertisement to assets (ADR), R&D (RD), capital expenditure to assets (CES) and the 
natural logarithm of firm assets (SIZE). The inclusion of the latter five variables is to control 
for the effects of short-term profitability, leverage, advertisement, investment and firm size 
on firm value. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of 
significance: ***1%;**5%;*10%
As reported in Table 3-8, the results indicate that diversification is largely the result 
of group-affiliated firms. Initially I focus on the results of “Excess”. The estimated 
coefficients for group-affiliated firms are negative and are statistically significant in 
model (4) and (5). In contrast, as reported in Table 3-9, the results indicate that the 
independent firms are diversification premiums or no diversification discount. With 
respect to the result of both “Excess” and Tobin’s Q, the estimated coefficients of
SEG_NO and DIVJH are both statistically insignificant. When diversification level
1 ■
(DIVJD) is measured by the multi-segment dummy variable, DIV_D is positive and 
statistically significant. Suggesting that diversification by independent firms is, on 
average, creating the internal capital market or not relating expropriation for minority 
shareholders.
Table 3-9 Regression between the Level of Diversification and Firm 
Valuation of Independent Firms in Korea (1988-1997)
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ITobin’s Q 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Excess
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6 )
Constant 2.0591***
(8.87)
2.0988***
(8.43)
2.0009***
(8.67)
0.4858**
(3.08)
0.5386***
(3.23)
0.3327**
(2.14)
SEG_NO -0.0172
(-1.60)
-0.0045
(-0.64)
DIV_H -0.1181
(-1.65)
-0.0413
(-0 .8 8 )
D I V D 0 .1 0 2 2 ***
(3.21)
0.0583*
(1.85)
DRC -0 . 1 0 0 1
(1.44)
-0.0494
(0.71)
-0.0909
(1.31)
-0.0171
(0.37)
-0.0180
(0.39)
0.2849***
(4.86)
RD 8.7980***
(5.59)
8.7613***
(5.91)
8.9458***
(6.09)
1.5091
(1.55)
1.4034
(1.44)
1.1744
(1.24)
ADR 0.18451
(0.07)
0.2704
(0 .1 0 )
-0.0650
(0 .0 2 )
-1.8309
(-1 .0 2 )
-1.9764
(-1 .1 0 )
-1.5684
(-0.89)
CES -0.0199
(-0.51)
-0.0242
(-0.62)
-0.0209
(-0.54)
0.0412
(1.59)
0.0422
(1.63)
0.0508**
(2 .0 0 )
Size -0.0723***
(-6.14)
-0.0716***
(-6 . 1 0 )
-0.0756***
(-6,44)
-0.0250**
(-3,13)
-0.0265**
(-3.33)
-0.0321**
(-4.07)
R 2 0.0384 0.0394 0.0174 0.0124 0.01297 0.1266
This table report the OLS regression with time and industry effects result of the relations 
between the Korean firms’ diversification levels and their performance in group affiliated 
firm in period of 10 years (1988-1997). The dependent variables are Tobin’s Q, from model 
(1) to model (3) and Excess value, from model (4) to model (6 ). The diversification level is 
measured by three methods: DIV_H is mean of Herfindal Index. The Herfindahl Index 
becomes 1/N when the scope of all business divisions are identical, and is equal to 1 when it 
is a single business corporation. SEG_NO is mean of the number of firm segments DIV_D 
is Percentage of firms with multiple segments. Control variables are total debt to assets 
(DRC), advertisement to assets (ADR), R&D (RD), capital expenditure to assets (CES) and 
the natural logarithm of firm assets (SIZE). The inclusion of the latter five variables is to 
control for the effects of short-term profitability, leverage, advertisement, investment and 
firm size on firm value. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of 
significance: ***1%;**5%;*10%.
The results indicate that group-affiliated firms tend to have a diversification discount. 
Those affiliated with the business groups have a poorer diversification performance 
in comparison to independent firms. Group affiliated firms are driven less by the 
ultimate owner’s aim for an efficient internal market but by the external capital 
market. This is consistent with the notion that group affiliated firms tend to use 
diversification to accrue private gains at of the cost of the minority shareholders. In
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contrast, Independent firms show either no diversification discount or a 
diversification premium. The benefits of diversification for such firms appear to 
balance and offset agency costs of diversification. Therefore, this data supports the 
expropriation hypothesis (hypothesis 3) but does not lend support to the efficient 
internal capital markets hypothesis (hypothesis 4) for group affiliated firms. 
However, it shows the opposite result for the independent firms.
5.3.2 The test results of Hypotheses 5 on the relation between the level of 
diversification and firm Valuation of Korean Companies.
As shown above, there is variable support for the expropriation and the efficient 
internal capital markets hypotheses. In particular it is not clear why independent 
firms demonstrate a positive correlation between diversification and firm value. 
Claessens et al (1999,2002), Lins and Servaes (2002) argue that the internal capital 
market hypothesis would suggest diversification to show greater benefit in less 
developed economies. External markets are subject to more distortions and hence the 
risks render them more costly. Such factors might influence results as the prevalence 
of the diversification discount might be stronger in more developed capital markets. 
Claessens et al (1999,2002) find that group-affiliated firms contribute positively to 
diversification performance than independent firms in less developed economies. 
Lins and Servaes (2002) show in their research that a diversification discount was 
statistically significant on a country by country basis. Fauver et al (2007) find a 
significant diversification discount among high-income countries with well- 
developed and integrated capital markets. In contrast, for the lower income and
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segmented countries, their findings are reversed and they discern either no 
diversification discount or even a diversification premium.82
I show in Chapter 2 that the capital market opening and financial liberalization 
process for the Korean economy developed over time during the sample period from 
1988-1997.83 Therefore, I directly investigate the link between the value of firm 
diversification and internal capital market according to economic and capital market 
development to further examine Hypothesis 4. I examine how the level of capital 
market development affects the diversification performance of group-affiliated and 
independent firms. As before, I estimate both Tobin’s Q and Excess Tobin’s Q on 
level of diversification in group-affiliated and independent firms. Claessens et al 
(1999) and Fauver et al (2007) have used per-capita GNP and legal origin indicator 
variables as proxies for capital market development and the legal environment.
In this study, I investigate how the level of capital market development (per-capita 
GNP and financial liberalization)84 affects the diversification performance of group- 
affiliated and independent firms. I again control for the effects of total debt to assets
82Fauver et al (2007) use data from more than 8,000 firms from 35 countries over a period of five 
years from 1991 to 1995 to test the value of diversification is related to the degree of country’s capital 
market development, integration, and legal system. However it is not clear for Korean case because it 
is included as an Upper-middle income category with a German-origin legal system. Capital market 
integration show an average intensity of 1.00, which are same as most developed countries (USA, UK, 
Germany, Switzerland etc.).
83 More detailed information contained in appendix B in Chapter 2. Also Bekaert and Harvey’s 
(1995) measure captures the time-varying nature of integration, whereas Edison and Wamock’s 
(2003) measure provides information on the extent of initial openings as well as the evolution of
liberalization over time.
84 GNP Per Capita for Korea (Source : World Bank official communication; International Financial 
Statistics. Unit: US$) ________       _^__
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
GNP Per 
Capita
4279 5199 5875 6752 7003 7508 8505 10056 10553 9507
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(DRC), advertisement to assets (ADR), R&D (RD), capital expenditure to assets 
(CES) and the natural logarithm of firm assets (SIZE).
Table 3-10 Regression between the Level of Diversification and Firm 
Valuation of Korean Companies in 1997 ____________________
Tobin’s Q 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Excess
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6 )
SEG_NO -0.014
(-1.40)
-0 . 1
(-0.44)
D I V H 0.06
(1.34)
0.05
(0.41)
D I V D -0.05**
(-1.90)
r-~°© 
—‘ 
■ 
i
R 2 0.5864 0.5873 0.5903 0.2675 0.2448 0.2884
Affiliated Firms
SEG_NO -0 . 0 2
(-1.04)
-0 . 0 0
(-0.08)
D I V H 0.13
(1.32)
0.03
(0.31)
DIV_D -0.09**
(-2 .0 0 )
-0.50*
(-1.97)
R 2 0.1317 0.1381 0.1557 0.0874 0.0884 0.1081
Independent Firms
SEG_NO -0 . 0 2
(-0.90)
-0.016
(-0 .8 6 )
D I V H 0.18*
( 1 .8 8 )
0.17*
(1.82)
D I V D -0.04
(-1.07)
-0.06
(-1.51)
R 2 0.4181 0.4630 0.4198 0.1126 0.1816 0.1242
This table report the OLS regression with time and industry effects result of the relations 
between the Korean firms’ diversification levels and their performance in 1997. The 
dependent variables are Tobin’s Q, from model (1) to model (3) and Excess value, from 
model (4) to model (6 ). The diversification level is measured by three methods: DIV_H is 
mean of Herfmdal Index. The Herfindahl Index becomes 1/N when the scope of all business 
divisions are identical, and is equal to 1 when it is a single business corporation. SEG_NO is 
mean of the number of firm segments DIV_D is Percentage of firms with multiple 
segments. Control variables are total debt to assets (DRC), advertisement to assets (ADR), 
R&D (RD), capital expenditure to assets (CES) and the natural logarithm of firm assets 
(SIZE). The inclusion of the latter five variables is to control for the effects of short-term 
profitability, leverage, advertisement, investment and firm size on firm value. But this table 
does not present for control variable. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics Asterisks denote 
the level of significance: ***1%;**5%;*10%.
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The results of the comparison between year 1989 and 1997 are presented in Table 3- 
10 and Table 3-11. As reported in Table 3-10, regression between the level of 
diversification and firm valuation of Korean Companies in 1997, the estimated 
coefficients for group-affiliated firms are both negative and statistically significant in 
model (3) and (6). The value of diversification for Independent firms is negative and 
statistically significant in model (2) and (5).
Table 3-11 Regression between the Level of Diversification and Firm 
Valuation of Korean Companies in 1989 ____________________
Tobin’s Q 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Excess
Model (4) Model (5) Model (6)
SEG_NO -0.01
(-0.26)
-0.03*
(-1.94)
D I V H -2.28
(-1-19)
1.38
(1.15)
D I V D 0.002
(0.23)
-0.019
(-0.73)
R 2 0.2283 0.2358 0.2133 0.2292 0.2159 0.2109
Affiliated 7irms
SE GNO -0.01
(-0.36)
-0.03*
(1.85)
D I V H 0.01
(0.08)
0.10
(1.25)
D I V D -0.01
(0.18)
-0.08
(-1.96)
R 2 0.4230 0.4216 0.4219 0.2879 0.2597 0.2935
Independent Firms
S E GNO -0.00
(-0.04)
-0.01
(0.62)
D I V H -2.34**
(-2.10)
1.38
(1.09)
D I V D 0.01
(0.03)
0.02
(0.50)
R 2 0.1250 0.1376 0.1250 0.1545 0.1630 0.1531
This table report the OLS regression with time and industry effects result of the relations 
between the Korean firms’ diversification levels and their performance in 1989. The
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dependent variables are Tobin’s Q, from model (1) to model (3) and Excess value, from 
model (4) to model (6 ). The diversification level is measured by three methods: DIV_H is 
mean of Herfindal Index. The Herfindahl Index becomes 1/N when the scope of all business 
divisions are identical, and is equal to 1 when it is a single business corporation. SEG_NQ is 
mean of the number of firm segments DIV_D is Percentage of firms with multiple 
segments. Control variables are total debt to assets (DRC), advertisement to assets (ADR), 
R&D (RD), capital expenditure to assets (CES) and the natural logarithm of firm assets 
(SIZE). The inclusion of the latter five variables is to control for the effects of short-term 
profitability, leverage, advertisement, investment and firm size on firm value. But this table 
does not present for control variable. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics Asterisks denote 
the level of significance: ***1%;**5%;*10%.
In contrast, as reported in Table 3-11, results indicate that the independent firms have 
diversification premiums or at least accrue no diversification discount. With respect 
to the result of both Excess and Tobin’s Q, the estimated coefficients of SEG_NO 
and DIV_D are both statistically insignificant. When diversification level (DIV_H) is 
measured by the Herfindal index, DIV_H is negative and statistically significant. 
This suggests that diversification by independent firms is creating the internal capital 
market, or not related to expropriation of minority shareholders in 1989. The results 
indicate that diversification is attributable to group-affiliated firms in 1989; however, 
the diversification discount is weaker than the result for 1997.
These results imply diversification has a negative effect on firm value, where this 
relationship is affected by capital market and economic development. Agency 
problems of group affiliated firms are responsible for firms maintaining 
diversification strategies. For independent firms, I find that there is either no 
diversification discount or a diversification premium when capital markets are less 
developed based on 1989 data. However for these firms, the benefits of 
diversification appear to offset the agency costs of diversification in under more 
developed capital markets, based on 1997 data.
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5.4 Simultaneous equation regression analysis on ownership structure, 
diversification and corporate valuation
So far it has been assumed that diversification policies and ownership structures are 
exogenous variables and analysis has focused on their influence on firm valuation. 
Here I combine the results and models by taking into account firm ownership 
structure and its diversification policies while correlating the decision-making and 
firm valuation. This is implemented using a two simultaneous equation model. The 
analyses in section 5.1-5.3 included assumptions that the descriptive variables in the 
model were exogenous by applying the normal ordinary least squares methods 
(OLS). This ignored or glossed over the fact that the determination of many of these 
variables is simultaneous. As a result, a model that takes the correlation between 
variables into account is therefore required. One significant problem of applying the 
OLS method to a structural model is the point that simultaneous equation biases 
occur. This study uses a two-stage least squares (2SLS) in order to correct for this 
type of problem. To address the potential endogenous effect, I estimate a 
simultaneous equations system of ownership structure, level of diversification, and 
corporate value using the two-stage least squares (2SLS). Using the same data as in 
section 5.1-5.4 as a basis I estimate the following simultaneous equation system:
Ownership Structure = FA (Firm value, Investment, Firm profit, Volatility of 
Earnings, Diversification, Asset Size) (1 -1)
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Firm Value=FB (Ultimate Ownership, Diversification, Investment, Financial 
leverage, Asset Size) (1-2)
Firm Diversification=FC (Ultimate Ownership, Firm value, Firm Profit, Financial 
leverage, Asset Size) (1-3)
Table 3-12 Simultaneous Regression analysis of the Firm value, 
Diversification, and Divergence between Control rights and Cash flow rights
(1988-1997)
Ownership Firm value Diversification
CONS 1.15*** -3.18 -1.42
(6.91) (-1.38) (-0.74)
VALUE 0.03 1.62
(1.49) (0.74)
RISK 0.129
(0.41)
CRCFR 3.20* -0.56**
(1.73) (-2.53)
CES -0.38 3.13***
(-0.41) (3.26)
PRO I 9 9 ** -0.43
(2.43) (-0.38)
DIV -0.04 -0.08*
(-0.42) (-1.94)
DRC 0 .6 8 *** -0.07
(3.37) (0.90)
SIZE . -0.03* -0.13 0.19**
(-1.80) (-0.19) (2.04)
R 2 0.0558 0.0119 0 . 0 1 0 0
This table present simultaneous equation analysis of ultimate ownership, firm value, and 
diversification 1892 published Korean firms froml988 to 1997. Ultimate ownership 
(CRCFR) is measured as divergence between cash flow rights and control rights of largest 
shareholder. Level of diversification (DIV) measures number of segment. Firm value is 
measured as Tobin’s Q. Firm value or investment opportunity (VALUE), standard deviation 
of profit (RISK), Capital expenditure ratio (CES), operating income over sales (PRO), Debt 
ratio (DRC) and Firm size (SIZE) and Firm age (AGE) are included as control variable. The 
regressions are performed using a fixed- effects with time and industry specification. 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Asterisks denote the level of significance: ***1%, 
**5%,*10%.
186
As reported in Table 3-12, corporate value and diversifications are not an important 
determinant of divergence between the cash flow rights and control rights of ultimate 
ownership. The divergence between control rights and cash flow rights affects both 
firm value and firm diversification; a finding that is similar to that using the OLS 
corporate value regression result in chapter 1. The regression results indicate that the 
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights negatively affect 
diversification. Thus, divergence between control rights and cash flow rights affects 
the diversification, which in turn affects the corporate value yet the corporate value 
does not affect the ownership structure.
6. Conclusion
I have examined empirically the relationship between the ownership structure and 
firm diversification, addressing issues arising from the agency problems and the 
relationship between firm diversification and valuation in Korea 1988 to 1997.
The results demonstrate that the relationship between the insider ownership and the 
level of firm diversification is non-linear. In particular, the divergence between the 
cash flow rights and the control rights is positive. Stockholders are divided into two 
groups: an inside shareholder (ultimate owner) who manages the firm and has 
exclusive voting rights; and outside shareholders (minority shareholder) who have no 
voting rights in firm policy. Both classes of security holders are entitled to the same
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dividends per share. The inside shareholders, however, are able to augment the 
stream of cash flow by consuming additional non-marketable benefits.
Secondly, the insider ownership may affect the valuation consequence of 
diversification. If value-reducing diversification stems from agency problems, firms 
with high managerial ownership are less likely to diversify. If the shareholder cost of 
diversification exceeds its benefits, firms with low managerial ownership may engage 
in value-reducing diversification because managers derive private benefits that 
exceed their private costs. On average, I would then expect to observe negative 
valuation consequences from diversification in lower ownership firms, and non­
negative effects in higher ownership firms.
I further compare the diversification patterns and performance between group 
affiliated and independent firms. The analysis indicates that group-affiliated firms’ 
diversification performance is poorer than that of independent firms. Group-affiliated 
firms are more likely to diversify than independent firms. Diversification discounts 
reported for the whole sample can be attributed to group-affiliated firms. This is in 
part because group affiliation amplifies the negative effects of firm-level 
diversification on firm valuation. I find that the benefits of diversification for 
independent firms appear to offset the agency costs of diversification in less 
developed capital markets and economies.
Finally, using the method of simultaneous equation regression, I find the divergence 
between control rights and cash flow affects both the firm diversification and value.
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Firm diversification affects directly firm value, but firm value does not affect the 
ownership structure.
Overall, these findings suggest that (i) excessively diversified ownership can reduce 
firm value; (ii) agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining diversification 
strategies; and (iii) group affiliated firms have a greater agency cost problem which 
exceeds the benefits of creating a internal capital market in both 1989 and 1997. 
However, diversification for independent firms created an advantage in terms of 
internal capital markets in 1989.
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